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Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the 
New Economy 
Christopher S. Yoo† 
 Recent mergers and academic commentary have placed renewed 
focus on what has long been one of the central issues in media policy:  
whether media conglomerates can use vertical integration to harm 
competition. This Article seeks to move past previous studies, which have 
explored limited aspects of this issue, and apply the full sweep of modern 
economic theory to evaluate the regulation of vertical integration in 
media-related industries. It does so initially by applying the basic static 
efficiency analyses of vertical integration developed under the Chicago 
and post-Chicago Schools of antitrust law and economics to three 
industries: broadcasting, cable television, and cable modem systems. An 
empirical analysis reveals that the structural preconditions recognized by 
both Schools as necessary for vertical integration to harm competition do 
not exist in any of these industries. In addition, the cost structure of these 
industries suggests that vertical integration may well lead to efficiencies 
sufficient to justify allowing such integration to occur. 
 A dynamic efficiency analysis provides additional reasons for 
believing that attempts to regulate vertical integration in these industries 
are misguided. Growing reliance on compelled access to redress the 
problems purportedly caused by vertical integration threatens to dampen 
investment incentives in technologically dynamic industries in which such 
incentives are particularly important. Not only does forcing a monopolist 
to share an input deviate from the system of well-defined property rights 
needed to promote efficient levels of investment, it also deprives new 
entrants seeking to compete directly with the supposed monopoly 
bottleneck of their natural strategic partners. The Article also engages a 
complex web of arguments involving the extent to which technological 
innovation is affected by market concentration, standardization, and 
network externalities. A close review of the economic literature reveals 
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that the relationship between these factors is too ambiguous to support the 
type of simple policy inference needed to prohibit vertical integration as a 
regulatory matter. The Article concludes with an analysis of the 
intellectual and institutional obstacles for adopting a more integrated 
economic approach to vertical integration in these industries. 
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Introduction 
 
 The megamerger between America Online and Time Warner almost 
unquestionably represented a watershed moment in business history. Not 
only did it represent the largest merger the world had seen to date,1 the 
combination of Internet content and transmission under the same corporate 
umbrella threw the already turbulent telecommunications industry into 
further turmoil. The merger forced all industry players to reevaluate their 
business plans and prompted speculation about what other mergers might 
follow.2  
 As dramatic as the merger’s impact on the business environment was, 
the merger’s impact on the regulatory environment may have been even 
greater in that it breathed new life into one of the more hotly debated 
issues in media policy: “open access” to high-speed broadband systems.3 
Until recently, most individuals connected to the Internet via narrowband 
technologies, which employ conventional telephone lines to convey 
Internet content at speeds no greater than fifty-six thousand bits per second 
(56 kbps). The last several years have witnessed the arrival of broadband 
services, which are mainly provided via cable television systems through 
cable modems and or via a special telephone-based technology known as 
digital subscriber lines (“DSL”). These new means of transmission 
represent a major technological leap forward, allowing users to receive 
                                                                                                                         
 1 At the time the deal was announced, it was valued at over $150 billion. Martin Peers et 
al., Media Blitz: AOL, Time Warner Leap Borders to Plan a Mammoth Merger, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 
2000, at A1. By the time the merger was consummated, its value had shrunk to around $100 billion, 
Jill Carroll, AOL-Time Warner Merger Clears FCC, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2001, at A3, and the deal 
had been eclipsed by Vodafone’s acquisition of Mannesmann, Philip Shishkin & William Boston, 
Vodafone Wins EU Clearance to Acquire Mannesmann in Record $180 Billion Deal, WALL ST. J., 
Apr. 13, 2000, at A14.  
 2 See Bruce Orwall & John Lippman, High Concept in Hollywood: More Web Alliances for 
Hollywood, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2000, at B1; Susan Pulliam & Paul M. Sherer, Anything Goes! After 
AOL Time Warner, Who’s Next?, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 2000, at C1. 
 3 For a complete discussion of the regulatory history of open access, see infra Subsection 
III.A.2. 
 Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the New Economy 
175 
Internet content at speeds exceeding one million bits per second (1 Mbps). 
The Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) estimates that within 
the next four years, over one-third of all U.S. households will subscribe to 
some form of broadband service.4  
 The concern about open access stems from one important difference 
between narrowband and broadband connections to the Internet. In the 
narrowband world, customers can use their telephone lines to connect to 
any one of a large number of Internet service providers (“ISPs”). 
Broadband providers, in contrast, typically require their customers to 
employ a proprietary ISP.5 Competitors and observers began to raise 
concerns that such exclusivity arrangements had the potential to reduce 
consumer choice and harm competition. As a result, these parties asked the 
FCC to impose an “open access” requirement that would require cable 
modem systems to make their transmission lines available to other, non-
proprietary ISPs on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms.6  
 Early calls for open access fell on deaf ears. Consistent with its 
longstanding policy of non-regulation of computer-based services,7 the 
FCC rejected calls for imposing open access as a condition to approving 
AT&T’s acquisition of TCI and MediaOne.8 Attempts to impose open 
access through municipal regulation were effectively blocked by a series 
of judicial decisions holding that the FCC has exclusive jurisdiction over 
the issue.9 Just seven months after its most recent refusal to impose open 
access, however, the FCC reversed course and embraced the concept of 
open access by conditioning its approval of the AOL-Time Warner merger 
on the merged company’s willingness to negotiate access agreements with 
                                                                                                                         
 4 Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecomms. Capability to All 
Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment 
Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecomms. Act of 1996, 15 F.C.C.R. 20,913, 20,983, ¶ 186 (2000) 
(Second Report) [hereinafter Second Advanced Services Report]. 
 5 For example, before its collapse, Excite@Home, which was the largest ISP serving cable 
modem subscribers, was owned by such major cable modem providers as AT&T, Comcast, Cox 
Communications, Cablevision Systems, and Shaw Cablesystems, and was the exclusive ISP for those 
systems. Time Warner, which is the second largest high-speed broadband provider, has previously 
required all of its users to use a proprietary ISP called RoadRunner. See Applications for Consent to 
the Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214 Authorizations from MediaOne Group, Inc., 
Transferor, to AT&T Corp., Transferee, 15 F.C.C.R. 9816, 9863, ¶ 107 (2000) (Memorandum Opinion 
and Order) [hereinafter AT&T-MediaOne Merger]. 
 6 Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214 
Authorizations from Tele-Communications, Inc., Transferor, to AT&T Corp., Transferee, 14 F.C.C.R. 
3160, 3197-98, ¶ 75 (1999) (Memorandum Opinion and Order) [hereinafter AT&T-TCI Merger]; 
AT&T-MediaOne Merger, supra note 5, at 9866, ¶¶ 114-15. 
 7 See, e.g., JASON OXMAN, THE FCC AND THE UNREGULATION OF THE INTERNET 8-12 
(FCC Office of Plans and Policy, Working Paper No. 31, July 1999), available at http://www.fcc.gov/ 
Bureaus/OPP/working_papers/oppwp31.pdf.  
 8 AT&T-TCI Merger, supra note 6, at 3205-07, ¶¶ 92-96; AT&T-MediaOne Merger, supra 
note 5, at 9866-73, ¶¶ 116-28. 
 9 See MediaOne Group, Inc. v. County of Henrico, 257 F.3d 356 (4th Cir. 2001); AT&T 
Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000). 
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at least three unaffiliated ISPs.10 The breadth of the reasoning contained in 
its Memorandum Opinion and Order regarding the merger suggest that the 
FCC may be willing to consider far more sweeping action.11 
 This abrupt change in policy sparked new regulatory and academic 
interest in open access. Not only did the FCC’s decision place new 
importance on the Notice of Inquiry currently pending before the agency,12 
it also stimulated a new round of scholarship that raised two different types 
of arguments in favor of open access. The first set of arguments centered 
on the concern that cable modem systems would use vertical integration or 
other forms of exclusive dealing to harm competition in the market for 
ISPs.13 In so arguing, these scholars invoked one of the central issues of 
vertical integration theory—whether a company can use its monopoly 
power over one level of the chain of production to harm competition in 
another level that otherwise would have been competitive. The danger that 
media companies might exercise market power vertically has long been a 
major focus of federal media policy, having played a pivotal role in the 
seminal cases regarding the structural regulation of broadcasting14 and 
cable television.15  
 The other set of arguments added a distinctively “New Economy” 
twist to the debate. For example, Professors Mark Lemley and Lawrence 
Lessig, who are without question two of the leading legal scholars on law 
and technology issues, contend that open access is essential to preserving 
and promoting continued innovation on the Internet.16 Other scholars have 
employed such new economic tools as game theory17 and network 
economics18 to fashion arguments in support of open access that go far 
                                                                                                                         
 10 Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214 
Authorizations by Time Warner, Inc. and America Online, Inc., Transferors, to AOL Time Warner 
Inc., Transferee, 16 F.C.C.R. 6547, 6590, ¶ 96 (2001) (Memorandum Opinion and Order) [hereinafter 
AOL-Time Warner Merger]. In so concluding, the FCC endorsed a similar conclusion drawn by the 
Federal Trade Commission. See America Online, Inc., Docket No. C-3989, 2001 WL 410712 (F.T.C. 
Apr. 17, 2001) (Decision and Order).  
 11 AOL-Time Warner Merger, supra note 10, at 36-57, ¶¶ 81-127. 
 12 See Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other 
Facilities, 15 F.C.C.R. 19,287 (2000) (Notice of Inquiry).  
 13 See, e.g., Jim Chen, The Authority to Regulate Broadband Internet Access over Cable, 16 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 677 (2001); Jerry A. Hausman et al., Residential Demand for Broadband 
Telecommunications and Consumer Access to Unaffiliated Internet Content Providers, 18 YALE J. ON 
REG. 129 (2001); Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Hal J. Singer, Open Access to Broadband Networks: A Case 
Study of the AOL/Time Warner Merger, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 631 (2001). For a detailed review of 
these arguments, see infra notes 310-322 and accompanying text. 
 14 NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943). See generally infra text accompanying notes 
42-49. 
 15 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 
512 U.S. 622 (1994). See generally infra text accompanying notes 209-214. 
 16 Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the 
Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925 (2001). 
 17 See Rubinfeld & Singer, supra note 13, at 655-57. 
 18 See Hausman et al., supra note 13, at 161-65. 
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beyond any of the rationales advanced in prior debates about vertical 
integration in media-related industries.19  
 To date, no one has undertaken a comprehensive evaluation of the 
economic arguments surrounding these issues. Media scholars have 
historically analyzed the problems associated with vertical integration in 
largely non-economic terms.20 It is only in recent years that scholars have 
begun to bring the insights of the burgeoning economic literature on 
vertical integration to bear on the regulation of media industries.21 While 
providing a welcome and useful starting point for exploring these issues, 
these initial economic studies have ultimately proven to be somewhat 
incomplete in that they have either limited their focus to a single 
communications technology or have concentrated only on certain 
economic schools of thought without taking the full sweep of modern 
vertical integration theory into account. The need to come to grips with the 
full range of issues raised by the literature on vertical integration is likely 
to grow even more onerous in the near future. As Professors Joseph 
Kearney and Thomas Merrill have observed, calls for open access in the 
communications sector are part of a new emerging paradigm that they 
                                                                                                                         
 19 This Article focuses solely on the economics unique to media-related industries. As a 
result, I do not discuss telephone-related technologies, which tend to be natural monopolies and which 
do not require large, up-front sunk costs in content. In so doing, I do not mean to suggest that vertical 
integration in the telephone industry is unimportant. On the contrary, it is now well-known that such 
concerns underlay the 1982 breakup of AT&T, see United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 
(D.D.C. 1982), aff’d, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983), as well as the provisions of the Telecommunications Act 
of 1996 that prohibited the former Bell Operating Companies that did not yet face local competition 
from entering the long distance market, see 47 U.S.C. § 271 (Supp. III 1997). For insightful 
discussions of the continuing influence of concerns about vertical integration on current telephone 
policy, see Timothy J. Brennan, Does the Theory Behind U.S. v. AT&T Still Apply Today?, 40 
ANTITRUST BULL. 455 (1995); and Paul L. Joskow & Roger G. Noll, The Bell Doctrine: Applications 
in Telecommunications, Electricity, and Other Network Industries, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1249 (1999). 
 20 Most analyses have focused on whether vertical structural regulations violate the First 
Amendment. E.g., THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER & LUCAS A. POWE, JR., REGULATING BROADCAST 
PROGRAMMING (1994); Benjamin M. Compaine, The Impact of Ownership on Content: Does It 
Matter?, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 755 (1995); Jonathan W. Emord, The First Amendment 
Invalidity of FCC Ownership Regulations, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 401 (1989).  
 21 See DAVID WATERMAN & ANDREW A. WEISS, VERTICAL INTEGRATION IN CABLE 
TELEVISION (1997); Ashutosh Bhagwat, Unnatural Competition?: Applying the New Antitrust 
Learning to Foster Competition in the Local Exchange, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1479 (1999); Jim Chen, The 
Last Picture Show (On the Twilight of Federal Mass Communications Regulation), 80 MINN. L. REV. 
1415 (1996); David D. Haddock & Daniel D. Polsby, Bright Lines, the Federal Communications 
Commission’s Duopoly Rule, and the Diversity of Voices, 42 FED. COMM. L.J. 331 (1990); John E. 
Lopatka & William H. Page, Internet Regulation and Consumer Welfare: Innovation, Speculation, and 
Cable Bundling, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 891 (2001); John E. Lopatka & Michael G. Vita, The Must-Carry 
Decisions: Bad Law, Bad Economics, 6 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 61 (1998); James W. Olson & Lawrence 
J. Spiwak, Can Short-Term Limits on Strategic Vertical Restraints Improve Long-Term Cable Industry 
Market Performance?, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 283 (1995); James B. Speta, Handicapping the 
Race for the Last Mile?: A Critique of Open Access Rules for Broadband Platforms, 17 YALE J. ON 
REG. 39 (2000) [hereinafter Speta, Handicapping]; James B. Speta, The Vertical Dimension of Cable 
Open Access, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 975 (2000) [hereinafter Speta, Vertical Dimension]. 
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believe is effecting a “grand transformation” in the way that policy makers 
are approaching all regulated industries.22  
 As a result, I believe that the time has come to undertake a more 
systematic review of the economics of vertical integration and access 
regimes in order to explore the extent to which the insights provided 
support or undercut recent attempts to regulate the vertical market 
structure of the various media industries.23 Only by bringing together all of 
the various threads of vertical integration theory can we understand the 
way that the different parts of the theory interact with one another.  
 The basic organization of this Article is to use the major conceptual 
strands in the economic literature on vertical integration to analyze 
previous attempts to regulate vertical integration in three different 
segments of the communications universe—broadcasting, cable television, 
and high-speed broadband. Part I uses the FCC’s first attempt to address 
the issues raised by vertical integration—the Chain Broadcasting Rules—
to review the basic economics of vertical integration.24 Even the most 
cursory reading of the economic literature reveals that issues surrounding 
vertical integration have proven to be quite controversial, as the Harvard 
School approach to industrial organization, which tended to regard vertical 
integration as illegal per se, gave way to the Chicago School of antitrust 
law and economics, which tended to regard vertical integration as more 
benign. The Chicago School’s call for treating vertical integration as legal 
per se has in turn inspired the development of the post-Chicago School, 
                                                                                                                         
 22 See generally Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Grand Transformation of 
Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1340-57 (1998). 
 23 This Article is the first step in what I hope will be a comprehensive critique and 
reconceptualization of media regulation. Previous scholarship in this area has tended to take each 
medium as a universe unto itself. As a result, policy debates tended to focus on the economics 
associated with the particular means of transmission at issue and the First Amendment implications of 
the communications being transmitted. Technological convergence, however, is altering media 
economics in fundamental ways that make the previous technological orientation untenable. My long-
term goal is to begin thinking about media regulation in a more integrated manner by examining the 
major regulatory approaches taken with regard to each of the existing communications technologies 
and determining the extent to which the lessons contained in each can serve as a model of regulation 
for the others. This Article focuses on the characteristic that I believe dominates the approach to 
regulating cable television (i.e., concerns about the vertical exercise of market power). Subsequent 
papers will focus on the common carriage and scarcity/diversity paradigms associated with telephony 
and broadcasting.  
 24 As scholars have frequently noted, firms can achieve many of the same benefits through 
vertical contractual restraints. As a result, the insights are quite similar. See ROGER D. BLAIR & DAVID 
L. KASERMAN, LAW AND ECONOMICS OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND CONTROL 20, 82 (1983); 
OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS & HIERARCHIES 29-30, 35-37 (1975); Andy M. Chen & Keith N. 
Hylton, Procompetitive Theories of Vertical Control, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 573, 583-85, 587, 590-91 
(1999). For more detailed analysis of the extent to which vertical restraints can simulate vertical 
integration, see BLAIR & KASERMAN, supra, at 52-82; PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, 
ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT 552-69 (1992); and JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION 173-81 (1988).  
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which has renewed scholarly interest in the ways that vertical integration 
can harm competition.  
 Although the scope of disagreement among these approaches remains 
significant, what I find most interesting is the extent to which consensus 
exists on certain issues. In particular, a review of the literature reveals that 
the Chicago School and post-Chicago models both begin from the premise 
that certain structural conditions must exist before vertical integration can 
pose any threat to competition. Furthermore, Chicago School and post-
Chicago theorists generally agree that vertical integration may lead to 
efficiencies that may justify vertical integration even when the market 
structure creates some anti-competitive dangers. An application of this 
basic framework to the broadcast television industry suggests that the 
emphasis on preventing vertical integration is fundamentally misguided 
since the relevant markets are not structured in a way that would permit 
any firm to use vertical integration to harm competition. The analysis 
shows, moreover, that the cost structure of producing television 
programming is such that vertical integration is likely to lead to the 
realization of significant efficiencies. While it is true that game theory, 
network economics, and innovation-based models do indicate that vertical 
integration can sometimes harm competition, a close analysis of the formal 
models reveals that such anti-competitive effects arise only under 
particular circumstances. As a result, although these analyses provide 
strong support for rejecting the Chicago School’s call for treating vertical 
integration as legal per se and insisting that vertical arrangements remain 
subject to antitrust scrutiny under the rule of reason, they do not support 
the imposition of categorical regulatory rules that would, in essence, 
render vertical integration illegal without any analysis of the facts of a 
particular case. Such an outcome would be tantamount to a return to the 
rule of per se illegality associated with the now-discredited Harvard 
School approach.  
 Part II uses an analysis of vertical integration in the cable television 
industry to extend the analysis further. In addition to applying the 
framework developed in Part I, this Part also discusses the problematic 
nature of compelled access as a remedy. Unlike conventional antitrust 
remedies, which seek to break up the monopoly power, access remedies 
simply demand that the monopoly bottleneck be shared, a result that does 
not necessarily lead to the reductions in price and increases in quantity 
required to enhance static efficiency. Access remedies cause even greater 
problems in terms of dynamic efficiency. The central problem is that 
forcing a monopolist to share an input rescues other firms seeking access 
to that input from having to develop alternative sources of supply. Access 
remedies thus can entrench the existing monopoly by depriving firms 
interested in competing with the monopoly of their natural strategic 
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partners. As a result, the economic literature cautions against compelling 
access whenever the bottleneck resource is available from another source, 
even if it is only available at significant cost and in the relatively long run. 
This is particularly true in technologically dynamic industries in which the 
prospects of developing new ways either to circumvent or to compete 
directly with the bottleneck are the highest. 
 Part III employs the lens of the open access debate to add another 
layer to the economic analysis. In addition to applying the analytical 
frameworks developed in the previous parts to the problem of open access 
to cable modem systems, this Part will respond to the New Economy-
based arguments raised by Professors Lemley, Lessig, and others that 
restrictions on vertical integration are necessary to preserve and promote 
technological innovation. In particular, it examines a complex web of 
arguments involving the extent to which innovation is affected by market 
concentration, standardization, and network externalities. A close review 
of the economic literature on these subjects reveals that these arguments 
are considerably more ambiguous than open access advocates would have 
us believe. While the sensitivity of these theories to the factual context 
might possibly provide support for prohibiting a particular instance of 
vertical integration on a case-by-case basis, it seems unlikely that these 
theories would support the type of simple policy inference needed to 
justify holding a specific practice illegal without any particularized inquiry 
into the facts. Part IV offers an analysis of the intellectual and institutional 
obstacles for adopting a more comprehensive economic perspective. 
 It should be noted that the Article’s focus on the policy question leads 
to two caveats. First, in focusing on the economic desirability of 
permitting vertical integration, I set aside, for the time being, any extended 
analysis of the important question of whether regulation of vertical 
integration is either permitted or even compelled under the current 
regulatory regime. I thus take no position on whether open access is 
permitted or mandated under current law.25 Second, this Article does not 
address questions of constitutionality. This is not because statutory 
authorization is unimportant or because regulation of vertical integration 
does not raise any First Amendment concerns.26 It is because both of those 
                                                                                                                         
 25 For detailed assessments of the statutory status of open access, see generally Chen, supra 
note 13; Howard A. Shelanski, The Speed Gap: Broadband Infrastructure and Electronic Commerce, 
14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 721, 740-42 (1999); and Speta, Handicapping, supra note 21, at 61-75. 
 26 I thus disagree with Lemley and Lessig’s suggestion that open access does not implicate 
the First Amendment. See Lemley & Lessig, supra note 16, at 955 (“There is no governmental 
regulation of speech at issue here.”). For discussions of the First Amendment implications of open 
access, see Stuart Minor Benjamin, Proactive Legislation and the First Amendment, 99 MICH. L. REV. 
281 (2000); Harold Feld, Whose Line Is It Anyway? The First Amendment and Cable Open Access, 8 
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 23 (2000); and Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Open Internet Access and Freedom 
of Speech: A First Amendment Catch-22, 75 TUL. L. REV. 87 (2000). 
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inquiries focus on what policy makers can do under the law. In so doing, 
they tend to elide over the more fundamental questions about what policy 
makers should do. In the absence of an affirmative policy justification for 
imposing vertical structural regulation, the First Amendment question 
never arises. 
I. The Chain Broadcasting Rules and the Basic Economics of Vertical 
Integration 
 This Part will use the FCC’s first major initiative designed to regulate 
vertical relationship in media industries to lay out the basic economic 
analysis of vertical integration. Section A begins by outlining the structure 
of the broadcast television industry and then describes the relevant 
regulatory scheme, known as the Chain Broadcasting Rules. It then 
identifies the primary economic arguments upon which the Chain 
Broadcasting Rules are based, determining that the FCC was motivated by 
the same concerns that underlay the major judicial decisions on vertical 
integration: the problems of leveraging and foreclosure. 
 Section B then reviews the historical development of vertical 
integration theory, tracing both the Chicago School’s critique of the 
courts’ hostility towards vertical integration during the 1950s and 1960s, 
as well as the post-Chicago reaction to that critique. Although these two 
approaches differ on many of the particulars of competition policy, a close 
reading of the literature reveals the existence of some common ground. 
Both approaches recognize the existence of certain structural preconditions 
that must be satisfied before vertical integration poses any threat to 
competition. In addition, both approaches acknowledge, for the most part, 
that vertical integration can yield certain efficiencies that may make 
vertical integration economically desirable.  
 The resulting analytical framework is applied to the broadcast 
television industry in Section C. This analysis reveals that the relevant 
markets are simply too unconcentrated and too unprotected by barriers to 
entry for vertical integration to represent a plausible threat to competition. 
In addition, a review of the cost structure of producing television 
programming suggests that it is quite possible that vertical integration in 
the broadcast television industry will yield significant efficiency benefits. 
Specifically, the existence of significant up-front, fixed-cost investments 
and minimal marginal costs of transmission make producers of television 
programming extremely dependent on their ability to reach guaranteed 
audiences and leave them vulnerable to post-investment opportunistic 
behavior. Under these circumstances, the limits on vertical integration 
imposed by the Chain Broadcasting Rules appear to make little sense. 
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A. The Chain Broadcasting Rules: Context, Substance, and Rationale 
1. The Structure of the Broadcasting Industry 
 Although the structure of the broadcasting industry may at times seem 
mysterious, when viewed from a certain perspective, it is in fact quite 
ordinary. Its basic organization differs little from that of the typical 
manufacturing industry, which is divided into a three-stage chain of 
production and distribution comprised of manufacturers, wholesalers, and 
retailers. The first and last stages are easiest to understand. The first stage 
is manufacturing, which is occupied by the companies that create the 
actual products to be sold. Retailers, who are responsible for final delivery 
of the products to end-users, occupy the last stage. Although it is 
theoretically possible for retailers to obtain products directly from 
manufacturers, in practice, the logistics of doing so have become so 
complicated that it is often necessary for an intermediate stage to develop 
between manufacturers and retailers. Firms operating at this intermediate 
stage, known as wholesalers, purchase goods directly from manufacturers 
and assemble them into complete product lines for retailers to purchase.  
 The broadcasting industry can, for the most part, be mapped onto this 
three-stage framework.27 For most of the history of the television industry, 
the manufacturing stage has been populated principally by the movie 
studios, which create the television programs in the first instance. The 
wholesale stage is occupied by the networks, which purchase the broadcast 
rights to programs from the studios, aggregate them into program 
packages, and redistribute them via satellite to local broadcast stations. 
The networks in turn sell28 these program packages to the local broadcast 
                                                                                                                         
 27 Although, for the purposes of program distribution, it is proper to regard networks and 
local broadcast stations as successive stages in a vertical chain of production, that relationship is 
complicated by the fact that, with regard to advertising, networks and local broadcast stations can be 
viewed as horizontal competitors. Advertisers have the choice of either spending their advertising 
money in the national market governed by the networks or in the spot market governed by the local 
broadcast stations. Although this dimension of competition is also important, this Article will limit its 
focus to the more vertical aspects of broadcast regulation relating to program distribution. 
 28 In one sense, it may seem strange to say that networks “sell” program packages to the 
local broadcast stations. In the typical purchase transaction, one party offers a cash payment in 
exchange for goods or services provided by another party. In such cases, the cash and the goods travel 
in opposite directions. In the typical transaction between a network and its broadcast affiliate, the 
network provides both the program packages and additional money to the station. In other words, the 
cash and the goods are traveling in the same direction, with the network seemingly receiving nothing 
in return. The solution to this apparent anomaly is well explained by the Report of the FCC’s Network 
Inquiry Special Staff: 
The relationships between the commercial broadcast television networks and their 
affiliated stations can be characterized in two equivalent ways. The broadcast networks 
can be described as buying access to the time of stations, paying the stations both in cash 
and by making time available within and between programs for sale by stations directly 
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stations that comprise the retail stage of production responsible for 
delivering the program packages to the end users.29  
 As with other consumer goods markets, however, regulators became 
concerned that integration between the different levels of the chain of 
production might pose a threat to competition. In order to address these 
concerns, the FCC enacted rules designed to limit the extent to which such 
vertical integration could occur as one of its first major regulatory 
initiatives. 
2. The Chain Broadcasting Rules 
 Concerned by the increasing dominance that the three major radio 
networks—NBC, CBS, and the Mutual Broadcasting System—were 
exerting over their broadcast affiliates, the FCC launched an investigation 
in 1938 to determine what, if any, restrictions should be placed upon 
them.30 This investigation culminated three years later with the issuance of 
the Report on Chain Broadcasting31 and the enactment of the Chain 
Broadcasting Rules.32  
 The Chain Broadcasting Rules placed direct restrictions on the extent 
to which networks could vertically integrate into local broadcasting.33 The 
                                                                                                                         
to advertisers. Alternatively, one can think of stations as purchasing programs from the 
networks, paying for these programs by permitting the networks to sell advertising time 
within programs and to retain a portion of the revenue that is thereby obtained. Under 
either view, the relationship between networks and their outlets is principally vertical 
with regard to program exhibition. 
1 FCC NETWORK INQUIRY SPECIAL STAFF, NEW TELEVISION NETWORKS: ENTRY, JURISDICTION, 
OWNERSHIP, AND REGULATION 395 (1980) [hereinafter NEW TELEVISION NETWORKS] (footnote 
omitted). 
 29 It should be noted that not all broadcast programming passes through all three stages of 
production. For example, broadcast networks on occasion bypass the manufacturing stage by creating 
their own content, such as news and sports programs. Similarly, local broadcast stations at times 
bypass both upstream stages by creating local news broadcasts and other original programming. In 
addition, some programs in effect bypass the network stage and move directly from the movie studios 
to the local broadcast stations through syndication. Notwithstanding these variations, the basic three-
stage model is useful to capture the basic structure of the broadcast industry. Indeed, the variations 
discussed above are largely consistent with the focus of this Article, since the fact that two stages are 
often collapsed into one can be seen as a form of vertical integration. 
 30 See 3 Fed. Reg. 637 (Mar. 26, 1938). 
 31 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, REPORT ON CHAIN BROADCASTING (1941). 
 32 For useful overviews of the Chain Broadcasting Rules, see Emord, supra note 20, at 405-
11; NEW TELEVISION NETWORKS, supra note 28, at 445-49; STANLEY M. BESEN ET AL., 
MISREGULATING TELEVISION 32-35 (1984) [hereinafter MISREGULATING TELEVISION]; and Chen, 
supra note 21, at 1451-54.  
 33 Specifically, the FCC prohibited networks from owning more than one station in any 
market and from owning stations in markets with so few stations that competition would be 
substantially restrained. REPORT ON CHAIN BROADCASTING, supra note 31, at 92 (Rule 3.106), 
repealed by Review of the Comm’n’s Regulations Governing Television Broad., 10 F.C.C.R. 4538, 
4540, ¶ 10 (1995) (Report and Order). The former provision has been largely overshadowed by the 
FCC’s duopoly rule, which prohibits all owners, networks and non-networks alike, from owning more 
than one station in any market. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.355 (1999).  
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FCC later bolstered this limit to vertical integration by promulgating rules 
limiting the number of television stations that any one person could own.34 
Although the initial rule banned any person from owning more than three 
stations,35 this number increased steadily over the years.36 Current law 
permits ownership of any number of stations so long as the total reach of 
the group does not exceed thirty-five percent of the national audience.37 
Although not targeted towards the networks specifically, the national 
ownership rules serve as the primary limit on network ownership of 
broadcast stations.38  
 The Chain Broadcasting Rules also included a number of restrictions 
on the networks’ ability to use vertical contractual restraints, banning the 
use of contract provisions requiring exclusive dealing, territorial 
exclusivity, and long affiliation terms.39 In addition, the rules guaranteed 
the local stations’ right to reject any programs that they deemed 
unsatisfactory40 and restricted the use of contract provisions granting 
networks guaranteed access to affiliates’ time during certain portions of 
the broadcast day (a practice known as “option time”).41  
 In the landmark case of NBC v. United States,42 the Supreme Court 
upheld the Chain Broadcasting Rules as a proper exercise of the FCC’s 
statutory obligation to regulate broadcasting in accordance with the public 
                                                                                                                         
 34 For reviews of the history of the group ownership rules, see Chen, supra note 21, at 
1445-46; and Glen O. Robinson, The “New” Communications Act: A Second Opinion, 29 CONN. L. 
REV. 289, 292 (1996).  
 35 See Rules and Regulations Governing Experimental Television Broad. Stations § 4.226, 6 
Fed. Reg. 2282, 2284-85 (May 6, 1941).  
 36 See Multiple Ownership, 9 Fed. Reg. 5442 (May 23, 1944) (authorizing group ownership 
of up to five radio stations); Amendment of Sections 3.35, 3.240 and 3.636 of the Rules and 
Regulations Relating to the Multiple Ownership of AM, FM, and Television Broad. Stations, 18 F.C.C. 
288 (1953) (Report and Order) (limiting any one owner to five television stations nationwide); 
Amendment of Multiple Ownership Rules, 43 F.C.C. 2797 (1954) (Report and Order) (authorizing 
group ownership of up to seven stations so long as two stations were UHF); Amendment of Section 
73.3555 [formerly Sections 73.35, 73.240 and 73.636] of the Comm’n’s Rules Relating to Multiple 
Ownership of AM, FM and Television Broad. Stations Amendment of Multiple Ownership Rules, 100 
F.C.C.2d 17 (1984) (Memorandum Opinion and Order) (authorizing group ownership of up to twelve 
stations), on reconsideration, 100 F.C.C.2d 74 (1985) (Memorandum Opinion and Order) (adding the 
additional requirement that the group reach no more than twenty-five percent of the national audience). 
 37 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202(c), 110 Stat. 56, 110 
(codified as 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(e)(1) (1999)). Interestingly, the FCC had already signaled its 
willingness to consider raising the cap to as high as fifty percent by the time the Act was passed. See 
Robinson, supra note 34, at 292 (citing Broad. Servs.; Television Stations, 60 Fed. Reg. 6490 (1995)). 
 38 See 100 F.C.C.2d at 50-54, ¶¶ 97-107. 
 39 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(a)-(c) (1999).  
 40 Id. § 73.658(e). 
 41 The FCC rejected the Chain Broadcasting Report’s call for an outright ban of option 
time, opting instead to place additional restrictions on it. 6 Fed. Reg. 5258 (1941) (extending the 
minimum notice period for the exercise of option time to fifty-six days and limiting the number of 
hours that could be reserved through option time). The FCC banned option time altogether in 1963. 
Option Time and the Station’s Right to Reject Network Programs, 34 F.C.C. 1103, 1130 (1963) 
(Second Report and Order) (codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(d) (1999)). 
 42 319 U.S. 190 (1943).  
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interest.43 Consistent with the spirit of the day,44 the Court did not subject 
the economic rationales underlying the Rules to any significant scrutiny, 
opting instead to defer to the agency in this regard.45 The Court later relied 
heavily on this decision in subsequently upholding the national ownership 
rules.46  
 In 1946, the FCC extended the Chain Broadcasting Rules to television 
without conducting any specific analysis of their applicability to the new 
medium.47 This action was clearly prophylactic, as there were only six 
television stations on the air in the entire U.S. at the time.48 The FCC has 
since largely eliminated the Chain Broadcasting Rules with respect to 
radio,49 so, as a practical matter, their only remaining relevance is with 
respect to television. 
3. The Economic Theory Underlying the Chain Broadcasting Rules 
 The Chain Broadcasting Rules reflected the FCC’s belief that the 
networks were using vertical integration and vertical contractual restraints 
to harm competition in two ways. First, the FCC was concerned that the 
use of such provisions allowed networks to use their dominant positions to 
reduce the local broadcast stations’ freedom to choose,50 a concern 
analogous to the concern in antitrust theory that a dominant firm might 
“leverage” its market power over one stage of production to reduce 
competition in an adjacent stage that otherwise would be competitive. 
Second, the FCC was also concerned that allowing networks to tie up local 
broadcast stations tended to obstruct the growth of new networks,51 a 
concern analogous to modern concerns about “foreclosure.” 
                                                                                                                         
 43 Id. at 215-19. 
 44 See, e.g., JAMES LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 95-103, 132-40 (1938). For 
general descriptions of the courts’ deferential attitude towards agency policymaking, see Thomas W. 
Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1048-50, 1056-59 
(1997); Reuel E. Schiller, Enlarging the Administrative Polity: Administrative Law and the Changing 
Definition of Pluralism, 1945-1970, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1389, 1417-19 (2000); Richard B. Stewart, The 
Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1677-78 (1975); and Keith 
Werhan, The Neoclassical Revival in Administrative Law, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 567, 574-75 (1992). 
 45 319 U.S. at 218-19; see also id. at 224-25 (rejecting the argument that the Chain 
Broadcasting Rules were arbitrary and capricious). 
 46 United States v. Storer Broad. Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956). 
 47 Amendment to Part 3 of the Comm’n’s Rules, 11 Fed. Reg. 33 (1946).  
 48 See Review of the Comm’n’s Regulations Governing Television Broad., 10 F.C.C.R. 
4538, 4539, ¶ 5 (1995) (Report and Order). 
 49 Review of Comm’n Rules and Regulatory Policies Concerning Network Broad. by 
Standard (AM) and FM Broad. Stations, 63 F.C.C.2d 674 (1977) (Report, Statement of Policy, and 
Order). 
 50 See REPORT ON CHAIN BROADCASTING, supra note 31, at 4, 52, 65- 67. 
 51 See id. at 51-52, 54, 59, 62, 67. It should be noted that the FCC also based its report in 
part on considerations unrelated to competition policy. For example, at times, the Report on Chain 
Broadcasting also relies in part on concerns more closely allied with the First Amendment, such as the 
perceived need to encourage locally produced programming. See id. at 4, 63, 65. 
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 The Chain Broadcasting Rules’ reliance on the perceived dangers 
posed by leveraging and foreclosure was an apt reflection of the prevailing 
economic wisdom of the day. At the time, the Harvard School of Industrial 
Organization52 (“Harvard School”), associated with the work of economist 
Joe Bain53 and legal scholars Carl Kaysen and Donald Turner,54 dominated 
antitrust law. The Harvard School based its hostility towards vertical 
integration on three central tenets. First, it readily accepted the leverage 
theory of vertical integration, believing that firms with as little as five 
percent of the market could use vertical integration to exert market power 
against upstream and downstream markets.55 Second, the Harvard School 
also believed that vertical integration allowed firms to foreclose entry 
either by tying up the supply of necessary inputs56 or by forcing new 
entrants to enter at two different levels of production.57 Third, Harvard 
School scholars believed that vertical integration provided few efficiency 
benefits58 and was more often motivated by the desire to create barriers to 
entry.59  
 From the 1950s through the early 1970s, the Harvard School swept 
the field60 and became the orthodox position on the Supreme Court.61 In 
                                                                                                                         
 52 For helpful overviews of the Harvard School approach, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 
FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY § 1.7, at 42-46, § 2.2a, at 60 (2d ed. 1999); F. M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL 
MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 4-6 (1970); Peter C. Carstensen, Antitrust Law 
and the Paradigm of Industrial Organization, 16 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 487, 493-501 (1983); Robert J. 
Larner & James W. Meehan, Jr., The Structural School, Its Critics, and Its Progeny: An Assessment, in 
ECONOMICS AND ANTITRUST POLICY 179, 180-91 (Robert J. Larner & James W. Meehan, Jr. eds., 
1989); Leonard W. Weiss, The Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm and Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1104, 1104-23 (1979); and Oliver E. Williamson, Antitrust Enforcement: Where It’s Been, Where 
It’s Going, 27 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 289, 290-92, 312-13 (1983). 
 53 JOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION 155-56 (1956); JOE S. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION 179, 360-64, 381 (2d ed. 1968). 
 54 CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL 
ANALYSIS (1959); CARL KAYSEN, UNITED STATES V. UNITED SHOE MACHINERY CORPORATION: AN 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF AN ANTI-TRUST CASE (1956); Donald Turner, The Validity of Tying 
Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws, 72 HARV. L. REV. 50 (1958). In fact, Kaysen was able to 
influence doctrine directly when he served as a law clerk to Judge Wyzanski in one of the leading 
antitrust cases of its time. See Carl Kaysen, In Memoriam: Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., 100 HARV. L. 
REV. 713, 713-15 (1987). 
 55 See KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 54, at 132 (arguing that firms “can, through the 
leverage effects of firms in one market on those in another to which they stand in the relation of 
supplier or customer, enhance existing power, or enable it to be applied in a new market”).  
 56 See id. at 121 (“Vertical integration backward over limited raw material supplies or 
forward over limited market outlets may provide either the basic sources of the market power of the 
firm or important buttresses to it.”). 
 57 See id. at 120.  
 58 See BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION, supra note 53, at 155-56; BAIN, INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION, supra note 53, at 179, 360-64, 381. 
 59 See BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION, supra note 53, at 144-47. 
 60 In fact, at the time, the Harvard School counted even such future critics as George Stigler, 
Ward Bowman, and Milton Friedman among its adherents. See GEORGE STIGLER, MEMOIRS OF AN 
UNREGULATED ECONOMIST 97, 99-100 (1988); Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Toward Less Monopoly, 101 U. 
PA. L. REV. 577, 589, 641 (1953). 
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case after case, the Court struck down vertical mergers by firms 
controlling as little as five percent of the market.62 The Court followed a 
parallel pattern with respect to vertical contractual restraints, either holding 
them illegal per se on the grounds that the restraint at issue evinced such a 
“pernicious effect on competition” and such a “lack of any redeeming 
virtue” that little would be lost if they were “presumed to be . . . illegal 
without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the 
business excuse for their use”63 or striking them down at such low levels of 
concentration as to be tantamount to the same thing.64 The Harvard School 
approach also became enshrined in the initial Merger Guidelines issued by 
the Justice Department in 1968, which disfavored any vertical merger 
involving a firm holding as little as six to ten percent of its market.65 Given 
the prevailing hostility towards vertical integration, it seemed quite natural 
for the FCC to impose categorical regulations that in essence made vertical 
integration in the broadcast industry illegal per se. 
B. The Basic Economics of Vertical Integration66 
1. The Chicago School’s Rejection of Per Se Illegality 
 The academic and doctrinal consensus in place at the time the FCC 
established the Chain Broadcasting Rules would not prove to be lasting. A 
new body of economic scholarship, spearheaded by a group of economists 
associated with the University of Chicago,67 unleashed a critique of the 
Harvard School’s approach to vertical integration that remains one of the 
central influences in competition policy to this day. 
                                                                                                                         
 61 See Louis Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 
515, 516-17 (1985). 
 62 See Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 578 (1971) (striking down vertical 
merger resulting in 10% foreclosure); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 328-34 (1961) 
(striking down vertical merger resulting in 5% and 1% foreclosure); United States v. E.I. du Pont de 
Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1956) (striking down vertical merger resulting in 6% to 7% 
foreclosure).  
 63  N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1957) (holding tying illegal per se); see 
also United States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962) (same); Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States 
Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 498-99 (1968) (same); United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 
365 (1966) (holding territorial restrictions illegal per se); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 
253 (1962) (same). 
 64 See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 314 (1948) (striking down 
exclusive dealing contract that foreclosed 16% of the market). 
 65 U.S. Department of Justice Merger Guidelines § 12, 33 Fed. Reg. 23,442 (1968), 
reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,101. 
 66 Readers already familiar with the basic economics of vertical integration might prefer to 
skip directly to infra Section I.C.  
 67 For a useful overview of the Chicago School, see Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School 
of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925 (1979).  
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 The Chicago School systematically called into question each of the 
three central propositions that underlay the Harvard School’s hostility 
towards vertical integration. First, the Chicago School argued that the 
leverage theory of vertical integration provided neither the incentive nor 
the ability to harm competition. Second, the Chicago School attacked the 
notion that vertical integration could foreclose entry. Third, Chicagoans 
offered plausible arguments that vertical integration could lead to more 
significant efficiency benefits than the Harvard School thought possible. I 
will discuss each in turn. 
a. The Critique of Leverage 
 The Chicago School leveled a twofold attack on the notion that firms 
could use vertical integration to gain leverage over another market. One 
attack focused on the structural preconditions required to state a coherent 
leveraging claim. The other attack was more radical; it argued that, even 
when the structural preconditions identified in the first attack were met, 
vertical integration did not provide firms with any additional market 
power. As a result, the Chicagoans argued, firms will generally find 
leverage to be unnecessary. 
 Beginning with the first attack, Chicagoans pointed out that it is 
impossible to state a coherent theory of leverage unless two structural 
preconditions are met. First, the merging firm must have monopoly power 
in its primary market since, without such power, any attempt to charge 
supra-competitive prices would simply induce customers to obtain the 
goods they need from other sources. In short, a firm that lacks market 
power has nothing to leverage in the first place.68 Second, the market into 
which the firm seeks to vertically integrate (called the secondary market) 
must also be concentrated and protected by barriers to entry. If no such 
barriers to entry exist, any attempt to raise price in the secondary market 
will simply attract new competitors until the price drops back down to 
competitive levels.69 Unless these two structural preconditions are met, it 
is impossible to see how vertical integration could provide any firm with 
the ability to extract any profit from either market. 
 In addition, the Chicago School pointed out that, although firms with 
monopoly power may have the ability to exercise leverage over upstream 
and downstream markets, those firms typically lack the incentive to do so. 
                                                                                                                         
 68 See RICHARD A. POSNER & FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST 870-71 (2d ed. 1982) 
(“The leverage theory . . . is beside the point if the integrated firm lacks a monopoly.”); Aaron Director 
& Edward H. Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 NW. U. L. REV. 281, 290 (1956) 
(“Firms that are competitive cannot impose coercive restrictions on their suppliers or their customers 
as a means of obtaining a monopoly. They lack the power to do this effectively.”). 
 69 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 172-73 (1976). 
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This is because there is only one monopoly profit in any chain of 
production, and any monopolist can capture all of that profit without 
having to resort to vertical integration. All it has to do is simply price its 
goods at the monopoly level.70 
 A simple numerical example will help illustrate the point.71 Suppose 
that a monopolist refines ore into copper ingot and sells it to a downstream 
firm that fabricates the ingot into copper pipe that is sold into a 
competitive market. Suppose further that the cost of refining ore into ingot 
is $40, that the cost of fabricating the ingot into pipe is $35, and that the 
monopoly price of the final good is $100. If the monopolist were to 
vertically integrate into fabrication, it could charge $100 for the final good 
and thereby earn a profit of $25 per unit (i.e., $100 - $40 - $35). The 
monopolist need not vertically integrate to capture this profit, however. All 
it needs to do is price the ingot at $65, which would allow it to earn the 
same profit of $25 per unit (i.e., $65 - $40). Since the downstream firm 
faces competition, it will simply set its markup equal to its costs. This 
results in the price of the final good also being set at its profit-maximizing 
price of $100 (i.e., $65 + $35). Thus, as a general matter, the monopolist 
gains nothing by vertically integrating into fabrication. All it needs to do to 
capture all of the available profit is simply price the input so that the final 
good is priced at the monopoly level. 
 Chicago School scholars did note two relevant exceptions to their 
critique of leveraging. First, they pointed out that leverage might be 
profitable if the monopolist controls an input that can be used in variable 
proportions with other competitively supplied inputs.72 The logic is 
straightforward: A firm with monopoly control over an input will price it 
                                                                                                                         
 70 See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 226-31, 372-73, 375 (1978); POSNER, 
supra note 69, at 173, 197; POSNER & EASTERBROOK, supra note 68, at 802-03, 870; Ward S. 
Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19, 20-21 (1957); Director 
& Levi, supra note 68, at 290. 
 71 The example is taken from Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 32 (1st 
Cir. 1990) (Breyer, C.J.), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 931 (1991). 
 72 See BORK, supra note 70, at 229-31; POSNER, supra note 69, at 201; POSNER & 
EASTERBROOK, supra note 68, at 874; Bowman, supra note 70, at 25-27; M.L Burstein, A Theory of 
Full-Line Forcing, 55 NW. U. L. REV. 62, 68, 76-83 (1960); John S. McGee & Lowell R. Bassett, 
Vertical Integration Revisited, 19 J.L. & ECON. 17, 22-32, 38 (1976); Posner, supra note 67, at 937. 
For the seminal economic articles, see L.W. McKenzie, Ideal Output and the Interdependence of 
Firms, 61 ECON. J. 785 (1951); and John M. Vernon & Daniel A. Graham, Profitability of 
Monopolization by Vertical Integration, 79 J. POL. ECON. 924 (1971). For useful reviews appearing in 
the economic literature, see BLAIR & KASERMAN, supra note 24, at 31-35; F.M. SCHERER & DAVID 
ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 522-27 (3d ed. 1990); 
TIROLE, supra note 24, at 179-81; Masahiro Abiru, Vertical Integration, Variable Proportions, and 
Successive Oligopolies, 36 J. INDUS. ECON. 315, 324 (1988); and Martin K. Perry, Vertical 
Integration: Determinants and Effects, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 183, 191-92 
(Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989). For overviews appearing in the legal literature, 
see HOVENKAMP, supra note 52, § 9.3a, at 377-78; Chen & Hylton, supra note 24, at 598-99, 627-28; 
and David Reiffen & Michael Vita, Is There New Thinking on Vertical Mergers?, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 
917, 922-24 (1995). 
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above cost. This price increase will lead customers to substitute alternative 
inputs whenever possible, a reaction that reduces the monopolist’s market 
power and decreases the profits it earns. The input can eliminate the 
reduction in profits resulting from input substitution by vertically 
integrating into fabrication.73  
 Chicago School scholars conceded that, under these circumstances, a 
monopolist could use vertical integration to earn positive profits, but 
tended to downplay the significance of the insight.74 Subsequent 
economists have largely agreed, in part because the welfare implications of 
input substitution are actually quite ambiguous.75 Although input 
substitution can reduce monopoly profits, it also reduces total welfare by 
inducing customers to deviate from the most efficient input mix. 
Determining which of the two countervailing effects will dominate can be 
quite difficult.76 In any event, any reduction in welfare is likely to be 
relatively small.77 As a result, the consensus position is that input 
substitution does not pose a problem significant enough to be worth 
redressing.78 And even in markets where market power exists, it is 
                                                                                                                         
 73 The monopolist could accomplish much the same effect through vertical contractual 
restraints requiring that customers agree not to substitute inputs.  
 74 See BORK, supra note 70, at 229-31 (arguing that input substitution rarely occurrs and as 
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probably an unanswerable one in the present state of economic science. There is accordingly no basis, 
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787, 799; and Schmalensee, supra note 75, at 447, with Parthasaradhi Mallela & Babu Nahata, Theory 
of Vertical Control with Variable Proportions, 88 J. POL. ECON. 1007, 1014-15 (1980); and Fred M. 
Westfield, Vertical Integration: Does Product Price Rise or Fall?, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 334, 335-346 
(1981). Scholars that have modeled the final product market as oligopolistic have reached similar 
disagreement. Compare Michael Waterson, Vertical Integration, Variable Proportions and Oligopoly, 
92 ECON. J. 129, 139 (1982) (concluding that, if the final product market is oligopolistic rather than 
competitive, the impact on welfare depends on the elasticity of substitution), with Abiru, supra note 
72, at 324 (employing similar assumptions to conclude that price will fall and welfare will increase 
regardless of elasticity of substitution). 
 77 Perry, supra note 72, at 192 (noting that the percentage welfare loss appears to be less 
than a couple percent); Reiffen & Vita, supra note 72, at 923 (drawing the same conclusion). 
 78 See Perry, supra note 72, at 192 (“[I]t is not clear that variable proportions raises a major 
policy issue on vertical integration.”); Reiffen & Vita, supra note 72, at 923 (“The variable proportions 
models of vertical integration seldom have been regarded as providing a sound basis for guiding 
vertical merger enforcement policy.”). 
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arguable that horizontal remedies will prove more effective in curbing it 
than any prohibition of vertical integration or vertical restraints.79 
 The second exception is more significant for the purposes of this 
Article. It acknowledges that a monopolist subject to rate regulation may 
well find it profitable to integrate vertically. Gaining control of a second, 
unregulated level of production would allow the firm to earn the profits 
foreclosed by regulators.80 In such cases, it is arguably appropriate to 
prohibit vertical integration in order to isolate and quarantine the 
monopolist. Such regulation is justified, however, only in cases of natural 
monopoly, where any attempt to break up the monopoly would ultimately 
prove futile. If the market at issue is not a natural monopoly, both rate 
regulation and the concomitant prohibition of vertical integration are 
equally unwarranted. 
b. The Critique of Foreclosure 
 Chicago School supporters also debunked the notion that a firm 
without market power could use vertical integration to foreclose 
competitors. Suppose that a shoe manufacturer that controls a non-
dominant share of total shoe manufacturing (say, ten percent) decides to 
integrate vertically into retail shoe stores and sell its shoes only through 
dedicated outlets.81 It cannot be said that the decision to integrate vertically 
has foreclosed any of the shoe manufacturer’s existing competitors, since 
they still have available the number of shoe retailers (ninety percent) 
sufficient to allow them sell all of their available supply (ninety percent). 
Vertical integration into retailing may realign the patterns of distribution, 
but it cannot limit the amount of the market available to rivals.82  
                                                                                                                         
 79 WILLIAM F. SHUGHART II, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 324 (1990); McGee & 
Bassett, supra note 72, at 22-32, 38; Perry, supra note 72, at 192. 
 80 BORK, supra note 70, at 376; POSNER & EASTERBROOK, supra note 68, at 809, 870 n.2; 
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BULL. 741 (1987). 
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Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). 
 82 BORK, supra note 70, at 232; Sam Peltzman, Issues in Vertical Integration Policy, in 
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market shares are unchanged; only the patterns of sales are altered. 
POSNER & EASTERBROOK, supra note 68, at 870. 
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 In addition, the Chicago School argued that vertical integration 
between shoe manufacturers and shoe retailers cannot deter new entry 
unless there are barriers to entry protecting the shoe retailing market. This 
is because, even if the existing shoe manufacturers have locked up all of 
the existing shoe retailers, absent barriers to entry in retailing, any new 
shoe manufacturer seeking to find distribution should find distributors 
waiting to meet it.83  
c. Efficiency Justifications for Vertical Integration 
 Having cast doubt on whether vertical integration could plausibly 
harm competition in the absence of monopoly power in the first market 
and barriers to entry protecting the second market, Chicago School 
scholars bolstered their campaign against the per se illegality of vertical 
integration by identifying several ways in which vertical integration could 
actually enhance efficiency. The two sources of efficiency most relevant to 
the purposes of this Article are the elimination of double marginalization 
resulting from successive monopolies and the reduction of transaction 
costs.  
 Elimination of Double Marginalization.  Drawing on the pioneering 
work of Joseph Spengler,84 Chicagoans pointed out that vertical integration 
or restraints can be welfare-enhancing when successive stages of 
production are both controlled by monopolies.85 Chicago School scholars 
pointed out that this so-called “double marginalization” problem leads 
successive monopolies to set higher prices than would firms that used 
some vertical device to coordinate pricing decisions. It has now become 
generally accepted that vertical integration between successive 
monopolists is unambiguously welfare-enhancing.86  
                                                                                                                         
 83 See BORK, supra note 70, at 241; POSNER, supra note 69, at 197-98; GEORGE J. STIGLER, 
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of the double marginalization.”); Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Antitrust Policy and 
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807 F.2d at 563 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (“Propositions about the economics of mergers often are 
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 Again, the example involving the fabrication of copper ingot into 
copper pipe discussed above provides a useful illustration.87 Suppose that 
both the company that refined copper ore into ingot and the company that 
fabricated the ingot into pipe were both monopolists. As noted before, the 
cost of manufacturing the ingot was assumed to be $40, the cost of 
fabricating the ingot into pipe was $35, and the profit-maximizing price for 
pipe was $100. In an effort to capture all of the monopoly profit, the ingot 
monopolist would charge $65 for the ingot ($40 in costs + $25 in available 
profit) and hope that the pipe fabricator will price at cost. The pipe 
fabricator will similarly attempt to capture all of the available profit by 
charging $60 ($35 in costs + $25 in available profit) and hope that the 
ingot manufacturer will price at cost. The result is that the final product 
will cost $125, a price driven well above profit-maximizing levels that 
would be in the self-interest of the two monopolists. Although both firms 
could increase the total profit available by agreeing on a way to reduce the 
final price, the fact that the firms are locked into a classic bilateral 
monopoly will render the terms of any such agreement indeterminate and 
greatly increase the likelihood of deadlock.88 Vertical integration would 
eliminate this problem, however, since the integrated entity would simply 
set the final price of the pipe at the profit-maximizing level of $100 
without having to worry about the allocation of the monopoly profits 
between the two different stages of production.  
 Reduction of Transaction Costs.  The Chicago School also contended 
that vertical integration could promote efficiency by reducing transaction 
costs. Some of these arguments followed the Coasean insight89 that 
integration can reduce the overall friction involved in organizing business 
enterprises by internalizing certain transactions within the firm.90 Others 
suggested that vertical integration can lead to efficiencies by allowing 
firms to avoid the transaction costs associated with protecting themselves 
against opportunistic behavior. In particular, the literature identifies at 
least three types of opportunistic behavior that firms may seek to avoid. 
 Hold Up. The landmark article by Benjamin Klein, Robert Crawford, 
and Armen Alchian identified a type of opportunistic behavior that can 
arise whenever a firm makes an investment that is uniquely tailored to the 
needs of the other. When the cost of such an asset exceeds the value of its 
next-best use, the investment is said to create “appropriable quasi-rents,” 
                                                                                                                         
filled with ifs and maybes; competing schools of thought produce different prescriptions. That 
successive monopolies injure consumers is a proposition on which there is unanimous agreement.”). 
 87 See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 88 Machlup & Taber, supra note 84, at 105-06, 111-13; Wirtz, 807 F.2d at 563 (Easterbrook, 
J., dissenting). 
 89 R.H. Coase, The Theory of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). 
 90 See BORK, supra note 70, at 227. 
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because they allow others to hold up the investing party in an attempt to 
extract a greater proportion of the joint benefits.91  
 Firms confronting the risk of such opportunistic behavior essentially 
have two options. First, they can attempt to anticipate the problems and 
incorporate solutions to them into the contractual relationship.92 
Negotiating and enforcing such contracts can be quite costly, and the costs 
of protecting one’s interests via contract rise dramatically as the size of the 
relationship-specific investment increases and as information becomes 
increasingly asymmetric and hard to verify. These problems are 
exacerbated still further if the risks associated with the project are high and 
the number of alternative business partners is relatively small.93 In 
addition, the impossibility of anticipating every possible contingency 
inevitably means that all contracts are in some way analytically 
incomplete. At some point, transaction costs may rise to the point where 
they frustrate the parties’ ability to reach a mutually beneficial bargain. 
When this occurs, the firms may find it beneficial to solve the problem 
through vertical integration. Bringing the two firms under the same 
corporate umbrella eliminates the incentives for engaging in opportunistic 
behavior designed to affect the division of profits between the two firms. 
The firms can then give their undivided attention to determining the 
combination of resources that maximizes joint profits and, as a result, 
maximizes total welfare.94  
 The classic example discussed in the literature is GM’s 1926 
acquisition of one of its component manufacturers, Fisher Body.95 
According to Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, the shift from wooden to 
metal automobile bodies required Fisher Body to make investments in new 
metal stamping technology unique to GM’s cars. Under the Klein-
Crawford-Alchian framework, the existence of such relationship-specific 
investments raised the danger that GM would act opportunistically against 
Fisher Body after the investment costs had already been sunk. To mitigate 
this risk, GM and Fisher Body entered into a long-term exclusive dealing 
agreement in which the price was set at operating costs plus a substantial 
                                                                                                                         
 91 Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford, & Armen A. Alchian, Vertical Integration, 
Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 298 (1978). 
 92 Id. at 302-07; see also POSNER & EASTERBROOK, supra note 68, at 886 (“[L]ong term 
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 93 See WILLIAMSON, supra note 24, at 22-24, 28-29; Chen & Hylton, supra note 24, at 590-
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 94 OLIVER E. WIILLAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 48-49 (1985); 
Paul L. Joskow, Vertical Integration and Long-Term Contracts: The Case of Coal-Burning Electric 
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 95 Klein et al., supra note 91, at 308-10. For a discussion of the seminal place that the Fisher 
Body case has taken in the literature, see Daniel F. Spulber, Economic Fables and Public Policy, in 
FAMOUS FABLES OF ECONOMICS 15-18 (Daniel F. Spulber ed., 2002). 
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markup for capital costs. While well-designed to protect Fisher Body 
against opportunistic behavior by GM, Klein, Crawford, and Alchian 
contend that the contract was not well-designed to protect GM against 
opportunistic behavior by Fisher Body. When the demand for metal-
bodied automobiles increased dramatically, Fisher Body was able to use its 
capital investments much more efficiently than the original contract had 
envisioned, and the existing formula allowed Fisher Body to charge GM 
prices that overcompensated it for its capital costs. In addition, Klein, 
Crawford, and Alchian argue that Fisher Body maximized its own profits 
by employing labor-intensive production methods that were 
technologically inefficient and by refusing to locate its plants near GM’s. 
Unable to manage its relationship with its input supplier through 
contractual devices, GM was left with no choice but to vertically integrate 
backwards into body fabrication by acquiring Fisher Body.96 
 Free Riding.  Free riding represents another type of opportunistic 
behavior that can cause transaction costs to rise. As Lester Telser’s 
seminal article demonstrated, transaction costs tend to rise any time a firm 
is not able to capture all of the benefits created by its own conduct, 
because the existence of such positive externalities gives other firms the 
incentive to attempt to free ride on the benefits created by other firms.97 
For example, suppose that a firm manufactures a technically complicated 
product that requires significant presale services (such as the 
demonstration of the product). Telser argues that retailers will have the 
incentive to shirk in providing such services in the hopes that other 
retailers will bear the costs of providing such services. If all retailers 
respond to these incentives in the same way, the total amount of presale 
services will fall below efficient levels.98  
 A manufacturer facing the possibility of such free riding has two 
alternatives. It can contractually specify the level of presale services that 
each retailer is required to offer. Alternatively, it might attempt to rely on a 
vertical contractual restraint, such as resale price maintenance or exclusive 
sales territories, to align the retailers’ incentives with the manufacturers’.99 
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Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 19:171, 2002 
196 
Such contracts can be quite expensive to negotiate and enforce, however, 
and are inevitably incomplete. If the transaction costs become sufficiently 
large, a manufacturer might instead choose to obviate the entire problem 
by vertically integrating into distribution.  
 Adverse Selection.  The third example of opportunistic behavior is 
known in the literature as “adverse selection.” In the context of 
manufacturing and distribution, it typically arises when products are non-
homogeneous and the manufacturer is unable to determine the value of its 
products easily. Customers facing such a situation have the incentive to 
expend a great deal of costs searching through the goods in an attempt to 
find the goods that are relatively underpriced. The seller will in turn have 
the incentive to expend additional funds sorting its goods, in order to avoid 
being left with an inventory comprised solely of below-average goods. 
These difficulties in determining product quality can thus lead to wasteful 
expenditure of resources, which Roy Kenney and Benjamin Klein call 
“oversearching.”100  
 The parties can avoid these costs, however, either by vertically 
integrating or by agreeing to a vertical contractual constraint, such as a 
long-term exclusive dealing arrangement, that functionally serves the same 
purposes.101 In addition, Kenney and Klein suggest that a manufacturer 
may mitigate oversearching by selling its goods in bundles. The logic is 
that bundling goods directs the parties’ attention away from the value of 
individual items, which is information that is extremely expensive to 
obtain, and instead focuses attention on the average value of the entire 
bundle, which is information that that can be gleaned more cheaply. 
Bundling, therefore, can reduce transaction costs by decreasing the parties’ 
incentives to expend additional effort in sorting through the goods since, 
on average, the overpriced and underpriced goods in the bundle tend to 
balance each other out.102  
 As Kenney and Klein point out, bundling of goods is quite common. 
Take, for example, the supermarkets’ common practice of selling groups 
of potatoes in opaque plastic bags. If the supermarket were to offer a bin of 
potatoes for individual sale at a specified price, purchasers would have the 
incentive to sort through the bin to find the best potatoes (i.e., potatoes that 
are underpriced, in that their value exceeds the average value of the bin). 
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 101 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
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The initial purchasers who find such potatoes receive a windfall. Later 
purchasers will find a bin composed entirely of potatoes that are worth less 
than the average price of the bin. A seller who wishes to avoid being left 
with a bin full of low-quality goods can either charge less than the average 
price or can attempt to sort the potatoes in advance and price them 
appropriately. Such efforts are costly. Furthermore, additional sorting is 
unlikely to eliminate this problem, since even if potatoes of different 
grades are placed into separate bins, the same effect will occur within each 
bin, albeit on a smaller scale. Prepackaging the potatoes into preset 
bundles may deal with this problem more effectively, since doing so 
reduces the incentives to oversearch by making information about quality 
harder to determine and by refocusing purchasers’ attention towards the 
average quality of the goods.103 
 Kenney and Klein also used examples directly relevant to media 
markets to illustrate their point. The one that has garnered the most 
attention is their discussion of the movie studios’ practice of “block 
booking,” which was struck down by the Supreme Court in United States 
v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.104 This practice prevented movie theaters from 
licensing individual films and instead required them to purchase packages 
of films arranged by the studio.  
 According to Kenney and Klein, block booking served two distinct 
purposes. First, it reduced the costs of distributing first-run movies. The 
practice stems in large part from the difficulty in determining the true 
value of a movie at the time it is initially licensed. The complexities of 
scheduling theaters generally required that licensing agreements be signed 
before the film was produced. Even when that was not the case, advance 
screenings did not yield much useful information, since consumer response 
to particular films remained unpredictable.105 According to Kenney and 
Klein, Paramount used block booking to reduce the transaction costs of 
distributing first-run movies by allowing the movie studios to lower the 
expenses associated with scheduling movies for release.106  
 Second, block booking solved adverse selection problems in the 
market for second-run films. A movie’s initial run, of course, tended to 
reveal a movie’s real value. Armed with knowledge that was unavailable 
ex ante, movie theaters have the incentive to accept only those films 
known ex post to be underpriced (i.e., whose value exceeds the value of 
the average film) and to reject or shorten the run of those films known ex 
post to be overpriced (i.e., whose value falls below the value of the 
average film). Kenney and Klein argued that block booking could 
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eliminate these incentives by preventing theater owners from 
opportunistically attempting to renegotiate deals based on the new 
information and by redirecting the focus of both parties to the average 
price.107 If block booking contracts become subject to renegotiation or too 
expensive to enforce, firms may find it preferable to vertically integrate 
into distribution. 
 The Empirical Evidence on Transaction Costs.  The transaction cost 
approach pioneered by the Chicago School was thus able to offer a number 
of theoretical explanations of why vertical integration might enhance 
efficiency and was able to identify several specific examples that appeared 
to confirm these theories. Establishing that something is possible, 
however, does nothing to establish whether something is likely. As a result, 
economists have conducted extensive empirical studies in an attempt to 
determine whether and how frequently such transaction cost efficiencies 
actually exist.108 Although many of these results are promising, they are 
not sufficient to establish whether vertical integration actually produces 
the transaction cost efficiencies described in the theoretical literature. 
 Other studies challenged the historical examples upon which the 
proponents of particular theories of transaction cost efficiencies have 
based their claims. For example, a number of distinguished scholars, 
including Ronald Coase himself, have challenged the Klein-Crawford-
Alchian account of Fisher Body. These critics argue that vertical 
contractual restraints were more than sufficient to protect GM’s interests 
and point out that at the time that Fisher Body supposedly acted 
opportunistically, GM already owned sixty percent of Fisher Body’s 
common stock.109 Klein, in turn, responded by arguing that the relevant 
quasi-rents resulted from firm-specific human (rather than physical) 
capital110 and by placing greater emphasis on Fisher Body’s supposed 
refusal to locate its plants near GM’s.111  
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 Another set of commentators has challenged Kenney and Klein’s 
account of the Paramount case. Block booking can only reduce transaction 
costs if the licensing agreement prevents theater owners from renegotiating 
the terms of the contract after the true value of the films has been revealed. 
Andrew Hanssen effectively undercut Kenney and Klein’s analysis by 
demonstrating that the typical block booking contract permitted theater 
owners to reject a significant number of second-run films and that the 
movie studios often did not force theater owners to fulfill all of their block 
booking obligations.112 Kenney and Klein, in turn, responded with an 
alternative account of the Paramount case. According to this new account, 
the parties relied on self enforcement, regulated by the mutual need to 
preserve reputational capital, rather than the provisions of the contract to 
protect themselves against opportunistic behavior. The real purpose of the 
contract was to provide a safety net to guard against the failure of such self 
enforcement. As a result, Kenney and Klein argued that it is not surprising 
that the parties occasionally deviated from the strict contract terms.113  
 It appears that the critics have gained the upper hand in these debates, 
a development made important because of the manner in which the 
proponents of the various efficiency theories relied upon the specific 
examples they cited as the primary support for their plausibility. These 
empirical disputes cannot completely resolve these issues, however. Even 
though subsequent work has called the specific examples cited into 
question as an empirical matter, the falsification of these particular 
examples does not necessarily invalidate these proposals as a theoretical 
matter. As Timothy Muris, the recently appointed Chairman of the FTC, 
has observed, the principal empirical questions surrounding the transaction 
cost implications of vertical integration and vertical restraints have yet to 
be resolved.114  
 It would, however, be a mistake to suggest that the unavailability of 
definitive empirical proof of the existence of such efficiencies renders the 
                                                                                                                         
 112 F. Andrew Hanssen, The Block Booking of Films Reexamined, 43 J.L. & ECON. 395 
(2000). 
 113 Roy W. Kenney & Benjamin Klein, How Block Booking Facilitated Self-Enforcing Film 
Contracts, 43 J.L. & ECON. 427, 430-32 (2000). 
 114 Timothy J. Muris, GTE Sylvania and the Empirical Foundations of Antitrust, 68 
ANTITRUST L.J. 899, 910-11 (2001); see also Eddie Correia, Antitrust Policy After the Reagan 
Administration, 76 GEO. L.J. 329, 331 (1987) (noting that the empirical evidence for “the most 
fundamental assumptions” underlying economic policy are “often very thin”); William H. Page, The 
Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust: Characterization, Antitrust Injury, and Evidentiary 
Sufficiency, 75 VA. L. REV. 1221, 1242 (1989) (observing that Chicago School studies “do not resolve 
many of the most basic empirical questions associated with the policy choices that the [Chicago] 
models pose”); id. at 1252 (noting that “[t]he state of empirical research” on resale price maintenance 
“is inadequate to resolve the dispute”). These issues are rendered even murkier by the argument that 
even when opportunism emerges as a real problem, the parties might look to governmental regulation 
to ensure that the various parties do not take advantage of one another. See Victor P. Goldberg, 
Regulation and Administered Contracts, 7 BELL J. ECON. 426 (1976). 
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Chicago School’s efficiency arguments unimportant. The mere possibility 
that such efficiencies might exist raises serious questions about the 
appropriateness of treating vertical integration as illegal per se. As the 
Court has noted, per se illegality is appropriate only if the practice is so 
pernicious and lacking in redeeming value that nothing would be lost if it 
were presumed to be illegal without any examination of the facts of a 
particular case.115 Chicagoans maintained that even if they could not 
establish that such efficiencies existed in all cases, they had at least raised 
a sufficient possibility that such efficiencies might exist to justify 
evaluating vertical integration under the case-by-case approach associated 
with the rule of reason.116 Even those who question whether vertical 
integration is likely to lead to widespread transaction cost savings will still 
pause before embracing the presumption that vertical integration is 
sufficiently likely to harm competition to justify embracing a blanket 
prohibition of the practice. 
d. The Impact of the Chicago School Critique 
 Although the Chicago School began as “little better than a lunatic 
fringe,”117 its attack on the existing orthodoxy regarding vertical 
integration ultimately proved transformative. Mainstream antitrust scholars 
have now largely accepted the Chicago School’s critiques of the Harvard 
School’s reliance on leverage and foreclosure theory.118 The Supreme 
Court has followed suit, on some occasions overruling precedents holding 
various vertical restraints to be illegal per se119 and on other occasions 
accomplishing essentially the same result by requiring plaintiff’s to 
establish the existence of the structural preconditions discussed above 
before subjecting the restraint to antitrust scrutiny.120 
                                                                                                                         
 115 See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). 
 116 See Bork, Rule of Reason, supra note 99, at 453-54; Frank H. Easterbrook, Maximum 
Price Fixing, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 886 (1981); Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements, supra note 99, at 
153; Richard A. Posner, The Rule of Reason and The Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania 
Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1977). 
 117 Posner, supra note 67, at 931. 
 118 See 3A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 758, at 27-32 
(1996); 4 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1004, at 222 (1980); 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 52, § 7.6b, at 301-02; Richard S. Markovits, Tie-Ins and Reciprocity: A 
Functional, Legal, and Policy Analysis, 58 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 1363-1410 (1980); Richard S. 
Markovits, Tie-ins, Leverage, and the American Antitrust Laws, 80 YALE L.J. 195, 199-205 (1970); 
Oliver E. Williamson, Delimiting Antitrust, 76 GEO. L.J. 271, 282 (1987). 
 119 See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997) (maximum resale price maintenance); 
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (vertical territorial restrictions); see 
also Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 236-37 (1st Cir. 1983) (Breyer, J.) 
(concluding that exclusive dealing contracts are now governed by the rule of reason).  
 120 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs. Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 481 (1992) 
(concluding that monopolization requires proof of monopoly power in primary market); Northwest 
Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 296-97 (1985) (holding that 
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 The ultimate testament to the triumph of the Chicago School’s 
precepts is the Justice Department’s Vertical Merger Guidelines. 
Promulgated in 1984121 and apparently still in force today,122 the Vertical 
Merger Guidelines embrace the structural preconditions identified by the 
Chicago School as essential to proving that a vertical merger is likely to 
have an anti-competitive effect. First, the Guidelines require that the 
primary market must be concentrated. The Guidelines measure the degree 
of market concentration by using the Hirschman-Herfindahl index 
(“HHI”),123 which has become the standard concentration measure for 
antitrust enforcement purposes. The Guidelines indicate that the antitrust 
authorities are unlikely to challenge a vertical merger unless HHI in the 
primary market exceeds 1800, which is the level of concentration that 
would result in a market comprised of somewhere between five and six 
equal competitors.124 Second, the Guidelines require that the secondary 
                                                                                                                         
the per se rule against group boycotts requires proof of market power in primary market); Jefferson 
Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12-15 (1984) (holding that the per se rule against tying 
requires proof of market power in primary market and substantial foreclosure of secondary market); cf. 
Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 459 (1993) (stating that antitrust laws regard “the 
conduct of a single firm unlawful only when it actually monopolizes or dangerously threatens to do 
so”).  
 121 See 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823 (1984).  
 122 The 1992 statement that accompanied the issuance of new Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
indicated that Section 4 of the 1984 Guidelines continued to provide the relevant guidance for vertical 
mergers. See U.S. Department of Justice & Federal Trade Commission, Non-Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552 (1992), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/ 
guidelines/2614.htm. The Clinton Administration did consider adjusting the Vertical Merger 
Guidelines, but did not do so, as evidenced by the fact that the Guidelines continue to appear on the 
Justice Department’s website. As a result, legal commentators have uniformly indicated that the 
Vertical Merger Guidelines remain in force. See, e.g., M. Howard Morse, Vertical Mergers: Recent 
Learning, 53 BUS. LAW. 1217, 1224 (1998). For a review of the recent increase in vertical merger 
enforcement actions, see id. at 1226-45.  
 123 HHI is a measurement of market concentration that is calculated by squaring the market 
share of each competitor and then summing the resulting numbers. For example, a market of four firms 
with market shares of 30%, 30%, 20% and 20%, respectively, would have an HHI of 302 + 302 + 202 + 
202 = 900 + 900 + 400 + 400 = 2600. The result is a continuum that rates the concentration of a market 
on a scale from 0 (in the case of complete market deconcentration) to 10,000 (in the case of 
monopoly).  
 124 Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 122, § 4.213. The Vertical Merger 
Guidelines reserve the possibility of challenging mergers at lower HHI levels if “effective collusion is 
particularly likely.” Id. Because vertical mergers are less likely than horizontal mergers to create 
competitive problems, the Vertical Merger Guidelines apply a somewhat more liberal standard than 
that applied to horizontal mergers. Id. § 4.0. The Horizontal Merger Guidelines classify markets in 
which the post-merger HHI is below 1000 as “unconcentrated.” Horizontal mergers in such markets 
are ordinarily not subject to challenge. U.S. Department of Justice & Federal Trade Commission, 1992 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 1.51(a), 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552 (1992), revised, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. 
(CCH) ¶ 13,104 (Apr. 8, 1997), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/horiz_book/ 
hmg1.html. Markets in which the post-merger HHI is between 1000 and 1800 are “moderately 
concentrated.” Horizontal mergers in markets that fall within this range “potentially raise significant 
competitive concerns” and may be subject to challenge if they increase HHI by more than 100 points. 
Id. § 1.51(b). The Horizontal Merger Guidelines treat markets in which the post-merger HHI exceeds 
1800 as “highly concentrated.” In these markets, mergers that raise post-merger HHI by more than 50 
points “potentially raise significant competitive concerns” and may be challenged. Mergers that raise 
post-merger HHI 100 points are “presumed . . . to create or enhance market power or facilitate its 
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market also be concentrated as well as protected by barriers to entry.125 
Lastly, even if those preconditions are met, the Guidelines recognize that 
the presence of significant efficiencies might nonetheless justify permitting 
a vertical merger to go forward even when the market structure raises the 
possibility that the merger might have some anti-competitive effects.126 
 Not content with these victories, the Chicago School proponents 
urged that the regulators subject vertical integration to even greater 
deference. Specifically, Chicagoans believed that they had completely 
discredited any possibility that a vertical merger could have any anti-
competitive effects. In the absence of any plausible harm to competition, 
these theorists posited that all instances of vertical integration must be 
motivated by the desire to realize pro-competitive efficiencies. As a result, 
it was not sufficient simply to move from the preexisting world of per se 
illegality to the rule of reason. Instead, they contended that it would be 
appropriate to go so far as to treat vertical integration as per se legal.127  
2. The Post-Chicago School’s Rejection of Per Se Legality  
 The Chicago School’s call for regarding vertical integration as legal 
per se in turn inspired a new generation of scholars known as the post-
Chicago School.128 Unlike the Chicago School’s previous critics, post-
Chicago scholars accept economic efficiency as the goal of antitrust.129 
They parted company with Chicagoans, however, by rejecting the static 
nature of the price theoretic models that provided the foundation for 
                                                                                                                         
exercise” and are likely to be challenged. Id. § 1.51(c). Interestingly, even if measured against the more 
stringent standards applied to horizontal mergers, most of the markets under consideration in this 
Article are too unconcentrated to permit any firm to use mergers to threaten competition. 
 125 Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 122, § 4.212. 
 126 Id. § 4.24. 
 127 See, e.g., BORK, supra note 70, at 226, 231. Chicago School theorists offered similar 
views with respect to vertical restraints. See id. at 288 (“Analysis shows that every vertical restraint 
should be completely lawful.”); Bork, Rule of Reason, supra note 99, at 397 (“The thesis advanced 
here is that every vertical arrangement should be lawful.”); Bork, Vertical Restraints, supra note 99, at 
181-82 (“[A]ntitrust should have no concern with vertical restraints; all should be lawful.”); Richard A. 
Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 6, 22-25 (1981) (“best to declare that purely vertical restraints on intrabrand competition . . . 
legal per se”); see also POSNER, supra note 69, at 182 (advocating per se legality of tying contracts).  
 128 For overviews of the post-Chicago School, see Jonathan B. Baker, Recent Developments 
in Economics that Challenge Chicago School Views, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 645 (1989); Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213 (1985) [hereinafter Hovenkamp, 
After Chicago]; Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review and Critique, 2001 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 257 (2001) [hereinafter Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago]; Michael S. Jacobs, An Essay on the 
Normative Foundations of Antitrust Economics, 74 N.C. L. REV. 219 (1995); and Michael W. Klass & 
Michael A. Salinger, Do New Theories of Vertical Foreclosure Provide Sound Guidance for Consent 
Agreements in Vertical Merger Cases?, 40 ANTITRUST BULL. 667 (1995).  
 129 See Baker, supra note 128, at 646; Jacobs, supra note 128, at 222, 242. As Carl Shapiro 
so colorfully put it, “If ‘Post-Chicago Economics’ stands for the notion that . . . antitrust should move 
away from promoting efficiency and consumer welfare, count me out.” Carl Shapiro, Aftermarkets and 
Consumer Welfare: Making Sense of Kodak, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 483, 484 (1995) (footnote omitted). 
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Chicago School scholarship.130 Instead, they employed game theory and 
other methods for modeling strategic behavior to study the impact of 
vertical integration when markets function imperfectly. These tools 
enabled them to identify circumstances under which firms have the ability 
to use the leverage provided by a dominant position in one market to harm 
competition.131 The existence of formal models showing potential anti-
competitive effects arising from vertical relationships served as a powerful 
rebuttal to the Chicago School’s call for treating vertical integration and 
vertical restraints as legal per se. It is my hope to lay out a more complete 
analysis of the post-Chicago theories of vertical integration elsewhere. In 
addition, Part III will specifically address some particular attempts to 
apply post-Chicago principles to vertical integration in the cable modem 
industry.132 For the time being, it is sufficient to restrict myself to a few 
observations. 
 First and foremost, notwithstanding the significant differences 
between these two schools of thought, a close examination of the post-
Chicago literature reveals the existence of some common ground. Most 
important for the purposes of this Article is the fact that the post-Chicago 
theories of vertical integration either explicitly or implicitly rely on the 
existence of the same structural preconditions identified by the Chicago 
School. Specifically, the post-Chicago scholarship models typically model 
the relevant markets either as dominant firm industries133 or as 
oligopolistic markets undergoing Cournot or Bertrand competition.134 Both 
of these approaches essentially require that the relevant markets be highly 
concentrated and protected by barriers to entry.135 In the absence of such 
                                                                                                                         
 130 Hovenkamp, After Chicago, supra note 128, at 256; Kaplow, supra note 61, at 527-31; 
William E. Kovacic, The Antitrust Paradox Revisited: Robert Bork and the Transformation of Modern 
Antitrust Policy, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1413, 1465 (1990); Williamson, supra note 52, at 299-301. 
 131 See, e.g., Oliver Hart & Jean Tirole, Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure, 
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 205 (1990); Janusz A. Ordover et 
al., Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 127 (1990); Michael H. Riordan, 
Anticompetitive Vertical Integration by a Dominant Firm, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 1232 (1998); Michael 
H. Riordan, & Steven C. Salop, Evaluating Vertical Mergers: A Post-Chicago Approach, 63 
ANTITRUST L.J. 513 (1995); Michael A. Salinger, Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure, 103 Q.J. 
ECON. 345 (1988); Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals’ Costs, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 
267, 268 (1983).  
 132 See infra Subsection III.B.4. 
 133 See, e.g., Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago, supra note 128, at 325-26; Salop & Scheffman, 
supra note 131, at 267. 
 134 See, e.g., Hart & Tirole, supra note 131; Ordover et al., supra note 131; Riordan & Salop, 
supra note 131; Salinger, supra note 131. 
 135 Dominant firm industries are generally defined as those in which the largest firm has at 
least a sixty percent share and into which entry is not easy. See, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, Assessing 
Vertical Market Restrictions: Antitrust Ramifications of the Transaction Cost Approach, 127 U. PA. L. 
REV. 953, 965 n.50 (1979). Cournot and Bertrand models similarly assume that entry is impossible and 
that market concentration is directly linked to anti-competitive effects. See, e.g., DENNIS W. CARLTON 
& JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 157, 165, 167, 175 (3d ed. 1999); 
JEFFREY CHURCH & ROGER WARE, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 233-40, 247-52, 256-57 (2000). See 
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structural features, the formal models recognize that vertical integration 
may be just as likely to lower price and increase welfare and that the 
ability of existing players or new entrants to expand their outputs will be 
sufficient to defeat any attempt to increase price above competitive 
levels.136  
 Furthermore, post-Chicago theorists generally accept the Chicago 
School position that, even when the market structure is conducive to 
leveraging, vertical integration may lead to efficiencies sufficient to offset 
any concomitant anti-competitive effects and that whether a particular 
instance of vertical integration impedes or promotes competition depends 
on which of these two effects dominates.137 In fact, the parallels between 
their recognition that vertical integration can promote welfare either by 
eliminating the problems of double marginalization138 or by minimizing 
transaction costs139 and the Chicago School arguments detailed above are 
striking. Thus, as post-Chicago theorists candidly acknowledge, the 
existence of potential efficiencies makes it impossible to take an a priori 
stance of hostility or non-hostility towards vertical integration.140 
 For the purposes of this Article, then, it is sufficient to draw two 
limited conclusions. First, since regulations of the type at issue in this 
Article prohibit vertical integration without any inquiry into the specific 
facts of the case, those regulations necessarily presuppose that the proper 
                                                                                                                         
generally Bhagwat, supra note 21, at 1488; Hovenkamp, After Chicago, supra note 128, at 274, 275 
n.291; Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy, Restricted Distribution, and the Market for Exclusionary 
Rights, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1293, 1301 n.37, 1302, 1310-11 (1987); Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago, supra 
note 128, at 324-25; Janusz A. Ordover, Predation, Monopolization, and Antirust, in 1 HANDBOOK OF 
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, at 537, 566; Williamson, supra note 118, at 293. For critics offering the 
same observation, see Edward A. Snyder & Thomas E. Kauper, Misuse of the Antitrust Laws: The 
Competitor Plaintiff, 90 MICH. L. REV. 551, 564, 566 (1991).  
 136 See Riordan & Salop, supra note 131, at 532-33; Michael A. Salinger, Vertical Mergers 
in Multi-Product Industries and Edgeworth’s Paradox of Taxation, 39 J. INDUS. ECON. 545 (1991). It 
should be noted that there is one family of post-Chicago models that does not necessarily depend upon 
the existence of market power in the relevant markets. These models turn on the possibility that a 
strategizing firm could use tying or some other form of vertical restraint to force other players below 
minimum viable scale. See, e.g., Michael D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion, 80 AM. 
ECON. REV. 837 (1990). Such models have little relevance to the contexts addressed by this Article, 
since minimum viable scale in the industries discussed in this Article tend to be too low to make this a 
viable strategy. See, e.g., Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1130-39 (D.C. Cir.), cert. 
denied, 122 S. Ct. 644 (2001).  
 137 See, e.g., IAN AYRES, VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND OVERBUYING: AN ANALYSIS OF 
FORECLOSURE VIA RAISED RIVALS’ COSTS 17-20, 23-24 (Am. Bar Found., Working Paper No. 8803, 
1988); Hart & Tirole, supra note 131, at 212; Klass & Salinger, supra note 128, at 679-82; Riordan & 
Salop, supra note 131, at 522-27, 544-51, 564; Salinger, supra note 131, at 349-50; see also Thomas 
G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve 
Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 277-80 (1986) (conducting a similar analysis with respect to 
vertical restraints).  
 138 See Riordan & Salop, supra note 131, at 526-27; Salinger, supra note 131, at 354-55. 
 139 See Klass & Salinger, supra note 128, at 673; Williamson, supra note 135.  
 140 See Riordan & Salop, supra note 131, at 526-27; Salinger, supra note 131, at 349-50; see 
also Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago, supra note 128, at 352-56. 
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stance with respect to vertical integration is one of per se illegality.141 
Although Chicagoans and post-Chicagoans disagree over the nature and 
frequency of the circumstances under which vertical integration can harm 
competition, they agree that vertical integration often enhances welfare. As 
a result, nothing in the debate provides any support for a return to the 
discredited Harvard School position of treating vertical integration as 
illegal per se.  
 Second, the debate between the Chicago and the post-Chicago 
Schools only seems to confirm the value of continuing to follow the basic 
approach taken by the Vertical Merger Guidelines, since both approaches 
seem to highlight the importance of focusing on market concentration, 
barriers to entry, and the potential for welfare-enhancing efficiencies.142 
The post-Chicagoans’ only quibble appears to be with the HHI levels used 
to demarcate when a market is sufficiently concentrated as to create a risk 
of anti-competitive danger.143 Such concerns are mitigated in large part by 
these scholars’ embrace of the Vertical Merger Guidelines when defending 
the administrability of their theories,144 their apparent willingness to apply 
the HHI thresholds appearing in the Guidelines,145 and their reticence in 
proposing an alternative numerical standard.146  
 Thus, notwithstanding the considerable divergence of opinion 
between the Chicago School and the post-Chicago School on a wide range 
of issues, the situations identified by the post-Chicago School in which 
vertical integration can harm competition reinforce, rather than undercut, 
the appropriateness of continuing to rely on the Vertical Merger 
Guidelines as a basis for determining whether a vertical merger is likely to 
harm competition. Although many questions remain with respect to 
vertical integration, the Guidelines continue to represent the underlying 
economic consensus and as a result constitute an appropriate starting point 
for evaluating the effect that vertical integration is likely to have on 
competition. 
                                                                                                                         
 141 Professor Louis Kaplow’s pathbreaking analysis of the Chicago School’s critique of 
leveraging is not to the contrary. By identifying particular circumstances in which leverage could harm 
competition, his article was meant to “establish[ ] only that leverage must be taken seriously; other 
explanations offered by the critics of leverage theory to explain restrictive practices are not ruled out.” 
Kaplow, supra note 61, at 516. 
 142 See Riordan & Salop, supra note 131, at 533, 540-41 (noting that their approach called 
for a structural evaluation of concentration and barriers to entry similar to that followed by the Vertical 
Merger Guidelines); see also Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 137, at 284-85 (calling their theory 
“broadly consistent” and “fundamentally consistent” with the Vertical Merger Guidelines).  
 143 See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 137, at 284-85. 
 144 See id. at 255-58, 289. 
 145 See id. at 261-62 (referring to HHI levels of “1000 (or 1800)”). 
 146 See Klass & Salinger, supra note 128, at 682-83 (noting that one post-Chicago model 
suggests that another numerical standard might be appropriate without suggesting any alternative).  
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C. Applying the Basic Economic Framework to the Chain Broadcasting 
Rules 
 The tripartite approach taken by the Vertical Merger Guidelines thus 
provides an appropriate basis for evaluating whether vertical integration 
can plausibly pose the threat to competition that the FCC envisioned when 
it enacted the Chain Broadcasting Rules. As noted earlier, the FCC’s 
central concerns were that the broadcast networks would be able to use 
their dominance over the wholesale level of production to harm 
competition at the retail level of production and to lock up local broadcast 
stations in ways that would forestall the emergence of new networks. 
Under the framework established by the Vertical Merger Guidelines, the 
market for networks represents the primary market, and the market for 
broadcast stations represents the secondary market. For vertical integration 
to pose a sufficient danger, then, (1) the market for networks must be 
concentrated, (2) the market for broadcast stations must also be 
concentrated and protected by barriers to entry, and (3) there must be no 
plausible efficiencies resulting from network ownership of broadcast 
stations. A systematic evaluation of each of these criteria reveals that none 
of them are met. As such, under the Guidelines approach, vertical 
integration between broadcast networks and local broadcast stations is 
insufficiently likely to produce the type of anti-competitive effects that 
would justify imposing a blanket prohibition on vertical integration of the 
type embodied in the Chain Broadcasting Rules.  
1. Concentration in the Market for Television Networks 
 The first step in determining whether vertical integration between 
broadcast networks and broadcast stations will have anti-competitive 
effects is evaluating whether the market for networks is concentrated. The 
key to evaluating the degree of concentration in a particular market is 
product market definition. As the D.C. Circuit has noted, “entertainment is 
an industry in which antitrust concepts such as product market . . . are 
exceptionally difficult to apply.”147 Policymakers and commentators have 
long debated whether such alternative media as print and videocassette 
recorders should be regarded as substitutes for broadcast programming.148 
                                                                                                                         
 147 National Ass’n of Theater Owners v. FCC, 420 F.2d 194, 204 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. 
denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1970).  
 148 See Syracuse Peace Coun., 2 F.C.C.R. 5043, 5053-54, ¶¶ 66-72 (1987) (Memorandum 
Opinion and Order); Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Comm’n’s Rules and Regulations Concerning 
the Gen. Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broad. Licensees, 102 F.C.C.2d 142, 198-219, ¶¶ 85-128 
(1985) (Report); Amendment of Section 73.3555, [formerly Sections 73.35, 73.240, and 73.636] of the 
Comm’n’s Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and Television Broad. Stations, 100 
F.C.C.2d 17, 25-26, ¶¶ 25-26 (1984) (Report and Order); Amendment of Sections 73.35, 73.240, and 
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I leave resolution of such complex issues for another day. To simplify the 
analysis, I will take the less controversial tack of focusing solely on 
alternative sources of television programming that more clearly represent 
substitutes for the original broadcast television networks.  
 Even the casual observer is no doubt well aware that the market for 
television broadcast networks has undergone a significant degree of 
deconcentration in recent years. The last fifteen years have witnessed the 
arrival of Fox as a fourth major television network strong enough to 
produce such hit shows as “The Simpsons” and “The X-Files” as well as 
capture such marquee properties such as the NFL. Three other fledgling 
networks—UPN, WB, and PaxTV—have also joined the fray. In addition, 
the last thirty years have witnessed an explosion of independent television 
stations that offer still more programming in direct competition with the 
broadcast networks.149 As a result, even if the relevant market were limited 
solely to the market for broadcast television, it appears that the market is 
too unconcentrated to permit the networks to harm competition in the 
market for local television stations.150 
 It is likely, however, that restricting our focus to other broadcast 
television networks would be too narrow. Proper market definition 
requires the inclusion of products that act as substitutes for broadcast 
networks as well. It now seems relatively clear that broadcast television 
networks compete directly with television networks transmitted via cable, 
direct broadcast satellites (“DBS”), and similar technologies (which the 
federal statutes term multichannel video programming distributors or 
“MVPDs”).151 As the FCC’s most recent Annual Report on Competition in 
Video Markets reveals, cable television is now essentially universally 
available, with cable lines passing ninety-seven percent of all households 
nationwide,152 and DBS is available to any home with a clear line of sight 
                                                                                                                         
73.636 of the Comm’n’s Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and Television Broad. 
Stations, 95 F.C.C.2d 360, 387-89 & n.101 (1983) (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking); JONATHAN LEVY 
& FLORENCE SETZER, MEASUREMENT OF CONCENTRATION IN HOME VIDEO MARKETS 51-53 (FCC 
Off. of Plans & Policy Staff Report, Dec. 23, 1982); Lawrence P. Blaskopf, Note, Defining the 
Relevant Product Market of the New Video Technologies, 4 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 75 (1985); 
Harry Boadwee, Note, Product Market Definition for Video Programming, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1210, 
1210 & nn.3-4 (1986). 
 149 Review of the Prime Time Access Rule, 11 F.C.C.R. 546, 560-61, ¶¶ 27-29 (1995) 
(Report and Order). 
 150 See id. at 562 n.64 (noting that the HHI for national prime-time broadcast television 
program distribution was 1366). 
 151 For a description of the various MVPDs, which also include home satellite dishes 
(“HSD”), multichannel multipoint distribution systems (“MMDS”), satellite master antenna television 
systems (“SMATV”), open video systems (“OVS”), see Annual Assessment of the Status of 
Competition in the Mkts. for the Delivery of Video Programming, FCC 01-389, slip op., at 10-54, ¶¶ 
15-115 (F.C.C. rel. Jan. 14, 2002) (Eighth Annual Report), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/ 
edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-01-389A1.pdf [hereinafter Eighth Annual Report]. 
 152 Id. at 87 tbl.B-1. 
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to the sky.153 Competition among MVPDs has caused them to routinely 
waive installation fees and other switching costs and has driven the price 
of introductory packages to as little as nine dollars per month.154 As a 
result, MVPDs have now overtaken conventional broadcasting as the 
predominant means for delivering television programming to the home. As 
Table I indicates, eighty-six percent of U.S. households now receive their 
television through cable, DBS, or some other MVPD.  
. 
Table I. Deployment of Multichannel Video Programming 
Distribution (“MVPD”) Technologies as of June 2001 
 
MVPD Technology 
Households 
(millions) 
% MVPD 
Households 
% Total TV 
Households 
    
Cable   68.98  78.11%  67.51% 
DBS   16.07  18.20%  15.73% 
SMATV   1.50  1.70%  1.47% 
Home Satellite Dish   1.00  1.13%  0.98% 
MMDS   0.70  0.79%  0.69% 
Open Video Systems  0.60  0.07%  0.06% 
    
Total MVPD Households  88.31  100.00%  86.42% 
Total TV Households  102.18   100.00% 
 
Source: Eighth Annual Report, supra note 151, at 95 tbl.C-1. 
 
 Indeed, the FCC has explicitly recognized that cable and broadcast 
networks operate as substitutes for one another. For example, in proposing 
the elimination of the two-year limit on network affiliation agreements 
enacted by the Chain Broadcasting Rules, the FCC recognized that the 
emergence of alternative video delivery systems had subjected the 
                                                                                                                         
 153 Id. at 56, ¶ 122. The only significant remaining impediment to MVPD deployment is the 
inability of cable and DBS operators to reach residents living in large apartment buildings, which the 
FCC terms multiple dwelling units or MDUs. Id. at 57-60, ¶¶ 124-36. The FCC has taken steps to 
increase MVPD access to MDU residents and is currently considering what additional steps may be 
necessary. See Promotion of Competitive Networks in Local Telecomms. Mkts., 15 F.C.C.R. 22,983 
(2000) (First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in WT Docket No. 99-217, 
Fifth Report and Order and Memorandum Opinion and Order in CC Docket No. 96-98, and Fourth 
Report and Order and Memorandum Opinion and Order in CC Docket No. 88-57); Implementation of 
Section 207 of the Telecomms. Act of 1996, 13 F.C.C.R. 23,874 (1998) (Second Report and Order); 
Telecomms. Servs. Inside Wiring, 13 F.C.C.R. 3659 (1997) (Report and Order and Second Further 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking). 
 154 See Dish Network, Dish Network Special Offers, at http://www.dishnetwork.com/ 
content/promotions/index.shtml (last visited Dec. 12, 2001). 
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established broadcast networks to increasingly vigorous competition.155 
The FCC reconfirmed this conclusion when repealing the two-year limit 
the following year.156 Similarly, when eliminating the Chain Broadcasting 
Rules’ prohibition of network ownership of certain local broadcast 
stations, the FCC relied in part on the emergence of cable and DBS as 
viable alternatives to conventional over-the-air television broadcasting.157 
Given the high degree of penetration achieved by the MVPDs and the 
FCC’s recent regulatory decisions recognizing the interchangeability of the 
various video technologies, it seems relatively clear that cable television, 
DBS, and other MVPDs should be included in the same product market as 
conventional broadcasting.  
 Once cable and the other MVPDs are included in the same product 
market as broadcast networks, the task becomes one of computing the 
relevant HHIs. Practical limitations lead me to include only those firms 
already participating in the relevant markets. The FCC is currently 
exploring whether focusing solely on current market participants 
understates the competitiveness of particular markets, since doing so 
ignores the fact that any attempt to increase price can often induce existing 
players to expand output as well as attract entry by new firms.158 Since any 
such entry would only increase the competitiveness of the market, 
calculating HHIs on the basis of the current market can provide a useful 
baseline for evaluating a market’s competitiveness. If HHIs calculated in 
this manner fall below the HHI thresholds identified by the Vertical 
Merger Guidelines, there would appear to be little basis for regulatory 
concern. 
 Although it is conventional to calculate HHIs using product share, the 
Guidelines issued by the Justice Department and the FTC to govern 
horizontal mergers indicate that dollar sales may be more appropriate 
                                                                                                                         
 155 Review of Rules and Polices Concerning Network Broad. by Television Stations: 
Elimination or Modification of Section 73.658(c) of the Comm’n’s Rules, 3 F.C.C.R. 5681, 5682, ¶ 18 
(1988) (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking). 
 156 See Review of Rules and Policies Concerning Network Broad. by Television Stations: 
Elimination or Modification of Section 73.658(c) of the Comm’n’s Rules, 4 F.C.C.R. 2755, 2757, ¶ 15 
(1989) (Report and Order). 
 157 Review of the Comm’n’s Regulations Governing Television Broad., 10 F.C.C.R. 4538, 
4540, ¶ 10 (1995) (Report and Order). 
 158 Eighth Annual Report, supra note 151, at 65, ¶ 154; see also Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines, supra note 124, § 1.32 (recognizing that well-defined product market includes firms that 
would enter in response to an increase in price). This revised approach would better incorporate the 
core insights of “contestability” theory, which recognizes that the threat of potential entry can 
discipline a market as effectively as competition from current market participants. Even markets that 
are heavily concentrated may nonetheless be efficient so long as barriers to entry and exit are low. See 
generally WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, JOHN C. PANZAR, & ROBERT D. WILLIG, CONTESTABLE MARKETS 
AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (1982). For a compact overview of contestability theory, 
see Elizabeth E. Bailey & William J. Baumol, Deregulation and the Theory of Contestable Markets, 1 
YALE J. ON REG. 111, 111-22 (1984). 
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when products are differentiated.159 Consequently, I will estimate HHIs 
using both dollar and audience share. Several considerations can make 
calculating HHIs in the television industry quite tricky. Since certain cable 
networks are jointly owned by several entities, it can be difficult to 
determine how to attribute ownership interests.160 In addition, practical 
considerations have forced me to base my analysis solely on published, 
non-proprietary information. The following analysis is thus offered as a 
rough-and-ready approximation of a true HHI. While a more refined 
analysis would doubtlessly be better, I believe that these calculations are 
sufficient to provide a working understanding of whether the market for 
television networks is sufficiently concentrated to support claims that 
vertical integration involving that market would harm competition. To give 
the Chain Broadcasting Rules the widest possible berth, I attempted to 
resolve all ambiguities in a way that maximized the effect on total HHI.  
Although the issue is a close one, analyzed in terms of viewership 
shares it appears that the market for television networks does not meet the 
standard of concentration articulated in the Vertical Merger Guidelines to 
raise the danger that the broadcast networks will be able to exert market 
power against local broadcast stations. An analysis of the market for 
television networks in terms of dollar share leads to the same conclusion. 
 
 
                                                                                                                         
 159 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 124, § 1.41. A growing number of scholars 
have questioned the appropriateness of using HHIs when products are differentiated. See Jerry A. 
Hausman & Gregory K. Leonard, Economic Analysis of Differentiated Products Mergers Using Real 
World Data, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 321, 337-38 (1997); Thomas Overstreet et al., Understanding 
Econometric Analysis of the Price Effects of Mergers Involving Differentiated Products, ANTITRUST, 
Summer 1996, at 30-31; Gregory J. Werden, Simulating the Effects of Differentiated Products 
Mergers: A Practical Alternative to Structural Merger Policy, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 363, 368-69 
(1997); Gregory J. Werden & Luke M. Froeb, The Effects of Mergers in Differentiated Products 
Industries: Logit Demand and Merger Policy, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 407, 423-24 (1994). It should be 
noted that such concerns were raised in the context of horizontal rather than vertical integration. In 
addition, although senior Justice Department officials acknowledge these problems, they still continue 
to advocate the use of HHIs. See Carl Shapiro, Mergers with Differentiated Products, ANTITRUST, 
Spring 1996, at 23, 28-29.  
 160 The FCC has traditionally taken a conservative approach to attribution, tending to regard 
equity positions as low as five percent as constituting an attributable interest. 47 C.F.R. §§ 21.912 note 
1(a), 73.3555 note 2(a), 76.501 note 2(a) (2000). The problem is that, while this approach may be 
appropriately conservative in the context in which it has been applied, when calculating HHIs, taking a 
broad approach to attribution may understate the degree of industry concentration. This is because 
allowing control of a particular group of viewers to be counted as part of the audience of more than 
one network tends to double count viewers in ways that makes market shares appear artificially low. 
For general commentary on the problems associated with partial integration, see Timothy F. Bresnahan 
& Steven C. Salop, Quantifying the Competitive Effects of Production Joint Ventures, 4 INT’L J. 
INDUS. ORG. 155 (1986); Daniel P. O’Brien & Steven C. Salop, Competitive Effects of Partial 
Ownership: Financial Interest and Corporate Control, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 559, 594-98 (2000); and 
Janusz A. Ordover & Carl Shapiro, The General Motors-Toyota Joint Venture: An Economic 
Assessment, 31 WAYNE L. REV. 1167, 1189-94 (1985). 
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Table II. Concentration of the Market for Television Networks by 
Audience Share as of November 2000 
 
Network Owner Rating  Share  HHI 
    
Viacom, Inc.  16.6  23%  550 
Walt Disney Co.  16.3  23%  530 
News Corp.  9.9  14%  196 
General Electric Co.  9.8  14%  192 
AOL Time Warner Inc.  8.2  12%  134 
Liberty Media Corp.  4.8  7%  46 
USA Networks, Inc.  2.7  4%  15 
Other   2.5  4%  4 
    
Total  70.2 100% 1667 
 
Source: Appendix A. 
 
 
Table III. Concentration of the Market for Television Networks by 
Dollar Share as of 2000 
 
Network Owner 
Revenue 
($ in billions) Share   HHI  
    
Walt Disney Co.  8.1  24%  565  
Viacom, Inc.  6.1  18%  316 
General Electric Co.  5.2  15%  233 
AOL-Time Warner Inc.  4.9  14%  207 
Liberty Media Corp.  4.7  14%  188 
News Corp.  2.4  7%  49 
USA Networks, Inc.  2.3  7%  45 
Other  0.5  1%  2 
    
Total  34.2 100%  1605 
  
Source: Appendix B. 
 
 The FCC has drawn the same conclusion in its recent regulatory 
decisions. For example, in eliminating the term of affiliation rule in 1988, 
the FCC concluded that the emergence of new broadcast stations, as well 
as the emergence of cable television, substantially mitigated the possibility 
that a broadcast network would be able to use its market position to harm 
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competition.161 Similarly, in its 1995 action to eliminate the Prime Time 
Access Rule, the FCC concluded that the increase in the number of 
broadcast television networks had so deconcentrated the market that it was 
no longer necessary to protect local television affiliates against possible 
dominance by the broadcast networks.162 As a result, the FCC concluded 
that the market for broadcast television networks was too unconcentrated 
to permit any network to dominate the market for video programming 
distribution.163 The subsequent emergence of DBS and other alternative 
sources of video programming will only further erode the position of the 
broadcast networks. 
2. Concentration and Barriers to Entry in the Market for Home 
Delivery of Television Programming 
 In order for vertical integration to harm competition, the Vertical 
Merger Guidelines require more than just concentration in the primary 
market; the secondary market must also be susceptible to monopolization. 
There is reason to doubt that the market for local broadcast stations is 
sufficiently concentrated to raise this type of risk. The FCC’s Network 
Inquiry Staff concluded in 1980 that the market for broadcast television 
stations was sufficiently unconcentrated as to render any attempt at 
foreclosure unprofitable.164 At the time, the average U.S. household could 
receive 3.9 over-the-air television stations.165 By the year 2000, the 
number of stations received by the average household had increased to 
thirteen, a more than threefold increase over the number found 
unconcentrated twenty years earlier.166 Furthermore, since that time 
technological change has deconcentrated the market and lowered the 
                                                                                                                         
 161 Review of Rules and Policies Concerning Network Broad. by Television Stations: 
Elimination or Modification of Section 73.658(c) of the Comm’n’s Rules, 4 F.C.C.R. 2755, 2757, ¶¶ 
14-16 (1989) (Report and Order). 
 162 Review of the Prime Time Access Rule, 11 F.C.C.R. 546, 562 n.64 (1995) (Report and 
Order) (noting that the HHI for national prime-time broadcast television program distribution was 
1366). 
 163 Id. at 556, ¶ 20. The FCC drew a similar conclusion in the proceedings that led to the 
repeal of the financial interest and syndication rules (“finsyn”). See Review of the Syndication and Fin. 
Interest Rules, Sections 73.659-73.663 of the Comm’n’s Rules, 10 F.C.C.R. 12,165, 12,170, ¶¶ 26-27 
(1995) (Report and Order); Evaluation of the Syndication and Fin. Interest Rules, 8 F.C.C.R. 3282, 
3296, ¶¶ 43-50 (1993) (Second Report and Order); Amendment of 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(j)(1)(i) and (ii), 
Syndication and Fin. Interest Rules, 94 F.C.C.2d 1019, 1052, ¶¶ 124-25 (1983) (Tentative Decision 
and Request for Further Comments). 
 164 MISREGULATING TELEVISION, supra note 32, at 60, 72-73, 169. 
 165 Review of Rules and Polices Concerning Network Broad. by Television Stations: 
Elimination or Modification of Section 73.658(c) of the Comm’n’s Rules, 3 F.C.C.R. 5681, 5685, ¶ 17 
(1988) (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking). 
 166 See 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review—Review of the Comm’n’s Broad. Ownership 
Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecomms. Act of 1996, 15 F.C.C.R. 
11,058, 11,064, ¶ 9 (2000) (Biennial Review Report). 
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barriers to entry still further. As noted earlier, cable television and other 
forms of multichannel video programming distribution have emerged as 
real alternatives to broadcasting and have captured eighty-six percent of all 
U.S. households.  
 Any remaining doubts are likely to be shattered by the imminent 
arrival of digital television, which is scheduled to completely supplant the 
current regime of analog transmission by the end of 2006.167 Although 
early analyses assumed that digital broadcasters would transmit a single 
channel of high definition television, it is now clear that a digital television 
station also has the option to broadcast up to six standard definition digital 
channels in the same amount of spectrum.168 The prospect of the average 
household being able to receive more than seventy over-the-air broadcast 
channels seems to all but guarantee that the local video distribution 
markets will continue to be too unconcentrated for any degree of vertical 
integration between a television network and its broadcast affiliates to 
harm competition. 
3. Potential Efficiency Justifications 
 The final step in the economic analysis of vertical integration in the 
broadcast television industry is an evaluation of possible efficiency 
justifications that would justify permitting such integration to occur. An 
analysis of the cost structure associated with producing and transmitting 
television programming reveals that it is quite possible that broadcast 
television networks will be able to realize significant economies from 
vertical integration. As the following section will discuss in detail, the 
combination of large, up-front fixed costs associated with creating the first 
copy of television programs and minimal costs associated with distributing 
                                                                                                                         
 167 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(14)(A) (2001). The statute extends this date if fewer than eighty-five 
percent of the station’s viewers can receive the broadcaster’s digital signal either off-air or through 
satellite or cable television. 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(14)(B) (2001). There are those that doubt whether 
sufficient digital televisions will be sold to meet this standard. 
 168 As the FCC has noted: 
In addition to being able to broadcast one, and under some circumstances two, high 
definition television (“HDTV”) programs, the [digital television] Standard allows for 
multiple streams, or “multicasting,” of Standard Definition Television (“SDTV”) 
programming at a visual quality better than the current analog signal. Utilizing this 
Standard, broadcasters can transmit three, four, five, or more such programs streams 
simultaneously. 
Advanced Television Syss. and their Impact Upon the Existing Television Broad. Serv., 11 F.C.C.R. 
17,771, 17,772, ¶ 5 (1996) (Fourth Report and Order), modified, 12 F.C.C.R. 3388 (1997) (Order); 
accord Thomas W. Hazlett, Digitizing “Must-Carry” Under Turner Broadcasting v. FCC (1997), 8 
SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 141, 145 (2000) (“TV licensees have the option of either broadcasting a high 
definition TV (HDTV) signal or multiplexing channel broadcasts to produce multiple digital standard-
definition television (SDTV) signals, which could accommodate four to six SDTV sub-channels or 
more.”) (citing CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, COMPLETING THE TRANSITION TO DIGITAL 
TELEVISION (1999)). 
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programs to additional viewers give television programming many of the 
attributes of a pure public good.169 The existence of high initial fixed costs 
leaves broadcast networks quite vulnerable to opportunistic behavior. 
Broadcast networks can eliminate these problems by using vertical 
integration to guarantee that they will have access to audiences for their 
programs. In addition, television programming has other qualities that 
increase the transaction costs associated with program distribution still 
further. The existence of these features makes it quite possible that vertical 
integration will yield benefits sufficient to justify releasing the industry 
from the strictures of the Chain Broadcasting Rules. 
a. Elimination of Double Marginalization and Static 
Transaction Costs 
 The most singular economic feature of the broadcast industry is its 
unique cost structure. Specifically, the creation of television programming 
requires the incurrence of large, up-front, first-copy costs, while the cost of 
making and distributing additional copies is trivial in comparison. Since 
marginal costs are close to zero, vertical integration can allow firms to 
mitigate the problems of double marginalization by charging a more 
economically efficient transfer price. In addition, this cost structure causes 
average cost to decline over all relevant volumes, as the large up-front 
investments are amortized over an increasingly large number of viewers. 
When faced with such a declining cost structure, economic efficiency 
increases with every additional viewer reached. Broadcast programming 
thus exhibits a natural tendency to seek as broad an audience as possible. 
This does not mean that all programs must secure universal distribution in 
order to survive or even that those programs that do achieve nationwide 
distribution must achieve dominant shares. On the contrary, the economic 
evidence suggests that programming is not a natural monopoly and that the 
minimum viable scale for broadcast programming is relatively small when 
compared to the nationwide audience. What it does mean is that broadcast 
programming will naturally exhibit a tendency towards an equilibrium 
level of distrubtion that is fairly widescale.170 The logical way for a 
network to secure such access would be for it to vertically integrate into 
the downstream stage or to negotiate contracts with its broadcast affiliates 
guaranteeing it the ability to reach a large enough audience to lower its 
costs. It also means that artificial barriers that prevent programming from 
                                                                                                                         
 169 BRUCE M. OWEN & STEVEN S. WILDMAN, VIDEO ECONOMICS 23-24 (1992). 
 170 NEW TELEVISION NETWORKS, supra note 28, at 398 & n.185, 519; MISREGULATING 
TELEVISION, supra note 32, at 5; Thomas G. Krattenmaker & A. Richard Metzger, Jr., FCC 
Regulatory Authority over Commercial Television Networks: The Role of Ancillary Jurisdiction, 77 
NW. U. L. REV. 403, 408 (1982). 
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securing its natural level of distribution can cause investment in 
programming to fall below efficient levels. The Chain Broadcasting Rules 
represent a significant obstacle to networks seeking to guarantee access to 
viewers.  
b. Elimination of Strategic Behavior 
 In addition, the broadcast market is susceptible to all three types of 
opportunistic behavior identified above. Specifically, the existence of 
large, up-front fixed costs leaves networks vulnerable to the problems 
associated with hold up and free riding. In addition, the fact that the 
popularity of a particular television program is notoriously hard to 
determine ex ante leaves networks vulnerable to adverse selection. 
Unfortunately, the Chain Broadcasting Rules prevent networks from using 
vertical integration or a related vertical contractual restraint to minimize or 
even eliminate these problems. 
 Hold Up.  The sunk cost investment needed to create original 
television programming exposes broadcast networks to the possibility of 
being held up. Networks, of course, will not invest in programming unless 
it is likely that they will be able to recover both the fixed costs associated 
with creating the programming, as well as the marginal costs of 
distribution. Once the first-copy costs are sunk, however, it is possible for 
broadcast stations to hold out in an attempt to avoid having to contribute to 
fixed costs. The classic way to deter hold up behavior is either to vertically 
integrate into retail distribution or to enter into a long-term contract or 
some other contractual device that brings the interests of both parties into 
alignment. Unfortunately, this is precisely the type of contract barred by 
the Chain Broadcasting Rules. 
 Free Riding.  The network-affiliate relationship is also potentially 
fraught with free rider problems. Recall that the value of a program is 
determined in no small part by the network’s ability to reach the largest 
audience possible. Network profitability thus depends upon the willingness 
of affiliates to “clear” programs provided by the network, since doing so 
allows the first-copy costs to be spread across the largest possible 
audience. Because of this, the value of the network to the local broadcast 
affiliates depends upon the behavior of other affiliates, since the refusal by 
any affiliate to carry a program offered by the network causes the fixed 
costs to be spread over a smaller number of viewers. So long as this danger 
exists, networks will factor the risk of non-carriage into their initial 
decision to invest in programming. As the networks’ willingness to invest 
in programming decreases, so does the profitability of the local broadcast 
station. In other words, each affiliate’s programming decisions can impose 
significant negative externalities on other affiliates, as greater defections 
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 19:171, 2002 
216 
lead to inefficient program distribution and lower overall investments in 
programming.  
 The ideal situation for a network affiliate, however, is to refuse to 
carry the least profitable programming provided by the network and to 
contribute as little as possible to the fixed costs associated with creating 
the programming. In effect, a station has the incentive to attempt to free 
ride on the willingness of other affiliates to bear the costs associated with 
creating and maintaining the network. Since all of the affiliates have the 
same incentives in this regard, absent coordination sufficient to solve this 
collective action problem, the affiliates will defect at an inefficiently high 
rate. This will lead to an inefficient level of program distribution, which 
will in turn create inefficiently low levels of investment in programming. 
 All of this could be solved by allowing networks to protect against 
such free riding either by vertically integrating into the retail distribution 
stage or by entering into affiliation agreements that limit an affiliate’s 
ability to refuse to carry network programming. Doing so would not only 
create a sounder financial basis for investment in the abstract, it would also 
decrease the likelihood that an affiliate could free ride on fellow 
affiliates.171 Again, the Chain Broadcasting Rules effectively prevent 
television networks from availing themselves of either option. 
 Adverse Selection.  Another feature of the network-affiliate 
relationships is the potential for adverse selection. As discussed earlier, 
adverse selection arises when the quality of a product varies and is hard to 
determine in advance. Customers looking to purchase such products have 
the incentive to search to find the highest quality goods. The customer who 
succeeds in finding such goods receives a windfall, having received goods 
of above average quality without having to pay more than the average 
price. In addition, the seller will be left with an inventory of below average 
goods that it will be unable to sell at the average price. The need to avoid 
this will lead to oversearching, as sellers invest additional resources in pre-
sorting the goods and pricing them at different points and buyers invest 
additional resources inspecting the goods in an attempt to gain an 
information advantage over each other.  
 Television programming bears all of the characteristics of a classic 
adverse selection problem. As noted earlier, the quality of goods varies 
and is very hard to determine ex ante when the initial investment in 
creating the program is made.172 The networks could avoid adverse 
selection problems either by vertically integrating, by entering into an 
exclusive dealing arrangement,173 or by bundling programs together in a 
                                                                                                                         
 171 OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note 169, at 171-72. 
 172 See id. at 164; see also Kenney & Klein, supra note 100, at 534 (noting that the value of 
movies can be hard to determine in advance). 
 173 See OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note 169, at 163. 
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way that forces the local broadcast affiliates to focus on the average 
quality of the programs.174 Unfortunately, the existing prohibitions on 
option time and mandatory clearance included in the Chain Broadcasting 
Rules prevent networks from fully mitigating these problems in this 
manner. 
 There are thus several plausible arguments that permitting vertical 
integration in the broadcast industry would allow firms to realize 
efficiencies. As noted earlier, for the purposes of my argument, it is not 
necessary to establish that such efficiencies actually exist in all cases with 
respect to broadcasting. The key question underlying the choice between a 
per se and a rule of reason approach is whether such efficiencies are so 
implausible and the practice in question so inherently suspect that little 
would be served by evaluating whether any such efficiencies actually exist 
in a particular case. It thus suffices to conclude that the danger of 
anticompetitive effects seems so remote and the potential efficiencies seem 
sufficiently plausible to justify rejecting flat regulatory prohibition of 
vertical integration in the broadcasting industry. 
D. The Future of the Chain Broadcasting Rules 
 The foregoing analysis reveals that the market for broadcast networks 
and the market for broadcast stations are both sufficiently unconcentrated 
and unprotected by barriers to entry as to make it unlikely that any 
television network could use vertical integration in a way that could harm 
competition. Furthermore, it appears that vertical integration could yield 
significant efficiency benefits. The problem, as one group of distinguished 
commentators has noted, is that the “the network-affiliate relationship is 
overregulated” and that the FCC’s focus on the supposed exclusionary 
danger of the practices of the broadcast networks “has been so single-
minded as to induce a form of regulatory paranoia.”175 These 
commentators argued that the Chain Broadcasting Rules should therefore 
be abolished.  
 The FCC agreed up to a point. For example, in 1989, the FCC 
eliminated the rule limiting the term of network affiliation agreements to 
two years.176 The FCC concluded that increases in the number of 
independent television stations and the emergence of cable television 
rendered it extremely unlikely that the use of long-term contracts posed a 
                                                                                                                         
 174 Cf. NEW TELEVISION NETWORKS, supra note 28, at 240-41; Kenney & Klein, supra note 
100, at 505. 
 175 MISREGULATING TELEVISION, supra note 32, at 92. 
 176 Review of Rules and Policies Concerning Network Broad. by Television Stations: 
Elimination or Modification of Section 73.658(c) of the Comm’n’s Rules, 4 F.C.C.R. 2755 (1989) 
(Report and Order). 
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significant threat to competition.177 The FCC further concluded that, by 
limiting the networks’ ability to obtain guaranteed access to programming 
outlets, the rule was discouraging the networks from investing in television 
programming.178 Moreover, since the program production and acquisition 
cycle often exceeded two years, the rule left the networks in the position of 
having to invest in programming without any ability to control or predict 
the size and location of the audience that would eventually be able to see 
the program.179 The reduction in uncertainty would likely be especially 
beneficial to new networks, which confront significantly higher risks than 
established networks. Ironically, the FCC concluded, the term of affiliation 
rule “‘may actually have the perverse effect of impeding new network 
entry, without providing any countervailing benefits.’”180 
 In 1995, the FCC also eliminated the provision of the Chain 
Broadcasting Rules that prohibited networks from owning stations in small 
communities.181 The FCC concluded that the increase in competition for 
television from new networks and the emergence of cable and DBS 
rendered it unlikely that any such vertical integration would harm 
competition.182 On the contrary, vertical integration offered networks the 
chance to take advantage of managerial, technical, and other efficiencies 
that would improve the financial viability and competitiveness of 
television broadcast stations in small markets.183  
 The drive to repeal the Chain Broadcasting Rules eventually stalled, 
however, as a proceeding to repeal the remaining provisions of the Chain 
Broadcasting Rules has remained open without action since 1995.184 As a 
result, the rules prohibiting exclusive affiliation agreements, territorial 
exclusivity, compulsory carriage, and option time remain in force today.185 
Therefore, despite the fact that the structure of the relevant markets is such 
that additional degrees of vertical integration would pose little threat to 
competition, broadcast networks remain unable to take certain steps that 
might allow them to realize all of the available efficiencies. Thus, the 
continued existence of these rules not only reflects an incomplete 
understanding of the economics of vertical integration, it also harms 
consumers by reducing the quality of programming available on broadcast 
television. It remains to be seen whether the accession of a new FCC 
                                                                                                                         
 177 Id. at 2757, ¶¶ 14-16. 
 178 Id. at 2757, ¶ 17. 
 179 Id. at 2757, ¶ 18. 
 180 Id. at 2757, ¶ 17 (quoting NEW TELEVISION NETWORKS, supra note 28, at 486). 
 181 Review of the Comm’n’s Regulations Governing Television Broad., 10 F.C.C.R. 4538 
(1995) (Report and Order). 
 182 Id. at 4539-40, ¶¶ 8, 10. 
 183 Id. at 4540, ¶ 11.  
 184 See Review of the Comm’n’s Regulations Governing Programming Practices of Broad. 
Television Networks and Affiliates, 10 F.C.C.R. 11,951 (1995) (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking). 
 185 47 C.F.R. § 73.658 (2001). 
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Chairman will spark new interest in bringing this proceeding to 
completion. 
 Recent events have also placed renewed focus on the other set of 
regulations primarily responsible for blocking vertical integration by the 
broadcast networks. The FCC recently denied the broadcast networks’ 
request that it repeal the rule prohibiting persons from owning stations 
capable of reaching more than thirty-five percent of the nationwide 
audience.186 The FCC agreed to refrain from enforcing that rule until a 
pending judicial challenge to that decision was completed.187 In the 
meantime, the issue created a major schism within the National 
Association of Broadcasters, as both NBC and Fox have withdrawn to 
protest the Association’s refusal to support lifting the thirty-five percent 
national audience cap.188 As this Article was going to press, the D.C. 
Circuit struck down the national audience cap as arbitrary and capricious 
as well as a violation of the FCC’s statutory mandate.189 Given the salience 
of this issue, it is quite possible that proceedings in connection with the 
national ownership caps will provide policy makers with an opportunity to 
rethink their approach to regulating vertical integration in the broadcast 
industry. 
II. The 1992 Cable Act and the Dynamic Inefficiency of Compelled 
Access 
 Anyone who peruses the findings and the legislative history of the 
1992 Cable Act will easily discern that its enactment was animated in no 
small part by concern over the increase in vertical integration in the cable 
industry that was taking place at that time.190 Some of its provisions 
imposed ownership restrictions similar to those appearing in the regulatory 
                                                                                                                         
 186 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review—Review of the Comm’n’s Broad. Ownership Rules 
and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecomms. Act of 1996, 15 F.C.C.R. 11,058, 
11,072-74, ¶¶ 25-30 (2000) (Biennial Review Report). 
 187 See UTV of San Francisco, Inc., 16 F.C.C.R. 14,975, 14,982, ¶ 25 (2001). The FCC’s 
action followed an initial refusal to suspend the national ownership restrictions for broadcasting in the 
wake of the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126 (D.C. 
Cir.), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 644 (2001), which overturned a similar national ownership restriction for 
cable. See Applications of Shareholders of CBS Corp., 16 F.C.C.R. 5831 (2001). 
 188 Paige Albiniak, Fox Bows Out of NAB, BROAD. & CABLE, June 14, 1999, at 15; Paige 
Albiniak, Peacock Finally Flies NAB, BROAD. & CABLE, Mar. 13, 2000, at 20. 
 189  See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, Nos. 00-1222 et al., 2002 WL 233650, at *10-
*16 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 19, 2002). 
 190 See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 
102-385, § 2(a)(5), 106 Stat. 1460, 1460-61 (entering legislative findings about the harms associated 
with vertical integration in the cable industry); id. § 2(b)(5), 106 Stat. at 1463 (stating that it is the 
policy of Congress to “ensure that cable television operators do not have undue market power vis-à-vis 
video programmers and consumers”); S. REP. NO. 102-92, at 23-32 (1992), reprinted in 1992 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1156-65 (reviewing the problems caused by vertical integration in the cable 
industry). 
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regime governing broadcasting. Most distinctive about the approach taken 
by the 1992 Cable Act was its greater emphasis on a different regulatory 
device—compelled access requirements—to redress the problems of 
vertical integration.191  
 This Part will evaluate the policy underlying the restrictions on 
vertical integration contained in the 1992 Cable Act by assessing the 
extent to which vertical integration in the cable industry poses a sufficient 
threat to competition. Section A will describe the basic structure of the 
cable television industry and the regulatory scheme erected by the 1992 
Cable Act. Section B will apply the basic economic approach developed in 
Part I to the cable television industry in order to assess the extent to which 
vertical integration in the cable industry poses a real threat to competition. 
Section C will examine the unique problems posed by access as a remedy 
to the problems of vertical integration. A review of the academic literature 
reveals that compelled access is quite problematic as a remedy to vertical 
integration. Section D will review the prospects for changes to the existing 
regulatory regime. 
A. Description of the Cable Industry and the Regulatory Restrictions on 
Vertical Integration 
1. The Structure of the Cable Industry 
 Just like broadcasting, the cable industry can be mapped onto the 
basic three-stage chain of production comprised of manufacturers, 
wholesalers, and retailers that typifies the distribution of many, if not most, 
physical goods in the U.S. economy.192 As was the case in broadcasting, 
the manufacturing stage is again occupied by the movie studios and others 
                                                                                                                         
 191 Although broadcast regulation did include some access requirements, those were 
restricted to political speech and were motivated primarily by the desire to promote free speech and to 
improve the functioning of the political process. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 312(a)(7), 315 (1994); see also Red 
Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (describing the now defunct Fairness Doctrine, Political 
Editorial Rule, and Personal Attack Rule). Competition policy in general, and vertical integration in 
particular, did not appear to be a motivation behind the access requirements imposed on broadcasters. 
 192 LEVY & SETZER, supra note 148, at 39-40; see Lawrence J. White, Antitrust and Video 
Markets: The Merger of Showtime and the Movie Channel as a Case Study, in VIDEO MEDIA 
COMPETITION: REGULATION, ECONOMICS, AND TECHNOLOGY 338, 347-48 (Eli M. Noam ed., 1985). It 
is more natural to conceive of the relationship between the wholesale and retail stages of the cable 
industry as a purely vertical relationship than it is with respect to broadcasting, in which the wholesale 
and retail stages are also horizontal competitors for advertising dollars. See supra note 27 and 
accompanying text. This is because, unlike in broadcasting, viewers are able to signal the intensity of 
their preferences through direct payments. As a result, advertising represents a nearly inconsequential 
amount of the revenue at the retail stage of the chain of production. See Michael G. Vita & John P. 
Wiegand, Must-Carry Regulations for Cable Television Systems: An Economic Policy Analysis, 37 J. 
BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 1 (1993) (reporting that advertising represents on average only 1.8% of a 
cable operator’s total revenue). 
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who create original television programming, as well as syndicators and 
others who hold the rights to programming that has already been produced. 
The wholesale stage is represented by the cable networks (such as 
Lifetime, TBS, the USA Network, Nickelodeon, A&E, and the Discovery 
Channel), which acquire the right to air programs and aggregate them into 
program packages. Integration between the manufacturing and wholesale 
stage is quite common in cable, with such popular networks such as CNN 
and ESPN airing high percentages of programming that they produce 
themselves. Because these functions are not as distinct as they generally 
are in broadcasting, producers of original programming and cable 
networks are often collectively referred to as “cable programmers.”193 
 The retail stage of the cable industry consists of local “cable 
operators,” who receive licenses from municipal governments to operate 
the web of coaxial cables connecting individual homes and for transmitting 
the television programming into those homes.194 A company that controls 
cable operators in more than one city is called a “multiple system 
operator” (“MSO”). The largest MSOs in the U.S. include AT&T 
Broadband, Time Warner Cable, Comcast Cable Communications, Charter 
Communications, Cox Communications, and Adelphia 
Communications.195  
 Historically, many of the largest MSOs have vertically integrated into 
cable programming. For example, the second-largest MSO, AOL-Time 
Warner, also controls a number of major cable networks, including TBS, 
CNN, TNT, the Cartoon Network, HBO, and Cinemax. The third-largest 
MSO, Comcast Communications, also runs a family of cable networks that 
includes QVC, E!, and the Golf Channel. The largest MSO in the U.S., 
AT&T Broadband, similarly held major equity positions in a number of 
cable networks until it completed its spin-off of Liberty Media on August 
10, 2001. Cable networks that are under the same corporate umbrella as a 
particular cable operator are called “affiliated programmers.” Cable 
networks with which a cable operator has no vertical relationship are 
called “unaffiliated programmers.” 
2. Provisions of the 1992 Cable Act Affecting Vertical Integration 
 The 1992 Cable Act contained a variety of measures designed to curb 
the supposed dangers posed by vertical integration in the cable industry. 
Many of these took the now familiar form of ownership limits and 
structural restrictions. For example, Congress enacted the so-called 
                                                                                                                         
 193 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 628 (1994). 
 194 Id. 
 195 See National Cable & Telecommunications Association, Top 25 MSOs (June 30, 2001), 
at http://www.ncta.com/industry_overview/top50mso.cfm. 
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“channel occupancy” provision, which authorized the FCC to place limits 
on the number of channels that cable operators could devote to networks 
with which they are vertically affiliated.196 Initially, the FCC set this limit 
at forty percent of the operator’s channel capacity, only to see that limit 
invalidated by the courts.197  
 The 1992 Cable Act also includes the so-called “subscriber limit” 
provision, which authorizes the FCC to cap the number of cable 
subscribers that any MSO can reach nationwide.198 To implement this 
provision, the FCC initially prohibited any MSO from servicing more than 
thirty percent of all MVPD subscribers only to see those limits invalidated 
as well.199 At first blush, this limit appears horizontal in focus. On closer 
inspection, however, it becomes clear that that is not the case. Horizontal 
integration involves a merger of direct competitors. Cable operators in 
different cities, however, serve different geographic markets and as a result 
do not compete with one another.200 Thus, a merger between cable 
operators serving different cities is not properly regarded as a true 
horizontal merger, since such a merger cannot be said to eliminate any 
direct competition. The real purpose for the subscriber limits is to prevent 
large MSOs from exerting too much bargaining power upstream against 
cable programmers in the national market for television programming.201 
Thus, the subscriber limits are more properly understood as being driven 
by vertical, rather than horizontal, concerns and as focusing on the national 
market in which MSOs contract with cable programmers, rather than the 
local markets in which cable operators contract with end users. In addition, 
even when vertical integration was permitted, the Act prohibits vertically 
integrated operators from entering into exclusive dealing contracts.202  
                                                                                                                         
 196 47 U.S.C. § 533(f)(1)(B) (1994). 
 197 Implementation of Sections 12 and 19 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection Act 
of 1992, 8 F.C.C.R. 8565, 8592-96, ¶¶ 64-70 (1993) (Second Report and Order), rev’d & remanded 
sub nom. Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1137-39 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 122 S. 
Ct. 644 (2001). The channel occupancy limit promulgated by the FCC applied only to the first seventy-
five channels of any cable operator’s capacity. Any additional channel capacity was not subject to the 
limit. Id. at 8601-02, ¶ 84. 
 198 47 U.S.C. § 533(f)(1)(A) (1994). 
 199 Implementation of Section 11(c) of the Cable Television Consumer Protection Act of 
1992, 14 F.C.C.R. 19,119, ¶ 55 (1999). Subscribers to new cable systems and cable systems in direct 
competition with other cable systems did not count against the thirty percent cap. Id. at 19,112-13, ¶¶ 
33-34, 37. 
 200 See Thomas G. Krattenmaker, The Telecommunications Act of 1996, 29 CONN. L. REV. 
123, 168 (1996) (noting that broadcasters and cable operators in Chicago do not discipline broadcasters 
and cable operators in New York in the market for selling television to viewers). 
 201 See Time Warner Entm’t, 211 F.3d at 1319 (noting that Congress enacted the subscriber 
limits in part because of the concern that “a few dominant cable operators might preclude new 
programming services from attaining the critical mass audience necessary to survive”); see also 14 
F.C.C.R. at 19,116, ¶ 43.  
 202 The statute prohibits exclusive dealing contracts in all areas served by cable at the time 
the 1992 Cable Act was passed unless the FCC determines that such contract is in the public interest. 
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 The most striking feature of the 1992 Cable Act is the inclusion of 
several compelled access requirements. The most controversial of these 
were the “must-carry” provisions, which required cable operators to 
provide free carriage to all full-power stations broadcasting within the 
operator’s service area.203 In addition, the “leased access” provision 
requires all cable systems with more than thirty-five channels to set aside 
part of their channel capacity for use by unaffiliated programmers.204 
Finally, the “program access” provisions prohibit vertically integrated 
programmers from refusing to deal with unaffiliated operators and from 
discriminating against them in the terms and conditions of providing 
programming.205  
3. The Economic Theory Underlying the Restrictions on Vertical 
Integration Contained in the 1992 Cable Act 
 A close analysis of the rationales underlying these provisions reveals 
that, in enacting them, Congress was motivated by the same type of 
economic concerns that lay behind the enactment of the Chain 
Broadcasting Rules. The first was the concern that vertically integrated 
programmers would use the leverage provided by their monopoly position 
in the retail stage to discriminate against unaffiliated cable programmers, 
thereby reducing competition in the wholesale stage of production.206 For 
example, there is anecdotal evidence that Time Warner was able to 
                                                                                                                         
47 U.S.C. § 548(c)(2)(D), (c)(4) (1994). In all other areas, exclusive dealing contracts are absolutely 
barred. Id. § 548(c)(2)(C).  
 203 Id. §§ 534, 535. The must-carry provisions of the 1992 Cable Act followed two 
unsuccessful attempts to impose must-carry by the FCC. See Century Communications Corp. v. FCC, 
835 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1032 (1988); Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 
F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986).  
 204 The amount of channel capacity that must be set aside for leased access varies from ten to 
fifteen percent, depending on the size of the cable operator. 47 U.S.C. §532(b)(1) (1994). This statute 
in effect overturned a previous Supreme Court decision holding that the FCC lacked the authority to 
mandate leased access. See FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979). Leased access was 
originally enacted in 1984 in order to bring about the First Amendment-related concern of assuring the 
availability of “the widest possible diversity of information sources” for cable subscribers. 47 U.S.C. 
§ 532(a). The 1992 Cable Act added a second rationale for leased access that focused on competition. 
See id. (adding that leased access was intended “to promote competition in the delivery of diverse 
sources of video programming”). 
 205 47 U.S.C. § 548(c)(2)(B) (1994). Regulators imposed similar conditions while approving 
both the Time Warner-Turner Broadcasting and the Liberty-TCI mergers. See United States v. Tele-
Communications, Inc., No. 94-0948, 1994 WL 904122 (D.D.C. Aug. 19, 1994); Time Warner, Inc., 
123 F.T.C. 171 (1997). 
 206 See Cable Television Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 
§ 2(a)(5), 106 Stat. 1460, 1460-61 (finding that vertical integration gives vertically integrated 
programmers “the incentive and ability to favor their affiliated programmers” and “could make it more 
difficult for noncable-affiliated programmers to secure carriage on cable systems”); S. REP. NO. 102-
92, at 25 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1158 (noting the concern that “vertical 
integration gives cable operators the incentive and ability to favor their affiliated programming 
services”). 
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forestall NBC’s first attempt to set up a cable news network to compete 
directly with CNN simply by having all of the local cable operators under 
its control refuse to carry the new network. Time Warner’s cable operators 
only agreed to carry what would become CNBC after NBC agreed to focus 
solely on business news and not to take steps to become a general news 
service.207 Since this concern focuses on the possibility that a company 
could use market power in one market to attack another market, this 
argument corresponds to the concerns about leverage that underlay the 
Chain Broadcasting Rules.  
 The second was the danger that vertically affiliated programmers 
would lock up key cable programmers in order to suppress the emergence 
of new MVPDs that would weaken their monopoly at the retail level. The 
theory is that vertically integrated programmers could create barriers to 
entry to DBS systems and other potential MVPD entrants by denying them 
access to key cable networks.208 For example, the fear is that AOL-Time 
Warner could forestall the emergence of DBS as a competitor to its local 
cable operations by refusing to allow DBS to carry CNN, TBS, HBO, or 
any of the other cable networks that it controls. This concern is analogous 
to the foreclosure rationale underlying the Chain Broadcasting Rules. 
 In rejecting a First Amendment challenge to the must carry provisions 
in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC (“Turner II”),209 a plurality of 
the Supreme Court implicitly condoned the approach to vertical integration 
taken by the 1992 Cable Act. The Court concluded that Congress had 
before it substantial evidence that cable operators had ample incentive to 
drop local broadcasters in favor of affiliated programmers.210 The plurality 
stopped short of putting its imprimatur on any particular economic theory 
of vertical integration embodied in the regulations, opting instead to defer 
to the judgment of Congress so long as that judgment was backed by 
substantial evidence.211  
                                                                                                                         
 207 See WATERMAN & WEISS, supra note 21, at 55-56 (citing Competition, Rate 
Deregulation and the Comm’n’s Policies Relating to the Provision of Cable Television Serv., 5 
F.C.C.R. 4962, 5028-29, ¶¶ 120-22 (1990) (Report) [hereinafter 1990 Report on Cable Competition]). 
 208 See § 2(a)(5), 106 Stat. at 1461 (finding that “[v]ertically integrated program suppliers 
. . . have the incentive and ability to favor their affiliated cable operators over . . . programming 
distributors using other technologies”); S. REP. NO. 102-92, at 26 (1992), reprinted in 1992 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1159 (noting the concern that vertically integrated cable programmers had the 
incentive and the ability to forestall entry by alternative video distribution technologies by 
discriminating on the price and terms of providing programs or by simply refusing to sell any 
programming). 
 209 520 U.S. 180, 196-200 (1997) (plurality opinion). Justice Breyer declined to join this 
portion of Justice Kennedy’s opinion, basing his decision solely on the government’s asserted interest 
in “(1) preserving the benefits of free, over-the-air local broadcast television and (2) promoting the 
widespread dissemination of information from a multiplicity of sources.” Id. at 226 (Breyer, J., 
concurring in part) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 210 Id. at 197-98 (plurality opinion). Additional evidence submitted in the district court 
bolstered this conclusion. See id. at 200-05. 
 211 Id. at 208-12.  
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 The D.C. Circuit initially followed similar reasoning, deferring to 
Congress’s choice of the appropriate economic theory when rejecting 
facial challenges to the subscriber limits, channel occupancy, and program 
access provisions.212 A recent decision may signal greater skepticism on 
the part of the D.C. Circuit of the vertical integration theories underlying 
the 1992 Cable Act. In that decision, the D.C. Circuit struck down the 
FCC’s implementation of the subscriber limits and the channel occupancy 
provisions on the grounds that the FCC had failed to base its decision upon 
substantial evidence appearing in the administrative record.213 A fair 
reading of the opinion, however, reveals that, in so holding, the D.C. 
Circuit did not mean to endorse or reject any particular economic theory of 
vertical integration. In ruling that the FCC had failed to base its decision 
on substantial evidence, the court specifically reserved the possibility that 
the FCC could rely on different theories about how vertical integration 
could harm competition on remand.214  
 It thus appears that the courts and the FCC have yet to settle on any 
particular economic theory of vertical integration with respect to cable. It 
is true that the argument that vertical integration does pose a significant 
threat to competition has considerable intuitive appeal. As one witness 
who testified regarding the 1992 Cable Act observed, “You don’t need a 
Ph.D. in Economics to figure out that the guy who controls a monopoly 
conduit is in a unique position to control the flow of programming traffic 
to the advantage of the program services in which he has an equity 
investment . . . and to the disadvantage of those services . . . in which he 
does not have an equity position.”215 Application of the analytical 
framework developed in Part I reveals, however, that, in light of the 
current structure of the cable industry, such anti-competitive harms, 
intuitive though they may be, are unlikely to arise. Thus, it seems that, 
although a Ph.D. in economics may not be necessary to understand the 
problem, any serious assessment of whether vertical mergers in the cable 
industry help or harm competition requires more analysis than the 
testimony quoted above would suggest. 
                                                                                                                         
 212 See Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 211 F.3d 1313, 1319-20, 1322 (D.C. Cir. 2000) 
(subscriber limit and channel occupancy provisions), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1183 (2001); Time Warner 
Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957, 978-79 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (vertically integrated programmer 
provisions). 
 213 Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1130-39 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 122 
S. Ct. 644 (2001). 
 214 Id. at 1133. 
 215 See S. REP. NO. 102-92, at 26 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1159 
(quoting testimony of Preston Padden); accord Chen, supra note 21, at 1490-91 (“The fear is 
instinctive and profound: She who controls the networks of the future shall control the terms of speech. 
She who owns the superhighway shall fetch whatever toll she demands.”). 
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B. Structural Market Conditions 
 As the analysis contained in Part I indicates, both Chicago and post-
Chicago School economists agree that vertical integration is unlikely to 
harm competition unless certain structural preconditions of the type 
identified in the Vertical Merger Guidelines are met.216 Specifically, the 
Guidelines require that (1) the primary market be concentrated and that (2) 
the secondary market be sufficiently concentrated and protected by 
barriers to entry as to be susceptible to monopolization. Even if these 
preconditions are met, the Guidelines recognize that vertical integration 
might still be justified if significant efficiencies exist.  
 When evaluated against these standards, it becomes relatively clear 
that the restrictions on vertical integration in the cable industry enacted by 
the 1992 Cable Act are not economically justified. In fact, a review of the 
empirical literature studying vertical integration in the cable industry 
further confirms this conclusion. This Section closes by evaluating the one 
economically defensible justification for prohibiting vertical integration 
(i.e., preventing cable operators from evading rate regulation). I conclude 
that the decline and impending demise of rate regulation of the cable 
industry has already undercut the relevance of this consideration. 
1. Concentration in the Market for MVPDs 
 As noted earlier, the first requirement under the Vertical Merger 
Guidelines is market concentration in the primary market, which in this 
case is the market for delivering multichannel television programming into 
the home. In order to properly make this determination, it is important to 
clear up a common misconception about the proper way to analyze this 
problem. This is the assumption that because cable appears to be a natural 
monopoly, it is a given that the market for MVPDs is highly concentrated. 
 This misconception is based on the belief that the relevant market for 
analysis is the local market for distributing MVPD services directly to 
consumers. If this is the appropriate market, then any restrictions on 
vertical integration are completely unjustified notwithstanding the fact that 
many of these markets may be true monopolies. This is because the level 
of vertical integration has no bearing on the real source of monopoly 
power in the first instance, which is the existence of the natural monopoly 
in cable distribution. Even complete vertical integration in the industry 
would not have any effect on the cable operators’ monopoly power vis-à-
vis consumers and thus would have no effect on the prices the cable 
operators charge consumers or the quantity and quality of programming 
                                                                                                                         
 216 See supra Subsection I.B.1.d. 
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that they provide. Thus, if the proper market is the market in which cable 
operators sell MVPD services to consumers, restrictions on vertical 
integration amount to little more than rearranging the deck chairs on the 
Titanic, in that such restrictions would rearrange distribution patterns 
without having any effect on what is causing the ship is to go down in the 
first place. On the contrary, even though prohibiting vertical integration 
might not provide any benefit to consumers, it could inflict considerable 
harm by preventing firms from achieving certain welfare-enhancing 
efficiencies. 
 Remembering that the central concern reflected in the provisions of 
the 1992 Cable Act under discussion is the cable operators’ ability to tie up 
cable networks can clear up this resulting confusion. The relevant market, 
then, is not the market in which cable operators sell MVPD services 
directly to consumers, a market that until recently was purely local in 
scope. Properly defined, the relevant market is the one in which cable 
operators purchase video programming from cable programmers, a market 
that is national in scope. In this market, the fact that a particular cable 
operator may have a local monopoly is irrelevant so long as each network 
has access to sufficient other cities around the U.S. As I explained earlier, 
this is also why I regard the subscriber limits to be primarily vertical in 
focus. Although the size of a particular MSO will not affect consumer 
pricing of cable services in any local market, it can affect the national 
market for cable programming by limiting the size of the market available 
in the event that a cable programmer is unable to strike a deal with that 
MSO. Thus, the appropriate unit of analysis, then, is the national market in 
which MVPDs purchase video programming from cable programmers.  
 As mentioned earlier, however, a properly defined product market 
also includes all available substitutes.217 FCC policy has long recognized 
that conventional television broadcasting can act as a substitute for cable 
television, so long as there are sufficient channels operating.218 The 
transition to digital television will only cause this level of competition to 
increase. As noted earlier, broadcasters have the option of using their 
digital channels to send up to six standard-definition digital channels 
instead of transmitting a single channel of HDTV.219 Thus, if it were still 
legitimate to continue to apply the standards announced by the FCC in 
                                                                                                                         
 217 See supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
 218 Reexamination of the Effective Competition Standard for the Regulation of Cable 
Television Serv. Rates, 6 F.C.C.R. 4545, 4547-51, ¶¶ 7-30 (1991) (Report & Order and Second Further 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking) (ruling that broadcast television can provide effective competition to 
cable so long as viewers can receive six over-the-air channels), superseded by 47 U.S.C. § 543(l) 
(1994). This overturned a previous ruling placing the threshold even lower. Implementation of the 
Provisions of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 50 Fed. Reg. 18,637, 18,648-50 (May 2, 
1985) (Report & Order) (ruling that cable operators face “effective competition” whenever they 
confront at least three over-the-air broadcast stations).  
 219 See supra note 168 and accompanying text. 
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1991, the presence of even a single conventional television broadcaster 
may be sufficient to provide some downward price pressure on cable 
operators.  
 In addition, Congress and the FCC have each recognized that other 
MVPDs are properly considered substitutes for cable.220 Under current 
law, a cable operator faces effective competition if another MVPD is 
available in at least fifty percent of the cable operator’s service area and if 
the MVPD actually serves at least fifteen percent of MVPD households in 
that area.221 After years of unfulfilled predictions,222 DBS has finally 
emerged as a viable competitor to cable, offering a similar number of 
channels at roughly comparable pricing and offering an array of additional 
services that cable cannot currently provide.223 In addition, the enactment 
of the Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Amendments of 1999 
(“SHVIA”) removed one of the most significant impediments to DBS 
growth by permitting DBS systems to carry local broadcast stations 
affiliated with the major broadcast networks.224 A recent FCC empirical 
study confirmed that, contrary to the findings of studies conducted prior to 
the enactment of the SHVIA,225 DBS is now acting as a substitute to cable 
television service.226 
                                                                                                                         
 220 See 47 U.S.C. § 543(l)(2), (3) (1997); Reexamination of the Effective Competition 
Standard for the Regulation of Cable Television Serv. Rates, 6 F.C.C.R. 4545, 4551-54, ¶¶ 31-46 
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 222 See G. KENT WEBB, THE ECONOMICS OF CABLE TELEVISION 15-16, 181-82 (1983); Jill 
A. Stern et al., The New Video Marketplace and the Search for a Coherent Regulatory Philosophy, 32 
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at http://www.directv.com/packages/packagespages/0,1336,516,00.html (last visited Dec. 12, 2001). 
The Dish Network, run by Echostar, typically prices its basic 50-channel service at $21.99/month and 
its 100-channel service at $30.99. At the time of this writing, the Dish Network was offering a 
promotional price of $9.00/month with free installation on its 100-channel service. Dish Network, Dish 
Network Special Offers, at http://www.dishnetwork.com/content/promotions/index.shtml (last visited 
Dec. 12, 2001). 
 224 17 U.S.C. §§ 119, 122 (Supp. V 1999). 
 225 See Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in Mkts. for the Delivery of Video 
Programming, 15 F.C.C.R. 978, 1012-13, ¶¶ 71, 73 (2000) (Sixth Annual Report) [hereinafter Sixth 
Annual Report]; AUSTAN GOOLSBEE & AMIL PETRIN, THE CONSUMER GAINS FROM DIRECT 
BROADCAST SATELLITES AND THE COMPETITION WITH CABLE TELEVISION 4, 27-28, 32 (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8317, May 29, 2001), available at 
http://gsbwww.uchicago.edu/fac/austan.goolsbee/research/satfin.pdf.  
 226 Specifically, the empirical analysis in the FCC’s 2000 Report on Cable Industry Prices 
concluded that the demand for cable is somewhat price elastic, which suggests that there are substitutes 
for cable service. Implementation of Section 3 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and 
Competition Act of 1992, 16 F.C.C.R. 4346, 4363, ¶ 48 (2001) (Report on Cable Industry Prices). The 
addition of a DBS coefficient to the model confirmed that DBS was in fact a substitute for cable 
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 The effect has been striking. For the last several years, DBS 
subscribership has grown at a rate nearly twenty times that of cable 
subscribership. As Table I indicates,227 on a national level, DBS has now 
surpassed the level required by Congress to represent effective competition 
to cable operators, capturing eighteen percent of the MVPD market.228 
Since DBS is in essence available to all U.S. households, the national 
numbers suggest that cable operators probably face effective competition 
in a large number of communities throughout the country. It appears to just 
be a matter of time until the monopoly control that cable operators have 
long exerted over the MVPD market completely erodes. 
 When DBS is included in the same product market as cable, it 
becomes clear that the MVPD market is too unconcentrated to support a 
credible leveraging argument. Once DBS and other MVPDs are included, 
the HHI of the national market for the purchase of video programming 
drops to 905, a level considered unconcentrated under the merger 
guidelines.229  
It thus appears that the national market for MVPDs is already too 
unconcentrated to support the conclusion that vertical integration could 
have any anti-competitive effects. The impending arrival of video-on-
demand via the Internet promises to deconcentrate this market still further. 
 
 
 
. 
                                                                                                                         
service, since the presence of DBS was found to cause a statistically significant reduction in cable 
subscribership. Id. at 4364-65, ¶ 53. 
 227 Supra notes 153-155 and accompanying text. 
 228 National Cable & Telecommunications Association, Cable & Telecommunications 
Industry Overview 14 (2001), at http://www.ncta.com/pdf_files/Ind_Ovrvw_060801.pdf. 
 229 Recent HHIs have been on a downward trajectory. See Eighth Annual Report, supra note 
151, at 100 tbl.C-4 (reporting HHIs of 954 for the year 2000, 923 for the year 1999, and 1096 for the 
year 1998); Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in Mkts. for the Delivery of Video 
Programming, 13 F.C.C.R. 1034, 1121, ¶ 155 (1998) (Fourth Annual Report) [hereinafter Fourth 
Annual Report] (reporting HHIs of 1166 for 1997 and 1013 for 1996); Annual Assessment of the 
Status of Competition in Mkts for the Delivery of Video Programming, 11 F.C.C.R. 2060, 2126-27, 
¶¶ 139-40 (1997) (Second Annual Report) [hereinafter Second Annual Report] (reporting HHIs of 
1098 for 1995 and 898 for 1994); 1990 Report on Cable Competition, supra note 207, at 5106 tbl.I 
(reporting HHI of 975 for 1990). It also treats AT&T Broadband and Time Warner Cable as separate 
entities, even though AT&T owns a twenty-four percent stake in Time Warner Entertainment, since 
AT&T has announced its intention to sell this holding. See Diane Mermigas, Schleyer’s Charge: 
Keeping Status Quo, ELEC. MEDIA, Oct. 29, 2001, at 20.  
 EchoStar announced its plans to acquire Hughes’s DirecTV unit. See Nikhil Deogun & Andy 
Pasztor, GM Agrees to Sell Hughes to EchoStar, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 2001, at A3. In addition, AT&T 
announced that it was selling its cable holdings to Comcast. See Deborah Solomon & Robert Frank, 
AT&T Picks Comcast to Get Cable Unit, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 2001, at A3. Even if these companies 
were to complete their mergers, total HHI would only increase to 1374, still well below the 1800 level 
identified by the Vertical Merger Guidelines as the threshold for anti-competitive concern. 
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Table IV. Concentration in the National Market for  
Purchase of Video Programming as of June 30, 2001 
 
Multichannel Video Programming  
Distributor (“MVPD”)  Share  HHI  
   
AT&T Broadband  16.44%  270 
Time Warner Cable  14.35%  206 
Hughes Electronics Corp.  11.32%  128 
Comcast Cable Communications  9.53%  91 
Charter Communications  7.35%  54 
EchoStar Communications  6.98%  49 
Cox Communications  6.87%  47 
Adelphia Communications  6.51%  42 
Cablevision Systems Corp.  3.40%  12 
Insight Communications  1.54%  2 
Other   15.71%  4 
   
Total  100.00%  905 
 
Source: Eighth Annual Report, supra note 151, at 98 tbl.C-3. 
 
2. Concentration and Barriers to Entry into the Market for 
Television Networks 
 The second structural precondition is that the secondary market—in 
this case, the market for cable networks—must be concentrated and 
protected by barriers to entry. An analysis of the industry strongly suggests 
that this precondition is not met either. As Subsection I.C.1 covers in some 
detail, the concentration levels in the market for television networks 
appear to fall below the thresholds established by the Vertical Merger 
Guidelines. 
 Indeed, the market for cable networks appears to be extremely elastic. 
The factors of production used to create these networks—talent and 
communication hardware—are readily available in markets already highly 
organized to supply these same inputs to other industries.230  The empirical  
record supports this conclusion as well. As Table V indicates, there are 
currently more than 294 cable networks operating in the U.S., and the FCC 
reports that an additional fifty-one networks are in the planning stages.231 
In addition, the total number of cable networks has increased by more than 
                                                                                                                         
 230 OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note 169, at 222. 
 231 Eighth Annual Report, supra note 151, at 67, ¶ 160. 
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four times over the last decade, and the level of vertical integration has 
dropped steadily as well. In the face of such data, it becomes all but 
impossible to maintain the existence of any significant barriers to entry 
into the market for cable networks. 
 
Table V. Vertical Integration of Cable Networks 
 
 1990 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Total Networks 70 106 129 147 172 245 283 281 294 
Vertically Integrated Networks 35 56 66 67 68 95 104 99 104 
Pct. Vertically Integrated 50% 53% 51% 46% 40% 39% 37% 35% 35% 
Among Top 15 Networks by 
Audience 
10 12 11 8 7 9 8 6 7 
Among Top 20 Networks by 
Subscribers 
13 14 13 9 8 9 8 9 9 
 
Sources: Eighth Annual Report, supra note 151, at 66, ¶ 157, 120-21 tbls.D-6 & D-7; Annual 
Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Mkts. for the Delivery of Video Programming, 16 
F.C.C.R. 6005, 6078-79, ¶ 173, 6138-39 tbls.D-6 & D-7 (2001) (Seventh Annual Report); Sixth 
Annual Report, supra note 225, 1057-58, ¶ 179, 1119-20 tbls.D-6 & D-7; Annual Assessment of the 
Status of Competition in Markets for the Delivery of Video Programming, 13 F.C.C.R. 24,284, 24,376, 
¶ 159 (1998) (Fifth Annual Report); Fourth Annual Report, supra note 229, 1122, ¶ 158, 1231-34 
tbls.F-6 & F-7; Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in Mkts. for the Delivery of Video 
Programming, 12 F.C.C.R. 4358, 4429-30, ¶ 142, 4470-81 tbls.6 & 7 (1997) (Third Annual Report); 
Second Annual Report, supra note 229, 2132, ¶ 150, 2163-64 tbls.6 & 7; Annual Assessment of the 
Status of Competition in Mkts. for the Delivery of Video Programming, 9 F.C.C.R. 7442, 7522-23, 
¶¶161-62 & n.434, 7526, ¶167 (1994) (First Report); 1990 Report on Cable Competition, supra note 
207, 5109-14 tbls.4, 5, 7 & 8. 
 
 That said, this conclusion is not unassailable. Some economists have 
long maintained that, when a market involves differentiated products, it is 
possible that all networks do not compete with one another equally and 
that submarkets may exist within the overall market for cable 
programmers.232 Indeed, there is substantial anecdotal evidence that certain  
networks, such as ESPN and CNN, may for all practical purposes be 
essential and have few real substitutes233 and that vertical integration 
                                                                                                                         
 232 The seminal submarket case is Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 
(1962). Although it has largely lain fallow for some time, a number of recent cases have renewed 
interest in it. See Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 464-65 (1992); Aspen 
Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 596 n.20 (1985); FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 
F. Supp. 1066, 1075 (D.D.C. 1997). For recent articles favoring the use of submarket analysis, see 
Jonathan B. Baker, Stepping Out in an Old Brown Shoe: In Qualified Praise of Submarkets, 68 
ANTITRUST L.J. 203 (2000); and Thomas J. Campbell, Predation and Competition in Antitrust: The 
Case of Nonfungible Goods, 87 COLUM L. REV. 1625 (1987). For recent analyses applying submarket 
theory to electronic communications, see Patrick Bolton et al., Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory 
and Legal Policy, 88 GEO. L.J. 2239, 2293-98 (2000); and James E. Meeks, Predatory Behavior as an 
Exclusionary Device in the Emerging Telecommunications Industry, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 125, 
132 (1998). 
 233 See S. REP. NO. 102-92, at 24 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1157; see 
also WATERMAN & WEISS, supra note 21, at 130 (“Although clearly an empirical question, there 
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permitted some companies to forestall competition from networks that 
directly competed with their own, vertically integrated networks.234 
Indeed, as recounted below, recent studies have lent some empirical 
support for the proposition.235 Submarket theory has its share of critics, 
however. A number of leading antitrust scholars have condemned it as a 
superfluous and confusing doctrine that adds nothing to the conventional 
analysis of what is a proper market while raising the danger that the 
relevant market will be defined too narrowly.236  
 Resolution of the controversy over the proper role of submarkets in 
antitrust analysis exceeds the scope of this Article. For current purposes, it 
suffices to point out that, even if submarket theory were accepted for all it 
is worth, it would not support the enactment of the prohibitions of vertical 
integration contained in the 1992 Cable Act. The existence of submarkets 
would justify intervening with respect to vertical integration involving 
only those cable networks that comprised the submarket, such as CNN or 
ESPN. It would not justify the indiscriminate type of prohibition of all 
vertical integration without regard to the type of programming involved 
that is embodied in the 1992 Cable Act. 
3. Potential Efficiency Justifications for Vertical Integration in the 
Cable Industry 
 The final stage of the basic analytical approach described above is an 
assessment of whether vertical integration is likely to permit firms to 
realize efficiencies. Given the similarity of the cost structures involved, it 
should come as no surprise that the potential efficiencies resulting from 
vertical integration in the cable industry are quite similar to those created 
by vertical integration in broadcast television. Just as was the case in 
broadcasting, the large, up-front costs associated with creating each 
program make it especially important that cable programmers be able to 
                                                                                                                         
seems to be a consensus in the industry that the lack of more than one or two of the most well-known 
networks would seriously handicap a multichannel competitor to an established cable system.”). 
 234 See WATERMAN & WEISS, supra note 21, at 55-56, 68-69 (describing Time Warner’s 
efforts to prevent entry of a general news service that would compete directly with CNN); Tasneem 
Chipty, Vertical Integration, Market Foreclosure, and Consumer Welfare in the Cable Television 
Industry, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 428, 429 & n.7, 437 (2001). 
 235 See infra Subsection II.B.5.a. 
 236 See 2A PHILLIP E. AREEDA, HERBERT HOVENKAMP & JOHN L. SOLOW, ANTITRUST LAW 
¶ 553c, at 167, 172-77, (1995); Phillip Areeda, Monopolization, Mergers, and Markets: A Century Past 
and Future, 75 CAL. L. REV. 959, 979-80 (1987); David A. Balto, Antitrust Enforcement in the Clinton 
Administration, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 73 n.63 (1999); Lawrence C. Maisel, Submarkets in 
Merger and Monopolization Cases, 72 GEO. L.J. 39 (1983); Timothy J. Muris, Economics and 
Antitrust, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 303, 312 (1997); Joshua A. Newberg, Antitrust for the Economy of 
Ideas: The Logic of Technology Markets, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 83, 90 n.27 (2000); see also Rothery 
Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, 792 F.2d 210, 218 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 
1033 (1987).  
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obtain guaranteed distribution before making their initial investments in 
the programming. In addition, cable programming exhibits the same type 
of product complementarities as broadcast programming. As a result, the 
potential efficiencies resulting from vertical integration end up being quite 
comparable. 
a. Elimination of Static Transaction Costs and Double 
Marginalization  
 Importance of Guaranteed Distribution. First, as was the case in 
broadcasting,237 the existence of large, up-front, first-copy costs for 
producing cable programming and the relatively low marginal costs 
associated with conveying the program to another viewer causes costs to 
decline across all relevant volumes. As a result, cable programming 
exhibits a natural tendency towards broad-scale distribution, since 
profitability now depends upon amortizing the fixed cost investment 
across as many sales as possible.238  
 The existence of such fixed costs makes access to a large portion of 
the market one of the primary determinants of economic success. 
Programmers who can obtain guaranteed distribution have substantial 
incentive to make efficient investments in programming. Conversely, cable 
programmers that lack a guaranteed market face risks that can depress 
investment in programming below optimal levels.239 These considerations 
are particularly important for new networks, which face even greater risks. 
Guaranteed distribution allows new networks to invest in their programs 
with greater confidence.240 Indeed, industry participants confirm that 
vertical integration was essential in getting programming stars such as 
CNN, C-Span, the Discovery Channel, BET, and TNT off the ground.241 
 The efficient functioning of the cable industry thus depends in no 
small part on the ability of cable programmers to ensure that they will have 
access to a sufficient number of cable operators. This is not to say that all 
programmers must secure universal distribution or that programming must 
capture a dominant share in order to be viable. Indeed, minimum viable 
                                                                                                                         
 237 See supra Subsection I.A.3.a. 
 238 See OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note 169, at 245; WATERMAN & WEISS, supra note 21, at 
58.  
 239 LELAND JOHNSON, TOWARD COMPETITION IN CABLE TELEVISION 60 (1994); OWEN & 
WILDMAN, supra note 169, at 245; WATERMAN & WEISS, supra note 21, at 61 n.11; Olson & Spiwak, 
supra note 21, at 291. 
 240 WATERMAN & WEISS, supra note 21, at 132. 
 241 See 1990 Report on Cable Competition, supra note 207, at 5009, ¶ 83, 5037, ¶ 144(a); 
David Waterman, Vertical Integration and Program Access in the Cable Television Industry, 47 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 511, 520 (1995). 
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scale appears to be small relative to the national market.242 My point is that 
the equilibrium levels for cable programming will exhibit a natural 
propensity towards as wide a distribution as possible and that artificial 
limits on cable programmers’ ability to secure such distribution may lead 
them to underinvest in programming. Although it is possible that policy 
makers could turn to regulation to guarantee such access, it is also possible 
that private ordering would be even more effective. For example, cable 
programmers could use contractual provisions to guarantee such access. 
Doing so would involve a large number of such negotiations that can lead 
to significant transaction costs. In addition, the inevitable incompleteness 
of these contracts would leave the parties unable to eliminate all of these 
risks. If these transaction costs are significant enough, cable programmers 
may find it more efficient to internalize those transactions within the 
boundaries of a single firm and instead use vertical integration to 
guarantee the access that they need in order to make efficient program 
investments.243  
 Programming Complementarities. In addition, bringing transmission 
and content under the same corporate umbrella can help control for the fact 
that the value of a particular cable network is not simply a function of its 
own intrinsic qualities, but depends as well on what other networks are 
being provided. The solution to this problem is simple. Allowing cable 
operators the freedom to choose what programming they will convey 
effectively internalizes these externalities by bringing them all under joint 
control. Conversely, restrictions limiting the cable operator’s ability to 
refuse to carry particular programming (such as the must-carry and leased 
access provisions contained in the 1992 Cable Act) can lead to a 
suboptimal program mix. This is particularly true where products are risky 
and difficult to value in advance, as is the case here. 244 
 The Problem of Double Marginalization. As noted earlier, vertical 
integration can enhance efficiency by allowing the integrated firm to 
transfer inputs at marginal cost.245 In the case of cable television, the 
marginal cost of duplicating and distributing programming to additional 
viewers is arguably so close to zero that any attempt to charge a positive 
price can reduce net economic welfare. Bringing programming and 
distribution under the same corporate umbrella draws attention away from 
the transfer price charged for programming and leads the vertically 
integrated entity to maximize its profits solely in terms of the price of the 
                                                                                                                         
 242  Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1130-39 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 122 S. 
Ct. 644 (2001). 
 243 1990 Report on Cable Competition, supra note 207, at 5009, ¶ 84; OWEN & WILDMAN, 
supra note 169, at 245; Chipty, supra note 234, at 431-32. 
 244 See OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note 169, at 220, 245. 
 245  See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text. 
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final good. In so doing, vertical integration has the potential to yield a 
more economically efficient result. 
b. Elimination of Strategic Behavior 
 In addition, the existence of large sunk costs and externalities creates 
the danger that cable programmers and cable operators will act 
opportunistically in an attempt to capture a greater percentage of the 
available profits. Vertical integration and vertical contractual restraints can 
allow cable programmers and cable operators to avoid incurring the 
transaction costs associated with protecting themselves against this 
possibility.  
 Hold Up. As noted earlier, the sunk cost investments needed to create 
original programming expose cable programmers to the possibility of 
opportunistic behavior. Cable programmers will not invest in 
programming unless it is likely that they will be able to recover both the 
fixed costs associated with creating the programming as well as the 
marginal costs of distribution. Once the first-copy costs are sunk, however, 
it is possible for the cable operators to hold out ex post in an attempt to 
drive price down to marginal cost. Thus, the danger of being unable to 
recover sunk costs can lead cable programmers that are unable to protect 
themselves ex ante against this possibility not to invest in creating new 
programming even when doing so would enhance welfare. While it is 
theoretically possible to use contractual devices to guard against such 
opportunistic behavior, such contracts may be costly to negotiate and, in 
any event, will not be able to anticipate every possible contingency. Thus, 
if the levels of risk and the costs of negotiation are relatively high, it may 
be more efficient for firms to use vertical integration to protect themselves 
against such sunk cost opportunism, since any attempt to hold up would 
simply redistribute profits between levels of production without having 
any effect on the firm’s overall return.246 
 Free Riding. There appear to be two different ways in which free 
riding may lead to a systematic underinvestment in cable programming. 
First, cable operators have the incentive to attempt to free ride on other 
cable operators’ contribution to the first-copy costs of production. Efficient 
production of any high fixed cost good requires all those purchasing that 
good to bear part of those fixed costs. Cable operators, however, have the 
incentive to shirk on bearing those costs. Ideally, a cable operator would 
prefer to rely on other cable operators to cover the up-front costs 
                                                                                                                         
 246 Id. (citing Franklin M. Fisher, The Financial Interest and Syndication Rules in Network 
Television: Regulatory Fantasy and Reality, in ANTITRUST AND REGULATION 263, 273 (Franklin M. 
Fisher ed., 1985)); WATERMAN & WEISS, supra note 21, at 47; Olson & Spiwak, supra note 21, at 290-
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associated with creating the program in the first instance and would simply 
pay the marginal costs associated with distributing the program. Even 
though such free riding also causes a decline in the attractiveness in the 
cable operator’s own programming, the decline would only be in 
proportion to its share of the national market. Although the various cable 
operators around the country would mutually benefit from restoring the 
investment in programming to efficient levels, the transaction costs 
associated with forging and monitoring such an agreement would 
potentially be huge. Since tying the fortunes of the cable operators and the 
cable programmers together allows the cable operator to internalize the 
negative externality effect on program supply, thereby reducing the cable 
operators’ incentives to shirk in the first instance, vertical integration 
offers another way for cable programmers to solve this problem.247 
 Second, even cable operators who do not shirk on price may attempt 
to free ride on the promotional efforts of other cable operators.248 Like 
most industries, there is an optimal level of promotion for the cable 
industry. Promotional efforts have the effect of increasing the market, 
which in turn allows the fixed costs to be spread over a larger viewer base. 
However, as before, cable operators do not capture all of that benefit, 
gaining only in proportion to national market share. Again, the ideal 
position for a cable operator is for other cable operators to undertake the 
promotional efforts necessary to build the audience for a particular 
network to its optimal level, while that operator gains the benefit of the 
efforts of other operators while simultaneously avoiding paying the costs 
of promotion. In other words, it attempts to free ride on the promotional 
efforts of other operators. If enough operators shirk in this manner, the 
industry will offer a suboptimal level of promotion. Even though all would 
be better off if they could mutually agree to engage in higher levels of 
promotional activity, there is no mechanism through which the various 
operators could coordinate their actions, and, even if there were, the costs 
of forging and enforcing such an agreement would likely be large. Thus, 
even a cable operator who foregoes the opportunity to free ride in terms of 
contribution to fixed costs may attempt to free ride in terms of promotion. 
Again, vertical integration has the potential of eliminating the incentives 
for shirking, since doing so would internalize both the gains and losses 
from shirking within the same firm.249  
                                                                                                                         
 247 WATERMAN & WEISS, supra note 21, at 74-76. Waterman and Weiss also offer a formal 
model of this problem. Id. at 78-86. 
 248 See generally supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text (discussing Lester Telser’s 
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 Again, it bears repeating that it is not my purpose to argue that such 
transaction cost efficiencies actually exist. As I noted earlier, the existence 
of such benefits is far from uncontrovertible.250 My point is simply that 
such efficiencies are sufficiently plausible to justify hesitating before 
erecting any regulatory barriers to vertical integration in the cable industry. 
Such considerations are better handled in the case-by-case context of an 
antitrust court applying the rule of reason than through the more 
categorical per se approach represented by a regulatory solution. 
4. The Special Problem of Rate Regulation 
 There is one significant risk resulting from vertical integration in the 
cable television industry that does not exist with respect to the broadcast 
television industry. As noted earlier, the existence of rate regulation at one 
level of production can provide a substantial anti-competitive motive for 
vertical integration or vertical restraints. This is because a monopolist who 
is barred by rate regulation from earning all of the available monopoly 
profits in one market can attempt to tie its product to an unregulated 
product in an adjacent, competitive market. In the absence of rate 
regulation on the second level, vertical integration could thus allow the 
monopolist to evade the consequences of regulation altogether.251 As 
commentators have pointed out in the past, cable operators facing rate 
regulation at the retail level may have an incentive to vertically integrate 
backwards into programming.252 
 Recent changes in the regulatory and technological environment have 
effectively rendered this argument toothless. This is because a provision 
included in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 eliminated rate 
regulation of all but the basic tier of cable programming services.253 Even 
the basic tier is subject to deregulation if a cable operator faces 
competition from another MVPD that can reach fifty percent of the 
households in the cable operator’s franchise area and actually reaches 
fifteen percent of those households.254 The emergence of DBS as a major 
competitor to cable makes it extremely likely that rate regulation will soon 
come to an end in most cities, since DBS is essentially universally 
available and, as Table I indicates, has already surpassed the fifteen 
percent threshold required under the statute on a nationwide level.255 As a 
                                                                                                                         
 250 See supra notes 108-114 and accompanying text. 
 251 See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 252 See J.A. Ordover et al., Nonprice Anticompetitive Behavior by Dominant Firms Toward 
the Producers of Complementary Products, in ANTITRUST AND REGULATION, supra note 246, at 115, 
127-28. 
 253 47 U.S.C. § 543(a)(1), (b) (1994). 
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 255 See supra Subsection I.C.1. 
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result, this argument will likely soon be rendered moot, since the 
elimination of rate regulation would effectively undercut its core premise. 
5. Empirical Evidence on Vertical Integration in the Cable Industry 
 It thus appears as a matter of theory that, in the cable industry, as it is 
currently structured, vertical integration is unlikely to harm competition. 
On the contrary, the existence of potential transaction cost savings flowing 
from vertical integration suggests that, if anything, the various limits on 
vertical integration imposed by the 1992 Cable Acts may actually be 
harming consumers. With regard to cable, however, we have the benefit of 
more than just theory. There is an excellent body of empirical work 
studying the impact of vertical integration on the cable industry. These 
studies provide us with greater insight into the potential anti-competitive 
impact of vertical integration identified in theoretical literature. 
a. Efficiency Effects vs. Strategic Effects 
 Of particular interest for our purposes is a group of studies examining 
the overall impact of vertical integration on competition.256 There have 
been two lines to these studies, one focusing on basic cable networks and 
the other focusing on premium cable networks. A recent article by 
Tasneem Chipty brings both of these lines of empirical inquiry together in 
insightful ways.257 What is most singular about Chipty’s work, however, is 
its attempt to evaluate the overall impact that the various pro-competitive 
and anti-competitive effects have on total consumer surplus. 
 The methodologies underlying these lines of study are similar.258 
They begin by comparing the carriage decisions of vertically integrated 
cable operators and non-vertically integrated cable operators. 
Unsurprisingly, these studies uniformly found that cable operators were 
more likely to carry networks with which they were vertically affiliated. 
The greater willingness to carry vertically affiliated networks is ultimately 
ambiguous, however, since it is consistent with both foreclosure (i.e., the 
operator is trying to use vertical integration to prevent the emergence of 
new competitors) and an efficiency justification (i.e., vertical integration 
                                                                                                                         
 256 For discussions of the early empirical work on the cable industry, see OWEN & 
WILDMAN, supra note 169, at 246-50; see also Klass & Salinger, supra note 128, at 692. 
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allows the realization of cost reductions that makes the vertically affiliated 
network more attractive than the unaffiliated network). 
 These studies solved this conundrum by also looking at the 
willingness of vertically integrated cable operators to carry unaffiliated 
networks. If vertical integration were motivated by foreclosure, one would 
expect that the increased willingness to carry affiliated networks be offset 
by a decreased willingness to carry unaffiliated networks. In contrast, if 
vertical integration were motivated by efficiency concerns, one would 
expect that the increased willingness to carry vertically affiliated networks 
would be matched by an increased willingness to carry unaffiliated 
networks, since the cost savings would allow the cable operator to engage 
in more efficient operations.  
 The conclusions drawn by these initial studies differed with respect to 
basic cable and premium cable networks. With respect to basic cable 
networks, the early studies by Benjamin Klein, Robert Crandall, and the 
National Telecommunications and Information Administration uniformly 
found the evidence to be more consistent with an efficiency story than a 
foreclosure story. Each study found that greater willingness to carry 
affiliated networks was correlated with a greater willingness to carry 
unaffiliated programming. Since any pure foreclosure story would have 
required a reduction in the amount of unaffiliated programming carried, 
these studies rejected the notion that vertically integrated cable operators 
were engaging in any systematic discrimination against unaffiliated 
programmers.259  
 Studies of premium cable networks tended to draw the opposite 
conclusion. For example, a 1997 study by David Waterman and Andrew 
Weiss found that vertical integration with premium cable networks did 
tend to lead to some foreclosure, since vertically integrated cable operators 
were simultaneously more likely to carry affiliated premium networks and 
less likely to carry unaffiliated premium networks.260 In addition, vertical 
integration appeared to reduce the total number of networks carried by the 
cable operator.261 Waterman and Weiss were unable to determine whether 
these effects indicated that vertical integration on the whole yielded pro-
competitive or anti-competitive effects.262 
 Chipty’s study confirmed and extended these conclusions, by finding 
evidence indicating that vertical integration had both competitive and anti-
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competitive effects. To determine the possible anti-competitive effects, 
Chipty measured the extent to which certain cable operators carried a 
home shopping channel with which they were vertically integrated (QVC) 
and compared it with the extent to which those same operators carried a 
home shopping channel with which they were not vertically affiliated 
(HSN). Chipty found that cable operators that were vertically integrated 
with QVC were simultaneously more likely to carry QVC and less likely 
to carry HSN than were non-vertically affiliated cable operators.263 Chipty 
similarly found that vertically integrated cable operators were more likely 
to carry premium cable networks with which they were vertically 
integrated and less likely to carry unaffiliated cable services that compete 
directly with those networks.264 Thus, Chipty concluded that vertical 
integration, regardless of whether it involves basic or premium cable 
networks, does result in some degree of market foreclosure.265 
 At the same time, however, Chipty found significant evidence that 
vertical integration yielded efficiencies. First, if vertical integration did not 
yield efficiencies, one would not expect it to have any effect on the total 
number of networks that a particular cable operator carried. Chipty found, 
however, that cable operators that were vertically integrated with basic 
cable networks tended to carry more total networks than non-vertically 
integrated cable operators, a result indicating that vertical integration leads 
to some gains in efficiency.266 Second, if vertical integration were driven 
solely by anti-competitive motives, one would expect to see those 
vertically integrated cable operators who had already decided to carry a 
home shopping network to replace HSN with QVC. Absent some 
efficiency gains from vertical integration, one would not expect 
foreclosure to make it any more or any less likely that any given cable 
operator would carry a home shopping network in the first instance. Chipty 
found, however, that vertical integration did significantly increase the 
likelihood that cable operators would carry a home shopping network. 
Such a result would not have occurred unless vertical integration had 
provided sufficient efficiencies to change the basic economics of the 
carriage decision.267 Lastly, Chipty compared the vertically integrated 
cable operators’ success in signing up cable subscribers with that of non-
vertically integrated cable operators. If no promotional efficiencies 
resulted from vertical integration, one would not expect vertically 
integrated operators to have any more success in attracting customers than 
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non-vertically integrated cable operators. Chipty found, however, that 
cable operators that were vertically integrated with cable programmers 
were significantly more successful in signing up customers than were non-
vertically integrated cable operators, a result that suggested that vertical 
integration does yield efficiencies in cable operators’ ability to promote 
cable services.268 
 Most importantly for our purposes, Chipty conducted a series of 
welfare calculations to determine whether the pro-competitive effects 
dominated the anti-competitive effects or vice versa. These calculations 
uniformly indicated that vertical integration had a positive impact on 
consumer welfare, and the majority of these calculations found the positive 
impact to be statistically significant.269 These findings ultimately led 
Chipty to conclude that vertical integration does not harm consumers; if 
anything, it may provide substantial benefits to them.270 
b. Vertical Integration vs. Vertical Restraints 
 The empirical literature on cable television also addressed a separate 
question. As noted earlier, a cable operator seeking to use vertical 
integration to harm competition can do so in two ways. First, it can 
vertically integrate with an essential cable network and refuse to offer that 
network to any competing MVPD. Alternatively, it can forego vertical 
integration and instead simply enter into a contract with a key cable 
network that either guarantees exclusivity or requires the network to 
charge competing MVPDs prohibitively high prices. If cable operators 
could achieve the same anti-competitive effects through vertical 
contractual restraints as vertical integration, then it is thus theoretically 
arguable that the presence or absence of vertical integration is actually 
irrelevant. The real source of market power would flow from horizontal 
concentration in the national market for the purchase of video 
programming at the MSO level. The presence or absence of vertical 
integration would not affect the leverage provided by this horizontal 
market power in any way.271 Although, under this argument, vertical 
integration would have no impact on the anti-competitive effects, it would 
still have potentially profound effects on the firms’ ability to realize the 
available pro-competitive benefits. As discussed earlier, vertical 
integration can enable firms to achieve greater efficiencies than vertical 
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contractual restraints. Thus, although the choice of strategies arguably has 
negligible impact on competition, the potential impact on the pro-
competitive effects may be profound. 
 Waterman and Weiss designed an empirical study to test this 
argument.272 If the real source of anti-competitive behavior were vertical 
integration and not horizontal market power, one would expect vertically 
integrated programmers to enter into a higher percentage of exclusive 
dealing contracts than non-vertically integrated programmers. However, if 
the real source of market power were vertical integration rather than 
horizontal concentration, one would expect the price premium charged by 
vertically integrated programmers to be higher than that charged by non-
vertically integrated programmers.  
 Waterman and Weiss’s study refuted the notion that vertical 
integration was the source of anti-competitive market power. Although this 
consideration was largely rendered moot by the industry-wide 
abandonment of exclusive dealing contracts in the early 1990s, their 
review of the available empirical evidence revealed that both vertically 
integrated and non-vertically integrated cable programmers were similarly 
prone to enter into exclusive dealing contracts.273 More important were 
their findings regarding the size of the premium charged to competing 
MVPDs. A review of the prices charged to two different types of 
competing MVPDs revealed that there was no significant difference 
between the premium charged by vertically integrated cable programmers 
and the premium charged by non-vertically integrated cable 
programmers.274 Waterman and Weiss thus found that vertically integrated 
and non-vertically integrated firms exhibited precisely the same type of 
potentially anti-competitive behavior. As a result, they concluded that 
there was no reasonable justification for treating vertically integrated firms 
in a different manner than non-vertically integrated firms. In either 
situation, the ability to harm competition stemmed from the horizontal 
market power possessed by the cable operators and not from the vertical 
practice employed.275  
 In sum, both the theory and the empirical evidence suggest that 
vertical integration is unlikely to harm competition in the cable industry. 
As a result, the restrictions on vertical integration contained in the 1992 
Cable Act appear to be unjustified. Indeed, there is great irony in the 
suggestion that cable networks are too weak to confront cable operators, 
since the broadcast regulations discussed in Part I are based on the exact 
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opposite assumption. In broadcasting, the fear was that powerful networks 
would overwhelm the local entities responsible for delivering the 
programming to the home. In cable, the concern is that powerful local 
video distributors will overwhelm the poor, hapless networks. Given the 
substitutability of cable and broadcasting, both of these propositions 
cannot hold simultaneously. It seems that policy makers are trying to have 
it both ways.  
C. The Problematic Nature of Compelled Access 
 As noted earlier, one of the most distinctive features of the 
restrictions on vertical integration contained in the 1992 Cable Act is the 
imposition of compelled access requirements. For example, the must-carry 
provisions require cable operators to provide free carriage to all full-power 
local television stations.276 In addition, both cable operators and cable 
programmers must make their facilities available to unaffiliated parties on 
reasonable and non-discriminatory terms.277 In essence, access is the 
regulatory analog to the “essential facility doctrine” developed under 
antitrust law. The concern is that cable companies will use their control 
over the monopoly bottleneck in transmitting multichannel programming 
to harm competition in the market for cable programming.278 
 Some scholars have lauded the imposition of access requirements on 
local cable operators as a salutary development.279 Indeed, the shift to 
access may represent a fundamental change in approach to regulatory 
policy. A recent survey of the regulatory changes taking place in six 
different regulated industries conducted by Joseph Kearney and Thomas 
Merrill identified compelled access to monopoly facilities as one of the 
central features of what they view as a new regulated industries 
paradigm.280  
 I take a less sanguine view of these developments, however. In fact, I 
believe that the access requirements imposed by the 1992 Cable Act suffer 
from several conceptual and practical problems that undercut its utility as a 
basis for media regulation.  
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1. The Relationship Between Compelled Access and Leveraging 
and Foreclosure Theory 
 First, a review of the findings and legislative history accompanying 
the 1992 Cable Act reveals that these access requirements were enacted 
out of the concern that a vertically integrated cable operator would be able 
to use its control over the retail level of production to harm competition in 
the wholesale market occupied by the cable networks and to bar the 
emergence of new competition at the retail level.281 Properly understood, 
such access requirements represent a version of leveraging and foreclosure 
theory and are thus subject to the same criticisms and caveats discussed 
above. Specifically, such regulations only make sense if the actor in 
question actually has monopoly power over the primary market and poses 
a real threat to the competitiveness of the secondary market.282 As detailed 
above, neither of these preconditions appears to hold with regards to cable 
television. 
2. The Administrability of Compelled Access  
 Furthermore, scholars of competition policy generally agree that 
compelled access is, in many ways, quite problematic as a remedy. If 
regulators compel non-discriminatory access without putting any 
restrictions on the price charged, the monopolist will simply charge the full 
monopoly price. While such access would be beneficial to the 
monopolist’s competitors, it provides no benefits to consumers, since the 
monopoly is left intact, and no improvements in price or output can be 
expected.283 Absent some regulation of the terms and conditions of access, 
compelled access represents something of an anomaly. As Professors 
Areeda and Hovenkamp note, the purpose of the competition policy “is not 
to force firms to share their monopolies, but to prevent monopolies from 
occurring or to break them down when they do occur.”284  
 Thus, if an access remedy is to benefit consumers, it must necessarily 
include a requirement that the rates charged be reasonable. Any attempt at 
regulating rates would likely be extremely difficult to administer. Since the 
monopolist has already evinced a lack of willingness to deal with its 
competitor, the relationship is likely to be surrounded by disputes over the 
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terms and conditions of the compelled access. As Professors Areeda and 
Hovenkamp have noted, once access is ordered,  
 
[t]he plaintiff is likely to claim that the defendant’s price for access to 
an essential facility (1) is so high as to be the equivalent of a continued 
refusal to deal, or (2) is unreasonable, or (3) creates a ‘price squeeze’ in 
that the defendant charges so much for access and so little for the 
product it sells in competition with the plaintiff that the latter cannot 
earn a reasonable profit.285  
 
The disputes, moreover, will not be limited just to price. The parties are 
likely to disagree on non-price terms and conditions as well.286  
 As a result, the relationship will require significant ongoing 
supervision to a degree that resembles public utility regulation.287 It goes 
without saying that rate regulation in declining cost industries has been 
plagued by complicated valuation and second-best pricing problems that 
have bordered on insurmountable. Previous attempts at imposing rate 
regulation on cable television have largely been a failure, as the variability 
in the quality of cable programming has frustrated efforts to impose 
meaningful rate regulation.288  
 The FCC’s history with policing access regimes provides ample 
reason to question whether it is institutionally capable of executing this 
charge. For example, leased access has been plagued by precisely the type 
of problems predicted by Areeda and Hovenkamp. Simply put, the 
regulatory regime went almost entirely unused, with the various parties 
disagreeing vehemently on the reason for the regime’s failure. Firms that 
sought leased access complained that local cable operators demanded 
excessively high prices and failed to bargain in good faith, while the cable 
operators claimed that the lack of leased access reflected a lack of demand 
for it.289 Even more spectacular has been the inability of the FCC and the 
state public utility commissions to use access requirements to foster 
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competition in local telephone markets as mandated by the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996. The FCC’s experience in policing other 
access regimes thus provides little reason to be optimistic that it will be 
able to manage the myriad problems associated with administering a 
regime of compelled access in this instance. 
3. Compelled Access and Dynamic Efficiency 
 Compelled access regimes are thus extremely questionable from the 
standpoint of static efficiency, since it is far from clear whether they can 
deliver the requisite benefits in price and quantity needed to justify the 
enterprise. Even more profound is the impact that compelled access 
regimes have on dynamic efficiency. From the perspective of dynamic 
efficiency, the only viable way to solve the problems caused by monopoly 
bottlenecks is the appearance of a new entrant that directly competes with 
the bottleneck facility. Access regimes, however, may actually retard such 
entry. 
 Access dampens investment in two ways that harm consumers. First, 
it is now well recognized that resources are most likely to receive the 
appropriate level of conservation and investment if they are protected by 
well-defined property rights. As Garrett Hardin pointed out in his path-
breaking work on the “Tragedy of the Commons,” resources that are in 
effect jointly owned tend to be overused and receive suboptimal levels of 
investment.290 Hardin’s insights apply with equal force to compelled 
access regimes. Since any benefits gained from investments in capital or 
research must be shared with competitors, forcing a monopolist to share its 
resources reduces incentives to improve their facilities and pursue 
technological innovation.291  
 In addition, compelling access to an input also discourages other 
firms that need the input from entering into business alliances with 
potential alternative suppliers of the input.292 In effect, forcing a 
monopolist to share an input rescues other firms from having to supply the 
relevant input for themselves.293 For example, allowing cable networks to 
use access requirements to reach audiences may well be depriving DBS of 
the parties most likely to invest in helping it build out its facilities. In 
effect, compelled access cuts DBS off from its most natural strategic 
partners. As a consequence, it preempts the only solution to the bottleneck 
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problem that is viable in the long run (i.e., the development of a viable 
alternative to the bottleneck facility).  
 Thus, access should not be compelled whenever the resource is 
available from another source, even if it is only available at significant cost 
and in the relatively long run.294 This is particularly true in technologically 
dynamic industries, in which the prospects of developing new ways either 
to circumvent or to compete directly with the bottleneck are the highest.295 
The inevitable lag in adjusting regulation also raises the risk that 
regulations, such as access, that protect incumbents from new entry will 
continue to exist long after the justifications for enacting the regulation 
have long disappeared.296 
D. The Future of the Vertical Integration Provisions of the 1992 Cable 
Act 
 It thus appears that the case for restricting vertical integration in the 
cable industry is quite weak. The relevant markets appear to be too 
unconcentrated and unprotected by barriers to entry to permit vertical 
integration to have significant anti-competitive effects. In addition, the 
cost structure and complementarities associated with television 
programming make it quite possible that vertical integration in the cable 
industry would yield significant efficiency benefits.  
 But perhaps the most important aspect of my analysis of the 
regulation of vertical integration in the cable industry revolves around the 
imposition of access remedies. As the foregoing discussion reveals, access 
remedies represent something of an embarrassment to competition policy. 
This is because access remedies simply demand that the monopoly power 
be shared, rather than broken up. As a result, access remedies are unlikely 
to promote static efficiency. The dynamic efficiency problems resulting 
from access requirements are, if anything, even more profound. By 
rescuing competing firms from having to develop alternative sources of 
supply, access remedies deprive those firms who are seeking to deploy 
technologies that would compete with the bottleneck of their natural 
strategic partners.  
 Despite these problems, however, the initial FCC and judicial 
decisions on these provisions evinced little inclination to challenge the 
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current regulatory regime. There are at least some indications that this 
climate may be beginning to change. As noted earlier,297 a recent D.C. 
Circuit decision struck down the thresholds established by the FCC to 
implement the subscriber and channel occupancy provisions contained in 
the 1992 Cable Act.298 In addition, there are open proceedings before the 
FCC that could permit greater vertical integration in the cable industry,299 
the prohibition on exclusive programming contracts is set to expire next 
year,300 and the FCC has commenced proceedings to evaluate whether the 
prohibition should be extended.301 It thus seems that the final chapter of 
this debate has yet to be written. 
III. Open Access to Cable Modem Systems and the New Economy 
Theories of Technological Change 
 Although broadcast and cable television remain important sources of 
information and entertainment programming, it goes without saying that 
the most singular media-related development of the last several years has 
been the arrival of the Internet. In just five short years, the Internet has 
revolutionized communications in ways that until recently were 
inconceivable. The vast majority of U.S. households receive Internet 
service through an analog modem attached to a conventional telephone 
line. Now known as “narrowband” technology, conventional telephone-
based connections permit theoretical connection speeds of 56.6 thousand 
bits per second (“kbps”), with actual connection speeds typically falling in 
the range of 30-40 kbps.302 Under the typical narrowband setup, an Internet 
user uses a conventional telephone line, provided by a local telephone 
company such as Verizon, SBC, Qwest, or BellSouth, to connect to any 
one of a large number of Internet service providers (“ISPs”), such as 
America Online, MSN or Earthlink. The ISP in turn provides access to the 
content and other services residing on a global network of computers 
interconnected by what are known as Internet “backbones.” Since local 
telephone companies allow any ISP with a local or toll-free telephone 
number to operate on their system, narrowband consumers typically face a 
wide range of choices in ISPs. 
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 More and more, however, U.S. consumers have been turning to 
“broadband” technologies that allow subscribers to achieve actual speeds 
in excess of one million bits per second (1 Mbps).303 Although several 
different broadband technologies exist, cable modem systems, which 
provide broadband services via coaxial cables originally designed to carry 
television programming, have taken the early lead, having signed up well 
over five million households. Unlike narrowband systems, however, 
broadband providers typically require their customers to use a designated 
ISP.  
 The emergence of cable modem systems has in turn raised serious 
questions about whether and how this new industry should be regulated. 
The most salient regulatory question has centered on whether the FCC 
should require cable modem system operators to offer consumers a broader 
range of ISP choices. The ensuing debate over “open access”304 has largely 
centered on the classic type of vertical integration arguments discussed 
above. For example, Professor James Speta has led a group of scholars 
challenging the notion that vertical integration or exclusive dealing 
arrangements with ISPs can enable cable modem systems to increase 
monopoly profits.305 On the other side of the equation, a group of 
distinguished scholars have applied the tools of game theory, network 
economics, and innovation dynamics to propose new theories about how 
such vertical integration could harm competition.306 
 This Part will analyze the various economic arguments surrounding 
open access, following the same organizational pattern as the previous 
discussions of broadcast and cable regulation. Section A will begin by 
reviewing the structure of the cable modem industry, the current regulatory 
regime governing that industry, as well as the economic arguments 
advanced in support of that regime. Section B will use the basic economic 
model of vertical integration developed above to conduct a static 
efficiency analysis that evaluates the extent to which vertical integration is 
likely to threaten competition in the cable modem industry. I conclude that 
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the structure of the broadband industry renders it unlikely that such 
combinations will pose any significant anti-competitive threat and that in 
fact such combinations might well lead to significant transaction cost 
efficiencies.  
 Section C will then apply the framework developed in the discussion 
of cable access requirements to evaluate open access in terms of dynamic 
efficiency. I conclude that imposing open access would retard the 
deployment of cable modem services by rescuing competing ISPs from 
having to invest in building out alternative means for reaching high-speed 
broadband customers. In so doing, open access would deprive companies 
attempting to deploy alternative broadband technologies, such as DSL and 
satellite broadband services, of their natural strategic partners. 
 Finally, Section D will take on the New Economy arguments 
advanced by Professors Mark Lemley, Lawrence Lessig, and others 
contending that open access is required in order to maintain the uniform, 
“end-to-end” architecture upon which innovation on the Internet depends. 
My review of the economic literature suggests that the relationship 
between open access and innovation is far more complex than these 
scholars suggest. In fact, an analysis of the formal models reveals that 
requiring all broadband providers to adhere to a uniform set of protocols 
may discourage, rather than promote, innovation. It thus appears that 
imposing vertical structural restrictions on cable modem services would be 
just as unjustified as the imposition of similar restrictions to broadcasting 
and to cable television.  
A. The Cable Modem Industry and the Open Access Debate 
1. The Structure of the Cable Modem Industry 
 Despite claims that the Internet is fundamentally different from other 
media, the vertical structure of the narrowband and broadband markets are 
remarkably similar to other markets. As was the case with broadcasting 
and cable, it is quite easy to map the high-speed broadband industry onto 
the three-stage chain of production and distribution consisting of 
manufacturing, wholesaling, and retailing that typifies most conventional 
industries.307 
 The manufacturing stage consists of those companies that generate 
the webpage content and Internet-based services that end users will 
actually consume. The wholesale stage is occupied by the ISPs, which, in 
the words of two noted open access advocates, add value through their 
                                                                                                                         
 307 For application of a similar taxonomy, see Lopatka & Page, supra note 21, at 897. 
 Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the New Economy 
251 
“unique aggregation and presentation of content that allowed for easy 
consumption by end users.”308 As was the case with respect to broadcast 
and cable television, firms often operate at both the manufacturing and 
wholesale stage by controlling proprietary content and providing services 
such as chat rooms and instant messaging.309 Finally, cable modem 
providers and other companies who deliver the content and service 
packages assembled by the ISPs to end customers occupy the retail stage. I 
will refer to this stage of production as broadband transport services.  
2. Regulatory Consideration of Open Access 
 Questions about vertical integration in the cable modem industry first 
arose during the FCC’s review of AT&T’s proposed acquisitions of TCI 
and MediaOne. In those proceedings, a number of parties argued that 
allowing AT&T to bring both physical transmission and ISP services 
under the same corporate umbrella would allow AT&T to use its control 
over cable to harm competition in the market for ISPs. As a result, these 
parties asked the FCC to impose an “open access” requirement, which 
would have forced AT&T to allow independent ISPs to interconnect with 
AT&T’s cable modem service network on non-discriminatory terms.310  
 Consistent with its longstanding policy of non-regulation of 
computer-based services,311 the FCC refused to impose open access as a 
merger condition in either case.312 In so ruling, the FCC rejected 
arguments that such vertical linkages threatened competition.313 On the 
contrary, the FCC concluded that refusing to impose open access would be 
more effective in encouraging the deployment of high-speed broadband 
services.314 To the extent that such problems existed, they were primarily 
horizontal rather than vertical and would remain regardless of whether the 
mergers went through.315 
 Since cable operators are subject to municipal as well as federal 
regulation, open access advocates pressed their arguments before 
municipal regulators. Some of these municipal authorities were more 
accommodating than the FCC, either mandating open access by municipal 
ordinance316 or requiring it as a condition for the transfer of a license 
                                                                                                                         
 308 Rubinfeld & Singer, supra note 13, at 634. 
 309 See AT&T-TCI Merger, supra note 6, at 3193, ¶ 65. 
 310 Id. at 3197-98, ¶ 75; AT&T-MediaOne Merger, supra note 5, at 9866, ¶¶ 114-15. 
 311 See, e.g., OXMAN, supra note 7, at 8-12. 
 312 AT&T-TCI Merger, supra note 6, at 3205-08, ¶¶ 92-96; AT&T-MediaOne Merger, supra 
note 5, at 9872-73, ¶ 127. 
 313 AT&T-MediaOne Merger, supra note 5, at 9872-73, ¶ 127.  
 314 AT&T-TCI Merger, supra note 6, at 3206, ¶ 94, 3229-32, ¶¶ 147-48. 
 315 Id. at 3207, ¶ 96. 
 316 See Comcast Cablevision of Broward County, Inc. v. Broward County, 124 F. Supp. 2d 
685, 686-87 (S.D. Fla. 2000). 
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needed to complete AT&T’s acquisitions of TCI and MediaOne.317 
Although this municipal-based strategy was soon cut short by a series of 
judicial decisions holding that the FCC had exclusive jurisdiction over the 
issue,318 these early successes represented the first acceptance of open 
access as a policy matter.  
 It was not until the FCC’s consideration of the AOL-Time Warner 
merger that the open access advocates were able to garner sustainable 
victories. On January 11, 2001, within two years of rejecting calls for open 
access in AT&T’s acquisitions of TCI and MediaOne, the FCC abruptly 
reversed course and endorsed the FTC’s requirement that Time Warner 
and America Online negotiate open access with at least three unaffiliated 
ISPs as a condition to their merger.319 It is expected that the FCC will offer 
more definitive guidance after it completes an ongoing Notice of Inquiry 
on the issue.320  
3. The Economic Theory Underlying the Open Access Debate 
 As noted earlier, open access advocates have based their arguments 
on a wide range of economic theories. The first set of theories should be 
quite familiar by now. The first theory argues that vertical integration 
between cable modem providers and ISPs enables the combined entity to 
harm competition in the market for ISPs by discriminating against 
unaffiliated content. 321 This corresponds to the traditional concern about 
leverage. The second theory focuses on the danger that cable modem 
providers will use their control over proprietary content to obstruct the 
emergence of DSL and other broadband alternatives.322 This strategy 
corresponds to the traditional concerns about foreclosure. 
 The other theories draw on a more diverse range of economic 
concepts. For example, Professors Lemley and Lessig argue that 
innovation in Internet-based technologies depends upon the preservation of 
interoperability.323 Other scholars have employed such new economic tools 
as game theory324 and network economics325 to support their calls for open 
                                                                                                                         
 317 See MediaOne Group, Inc. v. County of Henrico, 257 F.3d 356, 360 (4th Cir. 2001); 
AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 875 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 318 See MediaOne, 257 F.3d at 360; AT&T, 216 F.3d at 875. 
 319 AOL-Time Warner Merger, supra note 10, at 6568-69, ¶ 57. 
 320 See Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other 
Facilities, 15 F.C.C.R. 19,287 (2000) (Notice of Inquiry). Open access is also likely to emerge as in 
issue in obtaining regulatory approval of Comcast’s acquisition of AT&T’s cable properties that was 
announced as this Article was going to press. See Yochai J. Dreazen, AT&T, Comcast Likely to Get 
Regulators’ Nod, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 2001, at A3. 
 321 See Rubinfeld & Singer, supra note 13, at 636 (calling this strategy “content 
discrimination”). 
 322 See id. (calling this strategy “conduit discrimination”). 
 323 Lemley & Lessig, supra note 16, at 930-46. 
 324 See Rubinfeld & Singer, supra note 13. 
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access. After applying the analytical structure developed in the foregoing 
discussions to the cable modem industry, I will proceed to evaluate these 
New Economy theories. 
B. Structural Market Conditions 
 As the framework developed earlier reveals, in order to succeed, 
foreclosure and leveraging strategies depend on the existence of market 
power in the primary market (broadband transport) as well as a real threat 
of anti-competitive effects in the secondary market (ISPs). A review of the 
current deployment of broadband services renders these claims untenable 
on their face. The broadband transport market is too unconcentrated and 
the ISP market insufficiently protected by barriers to entry to allow 
vertical integration to have significant anti-competitive effects. In addition, 
it is possible to identify a number of efficiency justifications for such 
integration. Thus, under the conventional economic analysis, it is quite 
likely that imposing open access would actually harm, rather than benefit, 
competition. 
1. Concentration in the Market for Broadband Transport 
 The first issue in determining whether vertical integration can harm 
competition in the cable modem industry is concentration in the primary 
market. Open access advocates have generally concluded without much 
analysis that such power exists. In so concluding, they have fallen into two 
misconceptions, one resulting from confusion about the proper definition 
of the relevant market, and the other stemming from treating the cable 
modem industry as a unified whole.  
 Regarding the first misconception, some analyses have argued that 
the fact that many communities have only one cable system inescapably 
implies that cable modem providers have monopoly power in the market 
for broadband transport services.326 The problem with this approach is that 
it focuses on the wrong market. It focuses on the local market in which end 
users meet their broadband transport provider. As I pointed out in the 
discussion regarding vertical integration in the cable television industry, if 
this is the appropriate market, then any restrictions on vertical integration 
would be largely irrelevant, since even complete vertical disintegration in 
                                                                                                                         
 325 See Hausman et al., supra note 13, at 161-64. 
 326 Lemley & Lessig, supra note 16, at 965 (asserting that cable modem providers have 
market power in the market for broadband transport because “[c]able companies do have monopolies 
over cable wires in their local service area by government fiat”). 
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the industry would not change the fact that end users would only have 
limited options in broadband transport service providers. 327  
 The key to clearing up this misconception is to realize that open 
access is not designed to mitigate the exercise of monopoly power in the 
local markets in which retailers meet end consumers. Rather, its purpose is 
to protect competition in the national market in which broadband transport 
providers obtain content from the ISPs. Thus, the proper question is not 
whether the broadband transport provider has monopoly control over 
broadband users in any particular city, but rather whether that provider has 
market power in the national market for obtaining broadband content. The 
fact that a particular cable modem operator may have a local monopoly in 
a particular city is irrelevant so long as each network has access to a 
sufficient number of users in other cities around the U.S.  
 The second misconception is represented by the argument that cable 
modem providers clearly have market power because cable modem 
systems account for approximately seventy percent of the broadband 
market.328 This leads Daniel Rubinfeld and Hal Singer to declare that the 
HHI for residential broadband access to be 5673.329 The flaw in this 
argument is that, in addition to treating the relevant markets as local in 
scope, it treats the entire cable modem industry as if it were a single 
company. Although the cable modem industry may control seventy percent 
of the market, that industry is made up of a number of smaller players, 
none of whom have anything approaching a seventy percent share. It is 
thus impossible to determine the degree of concentration simply by 
looking at the overall penetration of the cable modem industry. In order to 
understand the appropriate degree of concentration in the relevant market, 
it is necessary to calculate HHIs on a company-by-company basis. 
 Turning now to the HHI calculation, there can be no question that 
cable modem services have taken the early lead in the broadband race.330 
Cable modem services are now available in nearly sixty percent of all U.S. 
households,331 and cable modem providers signed up more than 5.4 million 
subscribers as of June 30, 2001.332 Even if we were to define cable modem 
                                                                                                                         
 327 See supra Subsections II.B.1, II.B.5.b. 
 328 Hausman et al., supra note 13, at 155; Lemley & Lessig, supra note 16, at 952. 
 329 Rubinfeld & Singer, supra note 13, at 649.  
 330 After initially declining to decide the issue, AT&T-TCI Merger, supra note 6, at 3205, ¶ 
92; AT&T-MediaOne Merger, supra note 5, at 9866, ¶ 116, the FCC squarely concluded that 
narrowband and broadband constitute separate markets. AOL-Time Warner Merger, supra note 10, at 
78-88, ¶¶ 69-73. A recent econometric study indicates that the price of narrowband service does not 
constrain the price of broadband access. Jerry A. Hausman et al., Cable Modems and DSL: Broadband 
Internet Access for Residential Customers, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 302, 303-04 (2001). 
 331 National Cable & Telecommunications Association, Industry Statistics, at 
http://www.ncta.com/industry_overview/indStat.cfm?indOverviewID=2.  
 332 Residential Broadband Customer Count Tops 10 Million, CABLE DATACOM NEWS (Sept. 
1, 2001), at http://www.cabledatacomnews.com/sep01/sep01-1.html. 
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systems as a product market unto itself, however, it is far from clear that it 
is sufficiently unconcentrated to support leveraging or foreclosure as anti-
competitive strategies.333  
 
Table VI. Total High-Speed Lines as of June 2001 
(Over 200 kbps in at least one direction) 
 
    Percent Change 
Technology June 2000 Dec. 2000 June 2001 
June 2000-
Dec. 2000 
Dec. 2000-
June 2001 
      
Cable modems 2,284,491  3,582,874 5,184,141  57%  43% 
DSL  951,583  1,977,101 2,693,834  108%  36% 
Other 1,131,360  1,509,899  1,738,366  33%  15% 
      
Total 4,367,434  7,069,874  9,616,341  62%  36% 
 
Source: High-Speed Services Report, supra note 335, at 6 tbl.1. 
 
 But as noted earlier, proper calculation of HHIs requires 
consideration of substitutes for cable modem service. The evidence 
suggests that DSL has become an effective competitor to cable modem 
systems, capturing more than three million subscribers334 and growing at 
rates comparable to that of cable modem services.335 Market research 
indicates that some subscribers prefer the fact that DSL is not subject to 
the privacy and congestion problems that afflict cable modem systems.336 
Although it was once true that DSL was only available in households 
within roughly 3.5 miles of a large telephone facility known as a central 
office switch,337 recent technological developments have made it possible 
to extend DSL’s reach through the use of “remote terminals” and “loop 
extenders.”338 In addition, DSL providers have lowered adoption costs by 
offering substantial promotional discounts and free DSL modems.339  
                                                                                                                         
 333 A calculation based on the available data reveals an HHI of 1720. See Industry Statistics, 
supra note 331. 
 334 Id. 
 335 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, HIGH-SPEED SERVICES FOR INTERNET 
ACCESS: SUBSCRIBERSHIP AS OF JUNE 30, 2001, at 5 (Feb. 2002), at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/ 
Common_Carrier/Reports/FCC-State_Link/IAD/hspd0202.pdf [hereinafter High-Speed Services 
Report]. 
 336 William P. Rogerson, The Regulation of Broadband Telecommunications, the Principle 
of Regulating Narrowly Defined Input Bottlenecks, and Incentives for Investment and Innovation, 2000 
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 119, 147 n.13. 
 337 Lemley & Lessig, supra note 16, at 2, 37. 
 338 See Donny Jackson, Shifting Gears: DSL Vendors Target ILECs with Retooled Products 
and New Standards, TELEPHONY, July 2, 2001, at 60; Michael Martin, Vendors Focus on Bringing 
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 When DSL numbers are combined with cable modem numbers, it 
becomes clear that concentration levels in the market for high-speed 
 
 
Table VII. Concentration in the Market for 
Broadband Transport Services as of June 30, 2001 
 
Provider 
Subscribers 
(thousands) Share  HHI 
    
Time Warner Cable  1,409  16%  258 
AT&T Broadband  1,346  15%  235 
SBC Communications  1,037  12%  139 
Verizon Communications  840  10%  92 
Cox Communications  668  8%  59 
Comcast Cable Communications  676  8%  58 
Charter Communications  419  5%  23 
BellSouth Corp.  381  4%  19 
Cablevision Systems Corp.  368  4%  18 
Qwest Communications  360  4%  17 
Covad Communications  333  4%  14 
Adelphia Communications  253  3%  8 
RCN Corp.  95  1%  1 
Rhythms NetConnections  83  1%  1 
Insight Communications  82  1%  1 
Mediacom LLC  80  1%  1 
Broadwing  51  1%  0 
Other cable modem  50  1%  0 
Other DSL  249  3%  1 
    
Total  8,780 100%  944 
 
Source: Residential Broadband Customer Count Tops 10 Million, CABLE DATACOM NEWS (Sept. 1, 
2001), at http://www.cabledatacomnews.com/sep01/sep01-1.html. 
 
 
                                                                                                                         
DSL to Non-Metro Users, NETWORK WORLD EDGE, June 11, 2001, at 28; Vince Vittore, Making DSL 
Go for the Long Run, TELEPHONY, Dec. 11, 2000. 
 339 See, e.g., John Cook, DSL Providers Jump at Chance to Pick Up New Subscribers, 
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broadband fall far below the levels that traditionally have led to antitrust 
concerns.340  
Furthermore, when a market is undergoing explosive growth, it is the 
projected levels of concentration rather than current levels of concentration 
that matter more. The FCC’s own projections indicate that the competition 
between DSL and cable modem will only intensify over the next several 
years. While the FCC estimates that by 2004 cable modem service will 
reach eighty-four percent of U.S. households and 15.2 million subscribers, 
it also estimates that, by that time, DSL will approach parity with cable 
modems, reaching eighty percent of U.S. households and capturing a total 
subscribership of 13 million.341  
 
Table VIII. Projected Subscribership for  
Broadband Transport Services 
 
 As of Dec. 31, 2000 Projected Dec. 31, 2004 
Broadband Subscribers (millions) Subscribers National 
Technology Projected Actual (millions) Coverage 
     
Cable modems 3.2 3.6 15.2  84% 
DSL 2.0 2.0 13.0  80% 
Wireless n/a n/a 3.0 to 4.4  34% 
Satellite n/a 0.06 1.2 to 4.6  100% 
 
Sources: Second Advanced Services Report, supra note 4, at 20,984-86, 20,988, 20,990, ¶¶ 187, 189, 
191, 196-197, 202; High-Speed Services Report, supra note 335, at 6 tbl.1. 
 
 In addition, there are two satellite broadband providers currently 
operating: DirecWay and Starband. Although the service is not yet quite 
comparable to that provided by DSL and cable modems,342 they do possess 
one advantage: they are already available on a nationwide basis and are 
                                                                                                                         
 340 As noted earlier, AT&T announced that it was selling its cable holdings to Comcast as 
this Article was going to press. See Solomon & Frank, supra note 229. Consummation of this deal, 
upon regulatory approval, would not materially affect my conclusions. The combination of AT&T and 
Comcast would create a single entity with twenty-three percent of the broadband transport market, 
with a resulting HHI contribution of 526, an increase of 233 points over the HHI contributions of 
AT&T and Comcast when treated as separate entities. Total HHI would only increase to 1178, still 
well below the 1800 level identified by the Vertical Merger Guidelines as the threshold for anti-
competitive concern. 
 341 Second Advanced Services Report, supra note 4, at 20,984-88, ¶ 187, ¶ 189, ¶ 191, ¶ 195. 
These estimates contradict the suggestion that DSL is unlikely to exert competitive pressure on cable 
modem systems over relevant time horizons. See Hausman et al., supra note 13, at 149-51. 
 342 Satellite broadband is somewhat slower than DSL and cable modem service, achieving 
peak download speeds of 400-500 kbps and peak upload speeds of 128-150 kbps. Users also need to 
pay a significant up-front fee for hardware and installation. In addition, at seventy dollars per month, it 
is priced somewhat higher than DSL and cable modem service. John Yaukey, Satellite Broadband, 
TENNESSEAN, Sept. 18, 2001, at 4E. 
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thus able to reach rural areas that are likely to remain unserved by either 
cable modems or DSL.343 The FCC reports projected subscription rates of 
between 1.2 to 4.6 million, primarily concentrated outside urban areas.344  
 Other companies have begun to invest in a microwave technology 
known as multipoint distribution systems (“MDS”) that was originally 
intended to provide television programming in competition with local 
cable systems and convert it into providing high-speed broadband 
services.345 Estimates suggest that these fixed wireless services should 
reach thirty-four percent of U.S. households and obtain somewhere 
between 3.0 and 4.4 million subscribers in 2004.346 
 Furthermore, we are just seeing the beginnings of the deployment of 
third-generation (“3G”) wireless devices, which promise to provide yet 
another platform for high-speed broadband access on a mobile basis. 
Unlike current wireless Internet connections, which can only achieve 
speeds between 9.6 to 28 kbps, 3G devices offer the promise of delivering 
data at speeds comparable to that offered by cable modem services and 
DSL.347 
 This is not to say that broadband deployment has gone smoothly. 
Each of the major broadband technologies has confronted its share of 
problems.348 Indeed, it remains quite possible that some unforeseen 
development may force one of the contenders for broadband dominance to 
fall by the wayside. For the purposes of this Article, it suffices to observe 
that the market for broadband transport services as it is currently 
constituted is insufficiently concentrated for vertical integration to raise 
any significant anti-competitive concerns. With regard to the future 
broadband market, regulators must take special care not to exert undue 
influence on the final technological outcome. The indeterminacy about the 
final market position of the various platforms only serves to underscore the 
risks attending any regulatory intervention at this point in the industry’s 
development.  
                                                                                                                         
 343 Second Advanced Services Report, supra note 4, at 20,937, ¶ 56, 20,990, ¶ 202. 
 344 Id. at 20,990, ¶ 202. 
 345 This includes both multichannel multipoint distribution services (“MMDS”) and local 
multipoint distribution services (“LMDS”). See id. at 20,988-89, ¶¶ 197-99. 
 346 Id. at 20,988, ¶ 197. 
 347 See James H. Johnston, The Next New Thing: Third Generation Wireless, LEGAL TIMES, 
Jan. 18, 2001, at 25 (noting that 3G systems will operate at up to 384 kbps if the user is walking and 2 
Mbps if the user is stationary). 
 348 As noted earlier, DSL providers have been subject to a significantly higher degree of 
regulation than cable modem providers. In addition, DSL deployment has been plagued by service 
problems and a number of high-profile bankruptcies. See Dissatisfied Customers Sue Verizon over DSL 
Installation, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2001, at C5; Kalpana Srinivasan, Cable Net Providers Taking the 
Lead, HOUS. CHRON., June 12, 2001, at 4. At the same time, the collapse of Excite@Home represented 
a significant setback for the cable modem industry. See Mylene Mangalindan, Excite@Home’s 
Decision to Shut Down Carries Bitter Fallout for Investors, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 2001, at B8. 
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2. Concentration and Barriers to Entry into the Market for ISPs 
 In addition, the structure of the ISP market makes it extremely 
unlikely that cable modem providers pose any realistic threat to 
competition. As the FCC has recognized, the market for ISPs has 
historically been quite competitive,349 and the low degree of concentration 
in the broadband market discussed makes it all but impossible for any 
cable modem service provider to use vertical integration to foreclose other 
ISPs from obtaining the high-speed broadband access they need.  
 In addition, the current wave of explosive growth further lowers the 
barriers to entry faced by ISPs. Currently, approximately one-third of all 
U.S. households are on-line, with the vast majority (ninety-two percent) 
obtaining their services via narrowband connections.350 The FCC projects 
that the number of on-line households will double over the next three 
years, with almost all of the new growth representing new broadband 
users.351 Even if existing users were for some reason unlikely to switch 
from their current services, the availability of such a large number of new 
customers should be more than sufficient to render most foreclosure 
strategies pointless.352 
                                                                                                                         
 349 AT&T-TCI Merger, supra note 6, at 3206, ¶ 93. 
 350 Second Advanced Services Report, supra note 4, at 20,983, ¶ 186. 
 351 Id. 
 352 It should also be noted that the FCC has consistently maintained that all DSL 
technologies constitute network elements that the incumbent local telephony companies (called 
incumbent local exchange carriers or ILECs) must offer to their competitors on an unbundled basis. 
Deployment of Wireless Servs. Offering Advanced Telecomms. Capability, 15 F.C.C.R. 385 (1999) 
(Order on Remand) (affirming that ILECs are subject to the obligations imposed by Section 251 of the 
Communications Act in connection with the offering of advanced services); Deployment of Wireline 
Servs. Offering Advanced Telecomms. Capability, 13 F.C.C.R. 24,012, 24,031-34, ¶¶ 34-44 (1998) 
(Memorandum Opinion and Order, and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking). Given the easy access to 
DSL, it is hard to see how vertical integration by a cable modem provider could serve to restrict entry. 
 I have serious doubts as to whether compelling access to DSL systems represents good policy. 
There seems little justification for compelling access to services that are not natural monopolies and, as 
noted above, the relevant markets are insufficiently concentrated for vertical integration to pose a 
threat to competition. In addition, by subjecting the different broadband transport to different 
regulatory regimes, the FCC risks being responsible for picking the technological winner. A recent 
D.C. Circuit decision recently overturned a recent FCC order on unbundled access to DSL systems and 
remanded it for further proceeding. See WorldCom, Inc. v. FCC, 246 F.3d 690 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
(vacating and remanding the FCC’s classification of DSL-based advanced services as “telephone 
exchange services” or “exchange access”). Recent regulatory proposals suggest that the FCC may be 
ready to release DSL from its access obligations. See Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to 
the Internet over Wireline Facilities, FCC 02-42 (F.C.C. rel. Feb. 15, 2002) (Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking); Review of Regulatory Requirements for Incumbent LEC Broadband Telecomms. Servs., 
16 F.C.C.R. 22,745 (2001) (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking); Review of Section 251 Unbundling 
Obligations of Incumbent Local Exch. Carriers, 16 F.C.C.R. 22,781 (2001) (Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking). 
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3.  Potential Efficiencies from Combining Cable Modem and ISP 
Services 
 The final step in the conventional analysis is to evaluate whether 
vertical integration is likely to yield significant efficiencies. An analysis of 
the cable modem industry reveals that many of the potential efficiencies 
identified with respect to broadcast and cable television may well exist 
with respect to cable modem service as well. 
a.  Elimination of Static Transaction Costs and Double 
Marginalization 
 Importance of Guaranteed Distribution. Like all media products, the 
creation of broadband content necessarily requires significant, up-front, 
first-copy costs that are large in comparison to the marginal costs of 
distribution, which tend to be negligible. This cost structure creates a 
natural tendency for broadband content to seek widescale distribution, 
since economic efficiency increases as the fixed cost investment is 
amortized over an increasingly large volume of users.353 
 As a result, the equilibrium level of distribution in the broadband 
market is likely to be fairly widescale. It is quite logical then for ISPs and 
other content providers either to enter into contracts that guarantee them 
access to all of a cable modem system’s customers or to integrate 
vertically with cable modem systems. This is not to say that content 
providers unable to secure universal distribution will be barred from 
entering, since it is clear that the minimum viable scale is small relative to 
the national market. My point is that the erection of artificial regulatory 
barriers preventing ISPs from entering into such arrangements with cable 
modem systems can increase the risks associated with creating new 
broadband content, a development which would correspondingly depress 
investment in content below optimal levels, as well as retard or deter the 
entry of new content providers. 
 The Problem of Double Marginalization. As noted earlier, vertical 
integration can enhance efficiency by allowing the integrated firm to 
transfer inputs at marginal cost.354 Once broadband content has been 
created, the marginal cost of duplicating and distributing it to additional 
users is negligible. As a result, if the transaction between the broadband 
content provider and the broadband transport service provider occurs 
across a firm boundary, it is inevitable that the content provider will 
charge the transport provider a positive price that exceeds marginal cost, 
                                                                                                                         
 353 Rubinfeld & Singer, supra note 13, at 642-44. 
 354  See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text. 
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which, in turn, will reduce allocative efficiency. Vertical integration would 
allow the combined entity to ignore the appropriate transfer price and 
instead focus solely on the price charged for the final delivery of the 
service. Doing so should allow the entity to eliminate the markup charged 
by the content provider and price the final good closer to the welfare-
maximizing level. 
 Caching. Open access would potentially raise a number of technical 
problems as well. Modern ISPs minimize off-network traffic by “caching,” 
a process in which the ISP gathers information from popular websites and 
stores it at its headend. Thus, the ISP can serve all of its customers who are 
interested in accessing a popular site with a single query to that site’s 
server. Once the ISP has stored that content at its headend, all interested 
subscribers can access the content without having to tie up resources 
outside of the ISP’s proprietary system.355 
 Like all systems involving fixed costs, however, caching systems 
must spread their costs over as large a number of subscribers as possible in 
order to be economically viable. If other ISPs are allowed access to cable 
modem systems, each ISP’s caching costs will be spread across fewer 
subscribers, a result which would raise the cost of providing high-quality 
service. Worse yet, the unaffiliated ISPs would either have to create 
caching systems of their own, a result which would duplicate costs and 
waste resources, or would simply provide consumers with a lower quality 
product.356 Neither alternative seems particularly attractive.  
 Economies of Scope. Allowing ISPs to integrate with cable modem 
systems would also enable broadband providers to take advantage of the 
available economies of scope. For example, requiring open access would 
prevent cable modem systems from realizing the transaction cost 
economies associated with marketing, billing, and servicing both products 
together. Joint provision can be particularly important when the overall 
performance of the final product depends upon inputs provided by two 
different companies and when consumers have trouble distinguishing 
which of the two companies is responsible for any performance 
inadequacies. In such cases, the two companies may simply blame each 
other for the system’s poor performance. Customers that experience 
unsatisfactory performance with an emerging technology may simply 
choose to drop the product without attempting to identify the cause of the 
poor performance.357 In such cases, allowing a single company to provide 
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both complementary services better enables it to ensure the overall 
performance of the system. As the Supreme Court has implicitly 
recognized in an early cable television case, such concerns are particularly 
important in the case of new products, such as cable modem service, since 
an emerging industry’s “short and long-term well-being depend[s] on the 
success of the first systems sold.”358 
 Such economies of scope appear to exist in the cable modem industry. 
As experience in other telecommunications sectors has revealed, joint 
marketing of services can prove to be an essential means of competition. 
Absent some ability to guarantee a quality end-to-end product, cable 
modem systems will place less promotional efforts behind their products 
and risk alienating customers who have unsatisfactory experiences.359  
 Finally, the overall speed performance is a product of both the 
characteristics of the cable modem system, but also the server technology 
employed by the ISP. In addition, system performance is also determined 
in no small part by the degree of compatibility between the cable modem 
system and the ISP.360 A customer receiving unsatisfactory service may 
often be unable to discern whether the problem lies with the cable modem 
system or with the ISP. In a fledgling industry like the cable modem 
industry, the user may well form his or her opinion without determining 
the true cause of the poor performance. Integrating cable modem systems 
and ISPs simplifies the coordination of decisions in ways that avoid such 
problems and ensure end-to-end quality. It also allows customers to call a 
single service desk that is responsible for solving all of their problems. 
b.  Elimination of Strategic Behavior 
 Hold Up. The presence of the large upfront fixed costs discussed 
above also leaves both cable modem and content providers vulnerable to 
being held up. Like other creators of media content, broadband content 
providers must make significant up-front investments in their content. 
They will not do so unless they can expect to recover those fixed costs 
later. Once the content is created, however, content providers are 
vulnerable to hold-up behavior, since once the costs of creating the content 
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are sunk, the content owners’ customers can try to beat them down to 
marginal cost. 
 Conversely, cable modem providers are similarly vulnerable to sunk 
cost opportunism. They are making a multi-billion dollar investment in 
their physical plant. Once the costs are sunk, cable modem providers bear 
the risk of being beaten down to levels at which the fixed-cost investment 
can no longer be recovered.361 The traditional method for redressing both 
of these concerns is either vertical integration or long-term exclusive 
dealing contracts. If unable to rely on such exclusive dealing 
arrangements, an inherently unstable situation results in which the 
reservation prices overlap significantly and in which both sides are left to 
settle on price through strategic behavior.  
 Free Riding. Integrated provision can be particularly important when 
a new technology is involved, since the need for presale services typically 
required by the introduction of a new technology increases the dangers of 
classic Telserian free riding.362 If multiple ISPs are available, they will all 
have the incentive to underinvest in promotional activities, an effect that 
can be particularly damaging in the early days of a new business when the 
burden of the sunk costs is spread over the smallest number of 
customers.363 Furthermore, the speeds attainable via cable modem systems 
are determined by both the quality of the transport network provided by 
the cable operator, as well as the amount of server space provided by the 
ISP. A cable modem subscriber that receives poor service may not be able 
to determine whether it is the ISP or the transmission provider that is the 
cause of the problem.364 This ambiguity creates some incentive for each 
party to shirk. Furthermore, as the courts recognized in one of the earliest 
decisions involving cable television, inability to manage this potential 
problem may drastically increase the risks involved in deploying the new 
technology, since customers that experience unsatisfactory performance 
with emerging technologies may simply choose to drop the product 
without attempting to identify the cause of the poor performance.365  
 The potential for congestion also raises the possibility of free riding. 
Since each user and each ISP do not internalize all of their costs, each has 
inadequate incentives to conserve bandwidth.366 In addition, the cable 
modem provider will eventually have to make additional capital 
investments to upgrade its system to accommodate increases in traffic. 
Theoretically, simply forcing each ISP to bear the full costs of their usage 
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could solve such problems. To the extent that open access is limited to 
marginal cost, however, the existence of such externalities also gives ISPs 
the incentive to free ride on the cable modem provider by avoiding making 
any contribution to the additional capital costs that the ISP itself is 
responsible for creating. Even if regulators attempt to allocate such fixed 
costs fully, the allocation of fixed costs has proven quite difficult and even 
arbitrary. In addition, rate making authorities have had little success setting 
the appropriate cost of capital to reflect the true ex ante risks once the 
market has arrived in the ex post world. 
 Adverse Selection. Broadband transport services are also subject to 
two types of adverse selection problems. The first stems from the inability 
to determine ex ante which portions of the cable modem network are likely 
to be the most profitable. In such cases, a unified provider can focus on 
average profitability, trusting that those areas which turn out to be 
relatively less profitable will tend to be balanced by other areas that turn 
out to be relatively more profitable. Open access, however, allows 
competing ISPs to wait until the relative profitability of each part of the 
network is revealed and then to simply offer ISP services only in the most 
attractive areas of the network. Not only does this allow the competing ISP 
to avoid bearing its fair share of the overall risk of the venture, it also 
prevents the cable modem provider from using the different parts of the 
system to offset these risks. 
 In addition, cable modem service is subject to a second adverse 
selection problem resulting from the fact that cable modem systems are 
subject to congestion. Cable modem providers cannot measure the 
intensity with which particular individuals use the system. In the absence 
of the ability to sort customers, unaffiliated ISPs can avoid the costs of 
their use of the bandwidth and have inadequate incentives to conserve 
bandwidth. Unless vertical integration is allowed and open access is 
forbidden, the cable modem provider has little choice but to engage in 
costly measures to meter usage, to build in contractual protections, or to 
sort users.367 
 It is thus possible to identify several plausible ways in which vertical 
integration can promote efficiency in the cable modem industry. It is not 
my purpose to prove that such efficiencies actually exist in any particular 
case. The mere possibility of such efficiencies serves to rebut arguments 
that vertical integration is so unlikely to be pro-competitive that the 
practice may be prohibited without any inquiry into the facts of specific 
cases. 
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4. Post-Chicago Models of Open Access 
 The only major post-Chicago analysis of open access to appear to 
date was offered by economists Daniel Rubinfeld and Hal Singer in 
connection with the AOL-Time Warner merger.368 Rubinfeld and Singer 
base their analysis on two closely related articles, the first being the 
discursive analysis proffered by Michael Riordan and Steven Salop369 and 
the second being the formal model derived by Janusz Ordover, Garth 
Saloner, and Steven Salop370 from which the Riordan and Salop analysis 
draws its theoretical justification.371  
 The heart of Ordover, Saloner, and Salop’s analysis is its reliance on 
a form of oligopolistic competition known as “Bertrand competition.”372 
One of the unique qualities of Bertrand competition is that it supposes that 
two competitors are sufficient to drive the price down to competitive 
levels. Thus, unlike under other oligopolistic analyses in which reductions 
in the number of competitors gradually lead to increasingly anti-
competitive results, under Bertrand competition, the existence of as few as 
two competitors is sufficient to drive prices down to the levels that would 
result under perfect competition. This phenomenon is known as the 
“Bertrand paradox.” Thus, any reduction in the number of competitors 
does not force the market away from the perfectly competitive result until 
only two competitors remain. The elimination of one of these two 
remaining competitors, however, causes the market to shift abruptly and 
discontinuously from the perfectly competitive result to the monopolistic 
result.373 
 The Ordover, Saloner, and Salop model takes advantage of this large 
discontinuous change to generate the only model that indicates that vertical 
integration unambiguously leads to higher prices for consumers.374 It 
posits a market composed of successive duopolies, in which two input 
suppliers sell to two downstream manufacturers. Despite the extreme 
concentration of both of these levels of production, the market is presumed 
to be completely efficient, since under Bertrand competition the existence 
of two input suppliers is sufficient to yield the perfectly competitive result. 
Vertical integration between one of the suppliers and one of the 
manufacturers causes the input market to change from a duopoly to a 
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monopoly. The resulting price increase by the non-vertically integrated 
firm unambiguously causes welfare to fall.  
 The post-Chicago models upon which Rubinfeld and Singer base their 
analysis have been subjected to several conceptual criticisms. The most 
questionable aspect of these models is the extent to which their result 
depends on the Bertrand paradox. Bertrand models depend upon a number 
of strong assumptions that may not hold with respect to the markets 
involved in the open access debate. For example, classic Bertrand models 
assume that the goods produced by the duopolistic competitors are perfect 
substitutes for one another. It is generally acknowledged that the Bertrand 
paradox collapses if the products are non-homogeneous, since any degree 
of product differentiation will give the firms sufficient market power to 
raise prices above competitive levels.375 Bertrand competition assumes that 
the duopolistic competitors will take their rival’s prices as fixed and will 
not anticipate any actions. As Timothy Muris, the newly appointed 
Chairman of the FTC, has noted, such an assumption is empirically 
untested and is likely to be theoretically unsound.376  
 In addition, the anti-competitive effect described in the Ordover-
Saloner-Salop model depends on the assumption that only two firms exist 
at each level of production. The existence of a third competitor (or a 
potential entrant) will cause the anti-competitive effects to disappear.377 In 
addition, in order for the Bertrand paradox to spring, the firm that 
vertically integrates must use all of the input it produces internally. If the 
company continues to sell the input to other customers, vertical integration 
does not have the effect of reducing the number of competitors. As David 
Reiffen has pointed out, Ordover, Saloner, and Salop fail to explain why or 
how a company could precommit to forego external sales.378 
 Finally, these models fail to take into account the possibility of 
efficiencies resulting from the merger. By assuming that two firms are 
sufficient to force price down to competitive levels, the Ordover, Saloner, 
and Salop model, by its nature, precludes any possible welfare benefits 
resulting from the elimination of double marginalization even though the 
successive duopoly structure strongly suggests that such efficiencies would 
exist.379 In addition, the model fails to take into account the possibility that 
vertical integration could rationalize input substitution in ways that 
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promote efficiency,380 as well as the possibility of significant transaction 
cost savings. These problems have led even those economists firmly 
committed to regulatory intervention to question the utility of Bertrand 
models.381 Although some of the refinements offered by Riordan and Salop 
mitigate some of these problems, these concerns raise serious questions as 
to whether vertical integration yields such unambiguously anti-competitive 
outcomes so as to justify prohibiting it as a regulatory matter.  
 For the purposes of this Article, we need not come to any definitive 
resolution of these issues. As Rubinfeld and Singer acknowledge, the 
models upon which they base their argument depend on the same 
structural assumptions employed in my analysis. Specifically, Rubinfeld 
and Singer acknowledge that (1) the market for broadband transport 
services must be concentrated and burdened by high switching costs382 and 
(2) the market for ISPs must be concentrated and protected by barriers to 
entry.383 Their support for compelling open access as a condition of the 
AOL-Time Warner merger depended upon their assumption that the HHI 
in the residential broadband transport market was 5673, that DSL was 
unlikely to emerge as a competitor to cable modem service, and that 
switching costs among the services was likely to be high.384 Thus any 
disagreement with their position can be resolved simply by showing that 
these preconditions have not been met. For the reasons discussed above,385 
I believe that such preconditions have not been met with respect to open 
access. 
5. The Empirical Evidence on Open Access 
 Despite the relative youth of the broadband transport industry, one 
relevant empirical study on open access has already appeared in the 
literature. Thomas Hazlett and George Bittlingmayer designed an event 
study to determine the impact that positive and negative news concerning 
open access had on three different metrics: (1) a general index of Internet 
stocks, (2) the stock price of Excite@Home (to serve primarily as a 
control), and (3) the stock price of America Online. All three were 
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adjusted for changes in the S&P 500 index. If vertical integration and 
exclusivity did not yield net efficiency benefits and open access on balance 
enhanced efficiency, one would expect that setbacks to open access would 
have negative impacts on the Internet index and the stock price of AOL, 
while victories for open access would have a positive impact on both 
metrics. In fact, precisely the opposite was true, as setbacks to the open 
access movement were correlated with an increase in both the Internet 
index and the stock price of AOL, with the former effect being statistically 
significant. Hazlett and Bittlingmayer thus concluded that the data tended 
to be more consistent with the idea that vertical integration yielded net 
efficiency benefits than with the hypothesis that open access would be 
more beneficial.386 Although changes in stock prices and indices are 
subject to numerous other influences and, as a result, are admittedly 
imperfect measures of efficiency, in the absence of better evidence, this 
study does provide some preliminary support for the position that vertical 
integration in the cable modem industry may promote efficiency. 
C. The Problematic Nature of Compelled Access as a Remedy 
 For the same reasons described more completely in the discussion of 
the use of access remedies in cable television,387 it is likely that open 
access will prove problematic as a remedy. First, as noted earlier, access 
remedies by their nature depend on theories of leveraging and foreclosure 
that have largely been discredited388 and, in any event, depend on the 
existence of structural preconditions, including market power in the 
primary market and the existence of barriers to entry in the secondary 
market, that are not satisfied in the current case. 
 Second, the terms under which access is compelled are likely to be 
very difficult to administer. If the FCC were to compel access without 
imposing any restrictions on price, a cable modem provider would simply 
charge the monopoly price. While such access would clearly benefit other 
ISPs by rescuing them from having to make the capital investments that 
would have otherwise been required for them to secure carriage through 
other means, it would provide no tangible benefit to consumers, as price 
and output would remain at monopoly levels. Attempts at forcing prices 
below monopoly levels, however, would force regulators to referee a 
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never-ending series of disputes over the terms and conditions of access, a 
role for which the FCC has historically proven ill-suited.389 
 Most importantly, the economic literature suggests that open access 
would harm dynamic efficiency as well, by slowing the deployment of 
high-speed broadband services. The fact that any positive developments 
would need to be shared with competitors would represent a deviation 
from the well-defined property rights needed to provide cable modem 
operators with the incentive to engage in efficient levels of investment in 
their own technology.390 In addition, compelled access would also rescue 
unaffiliated ISPs from having to support the development of alternative 
broadband providers. These unaffiliated ISPs represent the natural 
strategic partners for DSL, satellite, and other broadband transport 
providers seeking to build services to compete directly with cable modem 
services. Providing unaffiliated ISPs with access to cable modem systems 
would remove any incentive to support such initiatives. 
 This insight underscores the core problem in the broadband industry, 
which is the paucity of providers capable of delivering broadband transport 
services into the home. An open access regime would do nothing to 
alleviate this central problem, since choice among ISPs will not provide 
consumers with any additional options for broadband transport services. 
Giving consumers their choice of ISP will thus not allow them to pay less 
than the monopoly price. Likewise, allowing vertical integration between 
cable modem services and ISPs will not make this problem any worse. On 
the contrary, open access will make the problem worse by preventing cable 
modem providers from realizing the available efficiencies and by 
depriving DSL and other alternative broadband transport providers of their 
natural strategic partners 
D. The New Economy Arguments: The Effect of Standardization on 
Innovation 
 Open access advocates have gone far beyond the conventional 
economics of vertical integration and instead have turned to arguments 
inspired by various features of the New Economy. Led by Professors 
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Lemley and Lessig’s recent article, this distinguished group of scholars has 
raised a wide range of arguments based on innovation theories and 
network economics. First advanced as considerations that should guide 
merger policy,391 more recent work has suggested that these arguments 
should serve as a guide to regulatory policy as well.392 The importance of 
these arguments justifies discussing them in detail. 
 Professors Lemley and Lessig’s central contention is that the failure 
to impose open access would threaten innovation on the Internet. In their 
eyes, innovation on the Internet depends on the maintenance of the “end-
to-end” design principle that has ensured that the Internet has remained 
fully interoperable since its inception. At the core of this principle is the 
belief that the functions of the Internet involved in transporting data 
between computers should be as simple and general as possible and should 
not be tailored towards any particular application. The computers 
connected to the ends of the network (rather than the network itself) should 
provide the functionality of particular applications. Put more simply, the 
connections between the computers should be as “dumb” as possible and 
should focus on carrying bits and bytes between computers as quickly as 
possible without performing any additional functions. The “intelligence” 
in the network should instead reside at the edges.393  
 Professors Lemley and Lessig believe that innovation on the Internet 
depends upon the continued standardization provided by this end-to-end 
architecture. As a result, they condemn the agglomeration of broadband 
transport providers and ISPs that threatens this standardization by 
permitting proprietary networks to introduce a greater degree of 
intelligence into the body of the network itself. In addition, Lemley and 
Lessig contend that the end-to-end architecture of the Internet encourages 
innovation by shifting the locus of creativity away from centralized control 
by dominant firms and towards a more diverse array of smaller 
innovators.394 Lemley and Lessig also assert that the empirical evidence 
indicates that creativity is better spurred by more competitive market 
structures.395 
 Finally, Lemley and Lessig argue that open access is necessary to 
ensure the new type of competition that is emerging in the New Economy. 
Drawing on the work of Timothy Bresnahan,396 they contend that 
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competition in the broadband industry will differ from competition in more 
conventional industries. Bresnahan argues that, unlike in conventional 
industries in which the manufacturing, wholesale, and retail levels are each 
occupied by several participants engaging in vigorous competition, the 
presence of large economies of scale will cause each level of the 
broadband industry to become dominated by a single player. Although 
strategic entry barriers and cost asymmetries appear to play some role, the 
primary cause of market concentration at each level is the presence of 
strong network externalities.397 Jerry Hausman, Gregory Sidak, and Hal 
Singer advance a similar argument.398 They argue that the existence of 
network economic effects can allow the early leader in the race to provide 
broadband Internet access to “lock in” subscribers and content providers. 
The existence of these network externalities can deter innovation by 
making it prohibitively expensive for subscribers and content providers to 
switch to alternative platforms, even when it might be in their best 
interests to do so.399 
 These scholars should be applauded for advancing such an important 
and innovative perspective. Clearly any policy evaluation in this area must 
take into account the impact of standardization and network externalities 
on innovation. That said, my review of the literature on the relationship 
between innovation, standardization, concentration, and network 
economics reveals that the relationship between these factors is more 
ambiguous than Professors Lemley, Lessig, and those advancing similar 
arguments would have us believe. If anything, it appears that permitting 
competing proprietary standards to emerge might help to mitigate, rather 
than exacerbate, some of the problems that may also emerge. Finally, the 
literature raises serious questions regarding the propriety of open access as 
a solution. In fact, the argument offered by Timothy Bresnahan, upon 
which Lemley and Lessig rely, suggests that even if firms achieve 
dominance over particular levels of production, open access may 
ultimately prove counterproductive. 
1. The Tradeoff Between Standardization and Product Diversity 
 First, it bears noting that standardization and openness can deter, as 
well as encourage, innovation. Scholars who have studied the problems of 
standardization in the face of network economic effects have long 
recognized that standardization necessarily limits product variety by 
                                                                                                                         
ANTITRUST IN THE DIGITAL MARKETPLACE 155 (Jeffrey A. Eisenach & Thomas M. Lenard eds., 
1999). 
 397 Id. at 159-65. 
 398 Jerry A. Hausman et al., supra note 13, at 129. 
 399 Id. at 161-62, 163-64; see also Jerry A. Hausman et al., Cable Modems and DSL: 
Broadband Internet Access for Residential Customers, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 302, 306 (2001). 
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 19:171, 2002 
272 
“prevent[ing] the development of promising but unique and incompatible 
new systems.”400 The resulting limits on possible innovation leave 
consumers with a narrower range of products from which to choose.401 
Indeed, the introduction of proprietary standards may simply represent the 
natural outgrowth of heterogeneous consumer preferences.402 Professors 
Lemley and Lessig implicitly concede as much when they recognize that it 
is the need for greater security and the growth of e-commerce that is 
leading network providers to move away from standard protocols and to 
introduce greater levels of intelligence into the network itself. The clear 
consumer benefits provided by the development of the commercial 
potential of the Internet lead Lemley and Lessig to recognize that a move 
towards proprietary standards may be “inevitable.”403 The recent discovery 
of security flaws in certain commonly used Internet protocols only serves 
to underscore the potential security dangers associated with the use of 
uniform standards.404  
 Similarly, even scholars concerned about the dangers of closed 
systems have acknowledged that exclusivity can similarly serve pro-
competitive functions, in that it “can serve to differentiate products and 
networks, to encourage investment in these networks, and to overcome 
free-riding.”405 As a result, these scholars have uniformly rejected applying 
a rule of per se illegality to such arrangements.406 
2. The Relationship Between Market Concentration and Innovation 
 Professors Lemley and Lessig further oppose permitting cable modem 
providers to exert too much control over the architecture of the Internet on 
the grounds that “the empirical evidence suggests quite strongly that it is 
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13, 2001, at D2 (discussing security flaw in TCP/IP); James Glanz, Cryptologists Discover Flaw in E-
Mail Security Program, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2001, at A14 (discussing security flaw in commonly 
used encryption program). 
 405 Carl Shapiro, Exclusivity in Network Industries, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 673, 678 (1999). 
 406 Id. (“I am certainly not proposing a per se rule against exclusivity in a network 
context.”); TIROLE, supra note 24, at 186 (“Theoretically, the only defensible position on vertical 
restraints seems to be the rule of reason. . . . Legality or illegality per se . . . seems unwarranted.”). 
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competition, not monopoly, that best spurs creativity.”407 In support of this 
proposition, they cite two pieces of data: (1) a recent study by Professor 
Howard Shelanski408 of the speed with which innovations in the 
telecommunications industry were deployed and (2) the empirical evidence 
about the relationship between market concentration and innovation on the 
Internet.409 My own review of both of these sources reveals that the 
relationship between market concentration and innovation is more 
ambiguous than Lemley and Lessig suggest. 
 The Shelanski Study. This ambitious work identified ten recent 
innovations in telecommunications and measured both the market structure 
under which each was deployed, as well as the length of time between the 
initial deployment of the technology and the time each technology was 
deployed in thirty percent of the relevant network points.410 Specifically, 
Professor Shelanski identified whether a particular innovation was 
deployed under one of three market structures: (1) monopoly conditions, 
(2) “concentrated oligopoly conditions,” defined as competition restricted 
to two or three firms, and (3) “competitive oligopoly conditions,” defined 
as competition among more than three firms.411 Professor Shelanski then 
calculated the average deployment time for technologies deployed under 
monopoly conditions (9 years), concentrated oligopoly conditions (8 
years), and competitive oligopoly conditions (4.3 years). This led 
Professor Shelanski to conclude that faster deployment times correlate 
with more competitive market structures.412  
 The care with which Professor Shelanski frames his empirical study 
makes it particularly important to pay close attention to the caveats that he 
attaches to his work. First of all, Shelanski himself concedes that his 
results are far from conclusive. Given the relatively small number of 
observations and the high degree of variance within each category, it 
comes as no surprise that Shelanski made no attempt to evaluate whether 
the differences were statistically significant. Even a casual review of the 
numbers reveals that even a small change in almost any of them would        
. 
                                                                                                                         
 407 Lemley & Lessig, supra note 16, at 961. 
 408 Howard A. Shelanski, Competition and Deployment of New Technology in U.S. 
Telecommunications, 2000 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 85. 
 409 Lemley & Lessig, supra note 16, at 961-62. 
 410 Shelanski, supra note 408, at 99. 
 411 According to Shelanski, four innovations were deployed under monopoly conditions: 
touch-tone dialing, digital stored-program-control switching, ISDN transmission, and electronic store-
program-control switching. Three other innovations were deployed under concentrated oligopoly 
conditions: SS-7 signaling, fiber-optic transport, and automatic switching. Three other innovations 
were deployed under competitive oligopoly conditions: DSL service, cable modem service, and digital 
wireless telephony. See id. at 98-114 (describing these various innovations in detail). 
 412 Id. at 115. 
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Table IX. Deployment of Ten Telecommunications Innovations 
 
Market 
Structure Technology 
Time to 30% 
Deployment 
Average Time 
to Deployment 
Touch-tone dialing 4 years 
Digital stored-program-
control switching 7 years 
ISDN transmission 9 years 
Monopoly  
Electronic stored-program-
control switching 14 years 
9 years 
SS-7 signaling 4 years 
Fiber-optic transport 6 years Concentrated Oligopoly 
Automatic switching 12 years 
8 years 
DSL service 2 years 
Cable modem service 3 years Competitive Oligopoly 
Digital wireless 7 years 
4.3 years 
  
Source: Shelanski, supra note 408, at 116. 
 
likely have a drastic impact on the results. It also bears mentioning that 
Shelanski’s study focused on the time it took to deploy technologies that 
had already been developed rather than innovative activity proper.413 
Indeed, as Shelanski specifically notes, many of the innovations that he 
studied had lain fallow for several years after their initial development.414 
As such, his study is more properly regarded as focusing on investment 
rather than innovation, since it measures the time it took to deploy 
technologies that had already been developed rather than the time needed 
to create the technological innovations in the first place. Shelanski also 
                                                                                                                         
 413 See id. (noting that the key measurement in the study was the length of time between the 
date of initial deployment and the date when thirty percent deployment was reached). 
 414 See id. at 99 (touch-tone dialing was developed in the late 1950s, but not deployed until 
1963), 105 (SS-7 signalling was developed in the 1970s, but not deployed until 1987), 111 (DSL was 
developed in 1989, but not deployed until 1996). 
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correctly notes that finding a correlation says nothing about causation.415 
Indeed, as Joseph Schumpeter famously suggested, it is quite possible that 
innovative activity causes market concentration and not the other way 
around.416 
 In addition, Shelanski recognizes that the speed with which a new 
technology is deployed depends on a wide range of considerations aside 
from market concentration. Differences in costs and benefits can have a 
large impact on deployment rates.417 Similarly, the leading commentary on 
product diffusion has recognized that a wide range of factors can affect the 
speed of product diffusion, including (1) the relative advantage conferred 
by the new product, (2) the compatibility of the new product with existing 
products, (3) the complexity of the product, (4) the new product’s 
trialability, and (5) the observability of the innovation to others.418 Other 
relevant factors include initial costs, ongoing costs, risk and uncertainty, 
scientific credibility, and social approval.419 Most importantly, since all of 
the innovations studied occurred in a heavily regulated industry, Shelanski 
was unable to determine whether some other factor correlated with market 
concentration might, in fact, be the true causal driver of the effect he 
observed. These would include a wide variety of factors, including 
“pricing rules, service requirements, subsidy flows and other regulatory 
and institutional factors.”420  
 Finally, and most importantly, the conclusion that Shelanski draws 
suggests that he would disagree with any attempts to draw simple policy 
inferences from his work. Shelanski simply argues that the data provided 
“sufficient support for an initial presumption that competition and 
implementation of new technology are mutually reinforcing, rather than 
conflicting, objectives.”421 He concedes that the record is too mixed and 
the data points too few to support a conclusive presumption. His work thus 
does not support the kind of categorical determination against such 
                                                                                                                         
 415 Id. at 117. 
 416 JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 81-86 (1942). 
 417 Shelanski, supra note 408, at 114-15. 
 418 EVERETT M. ROGERS, DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS 240-51 (4th ed. 1995). This 
framework represents the basic analytical approach reflected in many of the leading marketing 
textbooks. See, e.g., PHILIP KOTLER, MARKET MANAGEMENT 357 (Millennium ed. 1999); THOMAS S. 
ROBERTSON, JOAN ZIELINSKI, & SCOTT WARD, CONSUMER BEHAVIOR 373-76 (1984). 
 419 KOTLER, supra note 418, at 442; Minhi Hahn, Sehoon Park, & Andris A. Zoltners, 
Analysis of New Production Diffusion Using a Four-Segment Trial-Repeat Model, 13 MARKETING SCI. 
224 (1994); Vijay Mahajan, Eitan Muller, & Frank M. Bass, Diffusion of New Products: Empirical 
Generalizations and Managerial Uses, 14 MARKETING SCI. G79 (1995); Fareena Sultan, John U. 
Farley, & Donald R. Lehmann, Reflection on “A Meta-Analysis of Applications of Diffusion Models,” 
33 J. MARKETING RES. 247 (1996). 
 420 Shelanski, supra note 408, at 86. 
 421 Id. at 117. 
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consolidation that would be embodied in a regulation imposing open 
access. Indeed, Shelanski’s other work strongly suggests the contrary.422 
 Empirical Studies of the Relationship Between Concentration and 
Innovation. Professors Lemley and Lessig suggest that “the empirical 
evidence suggests quite strongly that it is competition, not monopoly, that 
spurs creativity.”423 My own review of the extensive empirical literature on 
this question indicates that, as a general matter, the relationship between 
innovation and market structure is more ambiguous than Lemley and 
Lessig suggest.424 While some studies found that increases in research and 
development tended to be associated with high market concentration,425 
other studies came to precisely the opposite conclusion.426 Still others 
studies argued that the relationship between market concentration and 
innovation was non-linear. Under these analyses, innovative activity is at 
its lowest when the market is either highly competitive or monopolistic 
and at its highest at moderate levels of concentration. If the level of 
innovation were drawn as a function of market concentration, the resulting 
pattern would thus appear as an “inverted-U.”427 Still other studies suggest 
                                                                                                                         
 422 See Shelanski, supra note 25, at 739-44 (arguing that competition could slow the 
deployment of broadband transport services). 
 423 Lemley & Lessig, supra note 16, at 48. 
 424 For useful surveys of the empirical literature, see MORTON I. KAMIEN & NANCY L. 
SCHWARTZ, MARKET STRUCTURE AND INNOVATION 86-91 (1980); SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 72, at 
644-51; PAUL STONEMAN, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 46-49 (1983); 
Wesley M. Cohen & Richard C. Levin, Empirical Studies of Innovation and Market Structure, in 2 
HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, at 1059, 1074-78 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert Willig 
eds., 1989). 
 425 See, e.g., EDWIN MANSFIELD, INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGICAL 
INNOVATION: AN ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS (1968); F.M. SCHERER, INNOVATION AND GROWTH: 
SCHUMPETERIAN PERSPECTIVES 59-64 (1984); Louis Amato & J. Michael Ryan, Market Structure and 
Dynamic Performance in U.S. Manufacturing, 47 S. ECON. J. 1105 (1981); A.J. Buxton, The Process 
of Technical Change in UK Manufacturing, 7 APPLIED ECON. 53 (1975); Douglas F. Greer & Stephen 
A. Rhoades, Concentration and Productivity Changes in the Long and Short Run, 43 S. ECON. J. 1031 
(1976); D. Hamberg, Size of Firm, Oligopoly, and Research: The Evidence, 30 CANADIAN J. ECON. & 
POL. SCI. 62 (1964); Ira Horowitz, Firm Size and Research Activity, 28 S. ECON. J. 298 (1962); Albert 
N. Link, An Analysis of the Composition of R&D Spending, 49 S. ECON. J. 343 (1982); Edwin 
Mansfield, Industrial Research and Development Expenditures: Determinants, Prospects, and Relation 
to Size of Firm and Inventive Output, 72 J. POL. ECON. 319 (1964); Edwin Mansfield, Composition of 
R and D Expenditures: Relationship to Size of Firm Concentration, and Innovative Output, 63 REV. 
ECON. & STAT. 610 (1981); J.B. Rosenberg, Research and Market Share: A Reappraisal of the 
Schumpeter Hypothesis, 25 J. INDUS. ECON. 101 (1976); see also DANIEL HAMBERG, R&D: ESSAYS 
ON THE ECONOMICS OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 64-65 (1966) (finding a positive correlation 
between industry concentration and research and development spending but calling it weak). 
 426 See, e.g., BARRY BOZEMAN & ALBERT N. LINK, INVESTMENTS IN TECHNOLOGY 53 
(1983); Zoltan J. Acs & David B. Audretsch, Innovation in Large and Small Firms: An Empirical 
Analysis, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 678, 686-87 (1988); Arun K. Mukhopadhyay, Technological Progress 
and Change in Market Concentration in the U.S., 1963-77, 52 S. ECON. J. 141 (1985); Oliver E. 
Williamson, Innovation and Market Structure, 73 J. POL. ECON. 67 (1965). 
 427 See, e.g., F.M. Scherer, Market Structure and the Employment of Scientists and 
Engineers, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 524 (1967); John D. Culbertson, Should Antitrust Use the 
Schumpeterian Model?: The Case of the Food Industries, in ISSUES AFTER A CENTURY OF FEDERAL 
COMPETITION POLICY 103, 106-07 (Robert L. Wills et al., eds., 1987); Richard C. Levin et al., R&D 
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that understanding the relationship requires the study of variables.428 In 
particular, many studies have focused on the level of “technological 
opportunity” available to a particular industry,429 with some studies finding 
concentration to be particularly conducive to innovation when 
technological opportunity is high430 and other studies finding the 
contrary.431 Given this confusing welter of information, it comes as no 
surprise that surveys of this literature have tended to describe it as 
“inconclusive”432 and exhibiting “little consensus.”433  
 Thus, as Professors Lemley and Lessig acknowledge,434 there appears 
to be little empirical basis for believing that, as a general matter, higher 
levels of innovation are associated with lower levels of market 
concentration. In the end, their argument turns on their own observations 
on the relationship between open architecture and innovation with respect 
to the Internet and their belief that past performance has been sufficiently 
                                                                                                                         
Appropriability, Opportunity, and Market Structure: New Evidence on Some Schumpeterian 
Hypotheses, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 20 (1985); John T. Scott, Firm Versus Industry Variability in R&D 
Intensity, in R&D, PATENTS AND PRODUCTIVITY 233 (Zvi Griliches ed., 1984); B. Wahlroos & M. 
Backström, R&D Intensity with Endogenous Concentration, Evidence for Finland, 7 EMPIRICAL ECON. 
13 (1982); Thomas Monroe Kelly, The Influences of Firm Size and Market Structure on the Research 
Efforts of Large Multiple-Product Firms 85-86 (1970) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Oklahoma 
State University) (on file with author). 
 428 Reinhard Angelmar, Market Structure and Research Intensity in High-Technological-
Opportunity Industries, 34 J. INDUS. ECON. 69 (1985); William S. Comanor, Market Structure, 
Product Differentiation, and Industrial Research, 81 Q.J. ECON. 639 (1967); J. Lunn & S. Martin, 
Market Structure, Firm Structure, and Research and Development, 27 Q. REV. ECON. & BUS. 31 
(1986); Dennis C. Mueller & John E. Tilton, Research and Development Costs as a Barrier to Entry, 2 
CANADIAN J. ECON. 570 (1969); Ronald E. Shrieves, Market Structure and Innovation: A New 
Perspective, 26 J. INDUS. ECON. 329 (1978); Robert W. Wilson, The Effect of Technological 
Environment and Product Rivalry on R&D Effort and Licensing of Inventions, 59 REV. ECON. & STAT. 
171 (1977). 
 429 See KAMIEN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 424, at 91 (“There is agreement that the relation 
[between research efforts and concentration] may vary with the ‘technological opportunity class’ of the 
industry.”). For useful surveys of this literature, see Cohen & Levin, supra note 424, at 1083-90; 
KAMIEN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 424, at 58-64, 88-90; SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 72, at 646-49; 
STONEMAN, supra note 424, at 47-49. 
 430 Kelly, supra note 427; Almarin Phillips, Patents, Potential Competition, and Technical 
Progress, 56 AM. ECON. REV. 301 (1966); F.M. Scherer, Firm Size, Market Structure, Opportunity and 
the Output of Patented Inventions, 55 AM. ECON. REV. 1097 (1965); Scott, supra note 427. 
 431 F.M. SCHERER, INNOVATION AND GROWTH: SCHUMPETERIAN PERSPECTIVES 24-46 
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 432 Cohen & Levin, supra note 424, at 1061. 
 433 KAMIEN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 424, at 91. 
 434 Lemley & Lessig, supra note 16, at 961 (recognizing that whether competition or 
monopoly better fosters innovation “is not a question that can be answered a priori, but only by 
reference to actual cases”). 
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meritorious to justify erecting a presumption in favor of the status quo.435 
Lemley and Lessig may well be correct. Unfortunately, it is impossible to 
verify such a claim, since one cannot determine whether the world would 
have been more or less innovative had the Internet taken a different 
structure. Given that the imposition of open access is tantamount to a 
declaration that vertical integration in this industry is per se illegal, the 
unlikelihood of economic harm and the real possibility of efficiencies 
identified by conventional vertical integration theory would seem to make 
it more appropriate to place the burden of proof on those who would 
impose open access regulation. The ambiguities surrounding the 
relationship between market structure and innovation should lead us to 
require more than casual empiricism before enacting what would amount 
to a declaration of per se illegality. 
3. Network Externalities and Vertical Competition 
 Finally, in relying on the work of Timothy Bresnahan,436 Professors 
Lemley and Lessig implicitly base their argument in favor of preserving 
the Internet’s end-to-end architecture on a theory of network externalities. 
As I noted earlier, other open access advocates have advanced similar 
arguments.437 My principal concern about such arguments is that, all too 
often, the existence of network externalities is automatically associated 
with the phenomena of “tipping” and “lock in.” An examination of the 
economic literature reveals that reducing network externalities to the 
harms to innovation associated with these phenomena is far too simplistic 
and that a correct application of network economic principles yields a far 
more complex (and ambiguous) perspective.  
a. The Ambiguous Impact of Network Economic Effects on 
Innovation 
 As noted above, network economics are almost invariably cited for 
the fact that the presence of network externalities can harm innovation by 
causing an inferior technology to become locked in. A review of the 
leading articles on the subject reveals that such a perspective is far too 
simplistic. As Joseph Farrell and Garth Saloner have pointed out, a 
consumer’s decision to adopt a new technology actually gives rise to two 
distinct and countervailing externalities. When the value of a network 
                                                                                                                         
 435 Id. at 933, 961-62. 
 436 Id. at 942. In his other work, Lemley recognizes that the policy implications of network 
economics are quite ambiguous. See Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of 
Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 498-99, 591-601 (1998). 
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depends on the number of people using the network, any decision to adopt 
a new technology enhances the value of the new network to those who 
have already adopted it as well as to those who will adopt it in the 
future.438 Because the person adopting the new technology is thus unable 
to capture all of the benefits created by his or her adoption decision, 
individuals may refrain from adopting a new technology even when it 
would be socially beneficial for them to do so.439 The existence of such 
positive externalities (i.e., benefits that the person adopting the new 
technology is unable to capture) may make the market reluctant to adopt a 
new technology, even when doing so is in society’s best interest. This can 
cause markets to become “locked in” to obsolete technologies, a 
phenomenon that Farrell and Saloner refer to as “excess inertia.”440 
 At the same time, however, the adoption of a new technology also 
gives rise to a countervailing negative externality that may produce 
precisely the opposite effect. This is because any decision to adopt a new 
technology also lowers the value of the old technology by reducing the 
number of people using it. Individuals considering adopting a new 
technology thus do not fully internalize the costs created by their decision. 
This may make an individual willing to adopt a new technology even when 
the net costs to society exceed the net benefits, a situation variously called 
“excess momentum”441 or “insufficient friction.”442 It is thus theoretically 
possible that the presence of network economic effects may accelerate, 
rather than retard, the pace with which new technologies are adopted. The 
impact of network externalities on innovation thus depends upon which of 
these two externalities dominates. This is an empirical question that cannot 
be simply asserted. 
 In addition, the economic literature also identifies a number of other 
features relevant to the broadband transport industry that can mitigate, or 
even eliminate, whatever problems are caused by network externalities. 
For example, excess inertia can be overcome if the value of the new 
product introduction exceeds the value of maintaining standardization.443 
As Steven Kaplan and Mark Ramseyer succinctly put it, “an entrenched 
                                                                                                                         
 438 Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Installed Base and Compatibility: Innovation, Product 
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inefficient technology is potentially a twenty-dollar bill lying on the 
sidewalk.”444 A sufficiently large difference in value should be sufficient 
to overcome whatever inertia exists. Even in the absence of such 
differences in valuation, convertibility or interoperability may limit the 
inhibition of innovation.445 Thus, even if owners of proprietary networks 
optimize their systems in ways that favor their own applications, the 
problems stemming from network externalities may be ameliorated if the 
network owner preserves the ability to run the basic Internet protocols, 
notwithstanding the fact that the proprietary changes imposed by the 
system owner may cause those protocols to run less efficiently. 
 Most importantly for our purposes, explosive growth of the kind that 
the broadband transport industry is currently undergoing can render the 
network externalities largely irrelevant.446 As Stan Liebowitz and Stephen 
Margolis have observed, “If a market is growing rapidly, the number of 
users who have made commitments to any standard is small relative to the 
number of future users.”447 In such cases, the fact that a particular firm 
may currently dominate a market is of little consequence. People 
concerned about lock-in will focus on the size of the network that will 
exist in the future, not the size of the one that exists today. 
 It is thus far from clear whether the broadband transport industry is 
susceptible to becoming locked in to any technology at this point. But the 
questions will become more complex still. As the next subsection will 
demonstrate, even when problematic network externalities are present, it is 
far from clear that standardization and preventing firms from controlling 
large portions of the network are the best way to solve the problem. On the 
contrary, the economic literature suggests that such steps might exacerbate 
these problems further. 
b. Proprietary Networks as a Solution to Network 
Externalities 
 Even if a market is subject to network externalities, it is arguable that 
insisting on standardization will make the problem worse and not better. 
First, the existence of multiple standards can mitigate many of the 
                                                                                                                         
 444 Steven N. Kaplan & J. Mark Ramseyer, Those Japanese Firms with their Disdain for 
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problems caused by network economic effects. As Michael Katz and Carl 
Shapiro have noted:  
 
Customer heterogeneity and product differentiation tend to limit tipping 
and sustain multiple networks. If the rival systems have distinct 
features sought by certain customers, two or more systems may be able 
to survive by catering to consumers who care more about product 
attributes than network size. Here, market equilibrium with multiple 
incompatible products reflects the social value of variety.448  
 
 Even in the absence of such customer heterogeneity, permitting 
proprietary networks to develop may also solve the network externality 
problem in the way that economics traditionally solves externality and 
investment problems: by creating well-defined property rights in the 
resource. The benefit that a person connected to a network receives from 
other people’s adoption decision increases with the percentage of the 
network that the person controls. Allowing a single firm to control a 
significant portion of the network would thus allow the firm to internalize 
more of the benefits of the larger network and give it the incentive to make 
the investments needed to get the ball rolling.449 Indeed, a formal model 
proposed by Katz and Shapiro indicates that competition among 
proprietary networks is more likely to lead to the adoption of the socially 
optimal technology than is competition between non-proprietary networks 
or competition between a proprietary and a non-proprietary network.450 
Another of Katz and Shapiro’s models found that “the sponsor of a new 
technology earns greater profits than its entry contributes to social welfare. 
In other words, markets with network externalities in which new 
technologies are proprietary exhibit a bias towards new technologies.”451 
Thus, the suggestion that the existence of proprietary networks tends to 
retard innovation is far from unassailable. 
 The presence of firms that occupy a large proportion of a particular 
network may make that network less susceptible to becoming locked in to 
any particular technology. Large suppliers and customers of the network 
also suffer less from the problems caused by network externalities since 
                                                                                                                         
 448 Katz & Shapiro, supra note 400, at 106 (citing Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, 
Standardization and Variety, 20 ECON. LETTERS 71 (1986)); Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 445, at 
292 (“Where there are differences in preference regarding alternative standards, coexistence of 
standards is a likely outcome.”). 
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their sheer size allows them to be the primary beneficiaries of their own 
adoption decisions.452 As a result, “large buyers are natural candidates to 
be the network sponsor.”453 The existence of large players thus represents 
one way in which the problems of network externalities may be 
circumvented. Far from being a bane, such firms may be a blessing in 
disguise. 
c. The Ultimate Ambiguity of Vertical Competition 
 Finally, even assuming that the network externalities ultimately prove 
intractable and cause the market to become locked in to particular 
technologies, it is far from clear whether regulatory intervention would be 
appropriate. The most complete exposition of this approach appears in the 
work of Timothy Bresnahan, upon which Lemley and Lessig rely.454 
Bresnahan’s focus is on a market in which the presence of network 
externalities, strategic entry barriers, and cost asymmetries leads each 
horizontal layer of a chain of production to become dominated by a single 
firm. Once these firms achieve dominance over each horizontal layer of 
the market, the nature of competition changes. Unlike the standard 
industrial organization framework, under which multiple firms compete at 
each level, what emerges is a distinctly Schumpeterian (if not Kuhnian) 
form of competition,455 characterized by “long eras of stable buyer-seller 
relationships,” during which players focus on making incremental 
improvements to the existing platforms, “punctuated by epochs of radical 
change” resulting from major leaps forward in technology.456  
Under this theory, Bresnahan regards many of the features that 
trouble other commentators as nothing more than the result of market 
equilibrium. For example, the existence of dominant firms is inevitable 
rather than problematic. As Bresnahan notes, “there will be a client-side 
dominant firm (whether its name is Microsoft or not).”457 In addition, 
competition in such a market is likely to be characterized by what 
Bresnahan calls “divided technical leadership,” in which firms with similar 
technical and marketing capabilities attempt to seize control over key 
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 455 THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF A SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION (1962); SCHUMPETER, 
supra note 416, at 83-85. 
 456 Bresnahan, supra note 396, at 161; see also id. at 169 (“It is not easy to spring customers 
loose from the network effects of the incumbent’s standard, not even for an entrant from an adjacent 
layer. The most common trigger for an outbreak of epochal vertical competition is a major 
technological dislocation.”). 
 457 Id. at 194. 
 Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the New Economy 
283 
platform elements.458 Since the different platform elements act as 
complements, each firm depends, in the short run, on the cooperation of 
other firms in keeping prices from any one layer from being too high and 
in making sure that the components remain compatible.459 In the long run, 
however, the companies vie to capture the rents generated by other layers 
primarily by channeling their energy into inventing new platform 
components.460 Over time, firms can be expected to push constantly at the 
boundaries between the layers, either by attempting to expand into 
additional technologies or by advancing their own technology in ways that 
affect the interfaces between layers.461 Thus, although the emergence of 
proprietary standards and the move to integrate into adjacent markets may 
well represent an attempt to monopolize a market in an anti-competitive 
manner, they may also be nothing more than the logical outgrowth of 
vertical competition. The problem is that it can be very hard to distinguish 
the two.462 
 It is not at all clear that this model fits the cable modem industry. At 
present, no firm controls more than sixteen percent of the high-speed 
broadband market. The current level of competition from DSL and the 
regulatory constraints limiting the ability of cable operators to increase 
their geographic footprint make it unlikely that any cable modem operator 
will be able to achieve dominance in the future.463 
 Even if the theory does apply, it is far from clear what policy makers 
should do about it. Kevin Werbach somewhat conclusorily asserts that the 
proper solution is to impose open access and other regulations that help 
insure that the interfaces between the various layers remain open.464 In 
contrast, Bresnahan is more circumspect about the possible benefits 
flowing from open access. His analysis suggests only two policy goals. 
First, policy makers could attempt to encourage dominant firms operating 
within an “era” to become more innovative. Bresnahan questions the 
wisdom of this goal since vertical competition already provides substantial 
incentives for dominant firms to innovate within eras and any failure to do 
so will have the pro-competitive consequence of hastening the arrival of 
                                                                                                                         
 458 Id. at 166. Bresnahan identifies several factors driving dominant firms to attempt to 
disadvantage other firms operating at a different level. Since the goods sold are typically 
complementary, each firm depends upon keeping firms at other levels from charging high prices, 
failing to innovate, and making their products incompatible. In addition, each firm has the incentive to 
attempt to capture rents generated by another layer. Id. 
 459 Id.  
 460 Id. 
 461 Id. at 168. 
 462 Id. at 172. 
 463 See Hazlett & Bittlingmayer, supra note 386, at 22-23; Lopatka & Page, supra note 21, at 
915. 
 464 See Werbach, supra note 306. 
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the next epoch.465 Indeed, regulatory intervention into the interfaces 
between the various layers might actually hurt competition by locking in 
the existing relationships in ways that decrease the level of vertical 
competition. 
 Second, policy makers could attempt to speed the arrival of the next 
wave of epochal competition by making it easier for competitors to 
dislodge the incumbent dominant firm. As a general matter, this would 
require the government to promote the emergence of a new technology 
platform.466 Bresnahan finds this second policy goal to be problematic for 
several reasons. Not only does it require users to abandon considerable 
investments that they have already made in the existing platforms, it also 
requires policy makers to forecast which new platform should be the 
winner and do so at an early stage in the technology’s development, when 
such judgments are hardest to make. Even worse, such a decision would 
likely be made on the basis of proprietary information supplied by the 
parties themselves.467 In addition, Bresnahan warns that policy making in 
this area tends to be influenced by certain biases that can lead to bad policy 
results.468 As a result, Bresnahan urges policy makers to refrain from 
intervening and instead to let the forces of the market determine the proper 
outcome.469 
 Thus, the very model upon which Professors Lemley and Lessig rely 
does not necessarily support the imposition of open access. Indeed, given 
the high-rates of growth currently associated with both cable modems and 
DSL providers, it appears that, for the time being, the broadband transport 
industry is in the throes of an epochal phase of competition, in which 
radical technological change is transforming the market. In such a 
situation, there seems little purpose for the government to attempt to speed 
the arrival of the next epoch. On the contrary, according to Bresnahan, the 
real danger arises from the possibility that the government would be thrust 
into the position of picking technological winners and losers. 
Unfortunately, the current state of asymmetrical regulation, in which DSL 
providers are subject to significantly greater regulatory burdens than cable 
modem providers, makes it increasingly likely that the government will 
assume this role. Confronted with these dangers, I would heed Bresnahan’s 
advice and allow the market to sort out the relative merits of these two 
technologies. I thus agree with Lemley and Lessig’s call for regulatory 
symmetry in the broadband industry.470 Where we differ is that Lemley 
                                                                                                                         
 465 Bresnahan, supra note 396, at 167-69, 198-99. 
 466 Id. at 199. 
 467 Id. at 200-01. 
 468 Id. at 202-03. 
 469 Id. at 200-03. 
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and Lessig would impose access requirements on both DSL and cable 
modems, whereas the symmetry I envision is one in which neither industry 
is subject to access regulation. 
IV. Obstacles to an Integrated Approach to Vertical Media Regulation 
 Many, if not most, of the economic principles I have described are far 
from new. Quite the contrary, many of the ideas on which I rely represent 
some of the most firmly established principles of competition policy. What 
then explains the failure to appreciate the relevance of the various 
economic principles? Three ideas come to mind. 
A. Misplaced Focus on Technological Differences Rather than 
Functional Similarities 
 The most salient mistake identified by the foregoing analysis is the 
tendency to treat each technology as if it were a universe unto itself. 
Failing to recognize the emergence of cable networks as competitors to the 
broadcast networks, DBS as a competitor to cable, and DSL as a 
competitor to cable modem service tends to exaggerate the dominance of 
the supposedly dominant technology. 
 The first problem stems from a misconception about the important 
role that the existence of substitutes can play in dissipating market power. 
Courts long exhibited a tendency to treat each technology as if it were a 
universe unto itself.471 For example, courts hearing tying cases have 
historically presumed that the exclusive right to use a technology granted 
by a patent necessarily gave rise to market power.472 This presumption 
only makes sense if each technology is regarded as occupying a separate 
market. Courts and commentators have become increasingly aware that 
exclusive control over a particular technology confers no monopoly power 
when substitutes for that technology exist.473 In such cases, any attempt to 
                                                                                                                         
 471 See generally HOVENKAMP, supra note 52, § 3.9d, at 141-42, § 10.3c, at 400-01. 
 472 See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16 (1984) (“[I]f the 
government has granted the seller a patent or similar monopoly over a product, it is fair to presume that 
the inability to buy the product elsewhere gives the seller market power.”); United States Steel Corp. v. 
Fortner Enters., 429 U.S. 610, 619 (1977) (“Thus, the statutory grant of a patent monopoly . . . 
represented tying product[s] that the Court regarded as sufficiently unique to give rise to a presumption 
of economic power.”); United States v. Loew’s Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45, 45 n.4 (1962) (“The requisite 
economic power is presumed when the tying product is patented . . . .”; “[W]hen the tying product is 
patented . . . sufficiency of economic power is presumed.”).  
 473 Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 37 n.7 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“A common 
misconception has been that a patent . . . suffice[s] to demonstrate market power. . . . [A] patent holder 
has no market power in any relevant sense if there are close substitutes for the patented products.”); N. 
Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 10 n.8 (1958) (“Of course it is common knowledge that a 
patent does not always confer a monopoly over a particular commodity.”); Abbott Labs. v. Brennan, 
952 F.2d 1346, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“A patent does not of itself establish a presumption of market 
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extract additional benefits will simply induce customers and suppliers to 
turn to the alternative technology instead.  
 Even if aware of this problem, policy makers at the FCC remain 
constrained by the technological approach embodied in the structure of the 
Communications Act of 1934 itself. As Kevin Werbach has pointed out, 
the Act divides the communications market horizontally, with each major 
technology being governed by a separate chapter in Title 47 of the U.S. 
Code and a separate bureau within the FCC.474 As a result, each regulatory 
decision is statutorily and bureaucratically programmed to address a single 
technology.475 This technological division could provide a satisfactory 
basis for policy making only so long as the various technologies did not 
act as substitutes for one another, since the FCC could focus on each 
medium in isolation and could craft solutions tailored to the particular type 
of communications conveyed, as well as to the economics underlying the 
means of transmission. For example, the regulatory model developed for 
telephony combined the natural monopoly economics of wire-based 
communications with the relatively uncomplicated free speech 
implications of person-to-person communications. The logical response 
was common carriage obligations combined with rate regulation. 
Conversely, with respect to broadcasting, the FCC attempted to craft a 
solution suited to the interference-related problems of spectrum-based 
communications, as well as the unique economic and First Amendment 
issues raised by mass media products, which tend to be differentiated and 
non-rivalrous and which tend to play a more important role in the political 
process. 
 The emergence of cable television began to cause this tidy division to 
unravel. Cable allowed mass media programming to reach consumers via 
the technology previously dedicated to personal communications. As a 
result, neither the telephony model nor the broadcast model could serve as 
an adequate basis for regulation. What followed was thirty years of               
. 
                                                                                                                         
power in the antitrust sense.”), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1205 (1992); POSNER, supra note 69, at 172 n.3 
(“A patent is actually a poor proxy for monopoly power . . . . (Some patents confer no monopoly 
power at all. . . .)”); Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 247, 249-50 (1994) (“[I]t became conventional to say that a patent is a monopoly. Nonetheless, 
it is readily apparent that the right to exclude another from ‘manufacture, use, and sale’ may give no 
significant market power . . . .”); Edmund W. Kitch, Patents: Monopolies or Property Rights?, 8 RES. 
L. & ECON. 31, 31 (1986) (“Since competitive forces which act upon a patent holder are readily 
identifiable, the patent holder cannot be assumed to have monopoly power.”). Consistent with this 
insight, Congress amended the patent statute in 1988 to make clear that patent tying applies only when 
the patents have been shown to confer monopoly power. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (1994). 
 474 For example, telephony is governed by Title II of the Communications Act and is 
regulated by the Common Carrier Bureau. Broadcasting is governed by Title III of the Act and is 
regulated by the Mass Media Bureau. Cable television is governed by Title VI of the Act and is 
regulated by the Cable Services Bureau. 
 475 Werbach, supra note 306, at 2. 
 Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the New Economy 
287 
Table X. 
 
  Type of Speech Conveyed 
  Personal 
Communications 
Mass 
Communications 
Wire-Based Telephony  Means of 
Transmission  Spectrum-Based  Broadcasting 
 
confusion, as both the FCC and the courts attempted first to fit cable into 
one of the existing regulatory boxes established by the Communications 
Act and then struggled with the limits imposed by the application of 
categories developed with another technology in mind.476 But the problems 
raised by cable were more profound than simply finding a new regulatory 
approach designed for the underlying characteristics of a new technology. 
For the first time, policy makers had to design a regulatory scheme that 
took into account not only the unique aspects of a new medium, but also 
the fact that the new medium could act as a substitute for another medium. 
Thus, the FCC could no longer treat each medium as a separate regulatory 
problem. Any solution would have to confront the more difficult problem 
of the interaction between two different media that each possessed 
different strengths.477  
 The results can perhaps most charitably be described as chaotic. 
Many of the FCC’s early attempts to regulate the relationship between the 
broadcast and cable industries were either struck down by the courts478 or 
abandoned.479 In the end, the major policy disputes were not resolved until 
                                                                                                                         
 476 At first, the FCC denied that cable fell into any of the conceptual categories established 
by the Communications Act. See Frontier Broad. Co., 24 F.C.C. 251 (1958) (Memorandum Opinion 
and Order). It soon reversed itself and asserted jurisdiction over cable on the basis of its authority to 
regulate the television industry. See Carter Mountain Transmission Corp., 32 F.C.C. 459, 464-65 
(1962) (Decision). The Supreme Court eventually upheld the FCC’s jurisdiction to act in United States 
v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968). Placing cable within the broadcast regulatory scheme 
only raised additional complications, however. The natural monopoly characteristics of cable led the 
FCC to attempt to mandate leased access. The Supreme Court overturned the FCC’s leased access 
requirement on the grounds that the title of the Communications Act governing broadcasting forbade 
the imposition of common carriage obligations. See FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 
(1979). 
 477 See Werbach, supra note 306, at 10. 
 478 Most significantly, the courts struck down the FCC’s earliest attempts to impose must 
carry requirements. See Century Communications Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. 
denied, 486 U.S. 1032 (1988); Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. 
denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986). Courts also struck down the FCC’s attempt to prohibit premium 
channels as well as the “anti-siphoning rules” designed to prevent movies and other programs that 
previously would have been shown on broadcast television from migrating to pay cable. See Home 
Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. ) (per curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).  
 479 For example, in 1974 the FCC repealed a regulation attempting to introduce parity 
between broadcasting and cable by requiring cable operators to originate local programming. See 
Amendment of Part 76, Subpart G, of the Comm’n’s Rules and Regulations Relative to Program 
Origination by Cable Television Syss.; and Inquiry into the Dev. of Cable Casting Services to 
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Congress enacted major cable legislation in 1984 and 1992 that established 
a separate title that largely prescribed the regulatory regime that would be 
applied.480 The enactment of those statutes did not end the confusion and 
the disputes over the proper scope of cable policy, however. Although the 
Acts largely resolved the major jurisdictional and substantive issues over 
cable regulation, they simply shifted the basis for dispute towards the First 
Amendment.481 
 The arrival of wireless telephony completed the collapse of this neat 
regulatory division. The identity between the means of transmission and 
the type of speech transmitted disappeared altogether, as both mass market 
and private speech could be conveyed through either means of 
transmission. 
 
Table XI. 
 
  Type of Speech Conveyed 
  Personal 
Communications 
Mass 
Communications 
Wire-Based Telephony Cable Means of 
Transmission  Spectrum-Based Wireless Broadcasting 
 
 Although the Telecommunications Act was trumpeted as a way to end 
the “balkanization” of communications technologies,482 it did little to 
dislodge the horizontal model of communications policy.483 It left the 
existing technologically-oriented structure of the Communications Act 
firmly in place. Even worse, it failed to take seriously the prospect that 
                                                                                                                         
Formulate Regulatory Policy and Rulemaking, 49 F.C.C.2d 1090 (1974) (Report and Order). In 
addition, the FCC later abolished rules in place since the mid-1960s that prevented most cable 
operators from importing broadcast signals from other cities. See Cable Television Syndicated 
Program Exclusivity Rules, 79 F.C.C.2d 663 (1980) (Report and Order) (repealing the prohibition on 
distant signal importation), aff’d sub nom. Malrite T.V. of N.Y. v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 454 U.S. 1143 (1982); Amendment of Subpart D of Part 76 of the Comm’n’s Rules and 
Regulations with Respect to Selection of Television Signals for Cable Television Carriage (Leapfrog 
Rules): §§ 76.59(b)(1) and (2), 76.61 (b)(1) and (2), and 76.63, 57 F.C.C.2d 625, 645 (1976) (Report 
and Order) (repealing the “anti-leapfrogging” rules that required those cable operators who were 
permitted to import distant signals do so only from adjacent cities).  
 480 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-
385, 106 Stat. 1460; Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779. 
 481 See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000); Turner 
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997); Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. 
FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994); Time Warner 
Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 644 (2001); Time Warner 
Entm’t Co. v. U.S., 211 F.3d 1313 (D.C. Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1183 (2001); Time Warner 
Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 56 F.3d 151 (D.C. 
Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1112 (1996). 
 482 See Krattenmaker, supra note 200, at 130, 156 (1996). 
 483 Werbach, supra note 306, at 3. 
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competition could arise from the same type of speech transmitted via 
different technology.484 Although the recent reorganization of the FCC 
along more functional lines is a welcome innovation, it does nothing to 
change the balkanized structure of the underlying substantive mandates 
that the FCC is charged with enforcing. 
 These problems are starting to plague the Internet as well.485 For 
example, the proper categorization of cable modem service remains 
elusive. At first, commentators tended to believe that it should be 
classified as a cable service.486 A pair of recent judicial decisions has 
classified cable modems as a telecommunications service.487 A recent 
Supreme Court decision declined to resolve the issue.488 Hopefully, the 
FCC will resolve the issue in the near future. 
 The problem, moreover, is about to get much worse. The impending 
shift of all networks to packet-switched technologies promises to cause all 
of the distinctions based on the means of conveyance and the type of 
speech conveyed to collapse entirely. Once all communications are 
reduced to bits and bytes, they can be transmitted via any technology. 
Once this occurs, the distinctions drawn in the columns and the rows 
represented in Table XI will no longer remain coherent as a regulatory 
approach. Even more importantly, the shift to packet-switched, data-
oriented networks will cause all the different means of transmission to 
become substitutes for one another. The logical step is to adopt what 
Kevin Werbach has termed a “layered approach,”489 which discards the 
current policy of technological compartmentalization in favor of treating 
the retail, wholesale, and manufacturing segments of the industry. 
 At this point, however, the existing statutory approach remains firmly 
entrenched, and as the recent experience with financial services reform 
reveals, any attempt to revise it promises to be time-consuming and 
                                                                                                                         
 484 For example, when establishing the conditions under which a local telephone company 
faces sufficient competition to justify releasing it from its regulatory obligations, the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 in effect disregarded the possibility of competition from wireless 
telephony. See 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(1)(A) (Supp. III 1997) (“For the purpose of this subparagraph, 
services provided pursuant to subpart K of part 22 of the Commission’s regulations (47 C.F.R. 22.901 
et seq.) shall not be considered to be telephone exchange services.”). The problems with this approach 
are readily apparent in an era during which many cellular providers are encouraging customers to 
terminate their landline service and to regard their wireless phones as the only phone they will ever 
need. 
 485 For an excellent review and analysis of these issues, see Chen, supra note 13. 
 486 Shelanski, supra note 25, at 740-41; Speta, Handicapping, supra note 21, at 71-75; Shih, 
supra note 390, at 801. 
 487 AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 878 (9th Cir. 2000); MediaOne Group, 
Inc. v. County of Henrico, 257 F.3d 356, 364-65 (4th Cir. 2001).  
 488 Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Gulf Power Co., 122 S. Ct. 782, 788 (2002). The 
lower court had held that cable modem services were neither cable services nor telecommunications 
services. See Gulf Power Co. v. FCC, 208 F.3d 1263, 1276 (11th Cir. 2000), rev’d on other grounds 
sub nom. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Gulf Power Co., 122 S. Ct. 782 (2002). 
 489 Werbach, supra note 306, at 9-13. 
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heavily politicized. We thus appear to be stuck with the statutory structure 
we now have, and the regulatory and institutional framework resulting 
from that structure makes any revolutionary shifts in approach all but 
impossible. So long as the underlying statutory framework remains in 
place, there remains a danger that the FCC will continue to analyze 
markets on a technology-by-technology basis without taking into account 
the extent to which services serve as substitutes for one another.490 
B. Lack of a Comprehensive Approach to the Economics of Vertical 
Integration 
 Another key explanation is that policy makers and commentators are 
all too often incompletely versed in the basic economic insights of the past 
few decades of scholarship on vertical integration. The dangers of vertical 
integration seem quite intuitive: It seems obvious that a merger between 
the nation’s largest ISP and its second largest cable operator would 
threaten competition. In fact, the Supreme Court accepted both leveraging 
and foreclosure as rationales for decades. Furthermore, there is a 
tremendous temptation to look at the real problems facing the competitors 
who are being shut out and forget that antitrust laws exist to benefit 
competition, not competitors. What the last half-century of economic 
theory has demonstrated is that, while vertical integration can harm 
competition, circumstances also exist in which vertical integration can 
promote efficiency.  
 In addition, antitrust and regulated industries law has done a relatively 
poor job of developing a sophisticated understanding of vertical 
integration. Both antitrust and regulatory policy are largely geared towards 
static efficiency concerns of price and quantity and consumer choice in the 
here and now. They seem badly designed to take into account dynamic 
efficiency considerations, such as the effect that compelled access has on 
incentives to invest and innovate. In addition, the law has tended not to 
give potential transaction cost efficiencies proper consideration. A review 
of the leading communications law and antitrust textbooks reveals that 
discussions of transaction cost considerations tend to be limited to brief 
descriptions of the possibility of free riding on pre-sale services.491 The 
                                                                                                                         
 490 See Shelanski, supra note 25, at 741 (noting that the need to place DSL and cable 
modems in particular regulatory boxes may lead the FCC to ignore any rivalry that may exist between 
those services). 
 491 For the discussions appearing in the leading communications law textbooks, see STUART 
MINOR BENJAMIN, DOUGLAS GARY LICHTMAN, & HOWARD A. SHELANSKI, TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
LAW AND POLICY 293, 301 (2001); and MICHAEL BOTEIN, REGULATION OF THE ELECTRONIC MASS 
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economic literature on vertical integration does not fare much better. In 
fact, the formal models of vertical integration routinely fail to take 
efficiencies into account.492 
 Finally, a proper understanding of vertical integration depends as 
much on the interaction between the various economic principles as it does 
on the principles themselves. Viewed in this manner, the nature of the 
disagreement between Professors Lemley and Lessig and Professor Speta 
over the dangers of monopoly leveraging begins to make sense. Professors 
Lemley and Lessig argue that Professor Speta’s critique of leveraging 
suffers from a large prediction problem since cable modem providers are 
clearly engaging in vertical integration.493 It is true that, if viewed in 
isolation, the critique of leveraging would suggest that vertical integration 
would never occur. The conclusion changes dramatically when all of 
vertical integration theory is viewed as an integrated whole, since the 
existence of welfare-enhancing efficiencies provides a strong explanation 
of why vertical integration might be economically beneficial. Thus 
reconstructed, the argument is not that the critique of leveraging 
demonstrates that vertical integration is never profitable and thus never 
undertaken. A more comprehensive view of the vertical integration 
literature reveals that it is highly unlikely that vertical integration in the 
markets considered by this Article is being driven by anti-competitive 
motives. The fact that vertical integration is in fact occurring tends instead 
to suggest the existence of efficiencies from vertical integration. Thus, the 
supposed prediction problem that Professors Lemley and Lessig have 
identified simply disappears. 
C. Misconceived Analogies to Previous Legacy Monopolies 
 Lastly, there is also a temptation for policy makers and commentators 
to draw inspiration from old regulatory patterns and models. The FCC’s 
long history with rate regulation and common carriage obligations in both 
telephony and cable television, along with its perceived mandate to open 
                                                                                                                         
REGULATION 582-84 (4th ed. 1997); THOMAS D. MORGAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MODERN 
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markets,494 appear to lead to the imposition of compelled access on non-
discriminatory terms. It is all too easy to see a lot of Ma Bell in the modern 
incarnation of Ma Cable.495  
 The comparison to AT&T, however, is inapt. As noted earlier, 
compelled access makes sense only if the industry being regulated is truly 
a natural monopoly that has already entered its mature stage in which the 
technology has already been largely deployed and incremental revenue and 
customer growth is relatively slow. Regulatory solutions are easier to 
manage, in that regulators can predict the future with greater confidence. 
Investment incentives also play a lesser role. Such an approach, however, 
has little applicability to industries like high-speed broadband, which are 
undergoing explosive growth and technological change. In such industries, 
firms do not compete over switching over a fixed number of existing 
customers. Instead, firms engage in vigorous competition to capture new 
customers. In addition, investment incentives play a more central role in 
regulatory policy when a growing industry is involved, and regulators 
confront the nearly intractable task of having to predict which technologies 
are likely to emerge as superior. As a result, policy makers should think 
long and hard before extending regulatory solutions developed for mature 
markets to an industry that is growing rapidly at a time when the growing 
competition among communications channels that had previously been 
separate is beginning to erode the natural monopoly characteristics of all 
media. 
 Not only are there dramatic differences in the industries being 
regulated; there are also drastic differences in the size and scope of the two 
organizations being compared. There can be little question that AT&T was 
able to use its absolute control over particular vertical levels of 
competition to squelch competition in other levels.496 There is a key 
difference between the two situations, however. Unlike the old AT&T, 
which controlled the entire national market for long distance, local service, 
and telephone equipment, the current players in the telecommunications 
markets control only a limited portion of the national market. In fact, the 
largest MSO controls only seventeen percent of the national market for 
MVPDs and sixteen percent of the broadband transport market; the second 
                                                                                                                         
 494 See Shelanski, supra note 25, at 739. 
 495 See Lemley & Lessig, supra note 16, at 936-38. The specter of Ma Cable was largely 
dissipated by AT&T’s recent announcement that it was selling its cable properties to Comcast. See 
Solomon & Frank, supra note 229.  
 496 For example, from 1900 to 1930, AT&T was able to use the market power provided by 
its long distance patents to quash the emergence of competitive providers of local telephone service. 
See Roger G. Noll & Bruce M. Owen, The Anticompetitive Uses of Regulation: United States v. 
AT&T, in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION 290, 292-93 (John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White eds., 
1989). Later on, it was able to use its monopoly control over the nation’s local telephone service to 
stifle the arrival of competition in the long distance markets. Id. at 302-06.  
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largest controls only fifteen percent of both of those markets. As the D.C. 
Circuit recently held, given that the FCC has concluded that a new cable 
network need only reach twenty percent of the market to achieve minimum 
viable scale, the argument that either of these companies was in a position 
to unilaterally harm competition in the market for television networks is 
simply not credible.497  
 In addition, it is far from clear that the FCC’s previous efforts to 
dislodge legacy monopolies should properly be viewed as success models. 
Although there are clearly some examples in which the FCC served to 
promote competition in telephone service,498 other commentators have 
been struck by the extent to which AT&T was able to use the regulatory 
process to thwart competition.499 Indeed, both Chicago500 and Post-
Chicago theorists501 agree that regulation can be a way to impose cost 
disadvantages on rivals and to create barriers to entry. These insights have 
been confirmed by a vibrant empirical literature identifying a wide variety 
of cases in which various forms of regulation were used precisely in this 
manner.502 
 A review of the history of mass media regulation reveals a long 
legacy of policies that frustrated the emergence of competition. With 
respect to broadcasting, even though policy makers had long regarded 
network dominance as one of the central problems plaguing the broadcast 
industry, subsequent analyses have shown that the maintenance of that 
dominance was almost entirely the result of regulatory policy. Indeed, the 
FCC had rejected a number of policy alternatives that would have allowed 
more networks to emerge.503 Even worse, those measures adopted to 
combat network dominance had the perverse effect of entrenching the 
                                                                                                                         
 497 Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1130-39 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 122 
S. Ct. 644 (2001).  
 498 See, e.g., Use of the Carterfone Device, 13 F.C.C.2d 420, 424 (1968) (Decision). 
 499 E.g., Noll & Owen, supra note 496; Kearney & Merrill, supra note 22, at 1367. 
 500 See BORK, supra note 70, at 159, 347-64; Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition 
Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371 (1983); Sam Peltzman, Toward a 
More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976); Richard Posner, Taxation by 
Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 22 (1971); Richard Posner, Theories of Regulation, 5 BELL 
J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335 (1974); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. 
ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971). 
 501 See Hovenkamp, After Chicago, supra note 128, at 276-77, 279; Salop & Scheffman, 
supra note 131, at 268, 268-69; Williamson, supra note 118, at 293. 
 502 See Robert E. McCormick, The Strategic Use of Regulation: A Review of the Literature, 
in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION 13, 18-25 (1984) (providing an excellent review of the 
early literature).  
 503 The central problem was the FCC’s decision to allocate only three television stations to 
most markets. This decision all but foreordained that only three broadcast networks would develop. 
See NEW TELEVISION NETWORKS, supra note 28, at 67-81, 488-9; MISREGULATING TELEVISION, supra 
note 32, at 12-16; Henry Geller, A Modest Proposal for Modest Reform of the Federal 
Communications Commission, 63 GEO. L.J. 705, 707-18 (1975); Thomas L. Schuessler, Structural 
Barriers to the Entry of Additional Television Networks: The Federal Communications Commission’s 
Spectrum Management Policies, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 875 (1981).  
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existing broadcast networks, since steps taken to limit the profitability of 
network operations also served to make entry of new networks more 
difficult.504  
 The history of cable regulation is just as troubling. Even though cable 
television represented an obvious way to introduce greater competition in 
television programming, the FCC’s initial response was to attempt to 
suppress its growth.505 Once cable became established, the central policy 
problem became cable’s supposed position as a natural monopoly. As a 
result, one might have expected policy makers to embrace DBS when it 
began to emerge as an alternative to cable. Instead, policy makers 
established a regime that protected both broadcasting and cable from the 
emergence of this new rival by making it all but impossible for DBS to 
carry programming from the major broadcast networks in most areas.506 
Even though Congress took a range of fairly drastic steps to curb the 
monopoly that cable television held over local markets,507 it did not revisit 
this fundamental decision to deny DBS the ability to carry local broadcast 
programming for more than a decade.508 Thus, despite the fact that the 
central policy dilemma posed by cable was its tendency towards local 
monopoly, policy makers consistently adopted policies that failed to 
encourage the development of alternative video technologies. 
 Even the mere threat of access regulation can stifle the emergence of 
competition in an emerging industry characterized by large, up-front 
investments. Regulators have incentives to attempt to force firms to price 
at marginal cost after the initial fixed costs have been sunk that are quite 
similar to the incentives faced by private firms. While firms can use 
vertical integration or vertical contractual restraints to manage the 
possibility of such opportunistic behavior by business partners, the 
impossibility of merging with the government and the near-impossibility 
of estopping the government from imposing access regulation render the 
                                                                                                                         
 504 See NEW TELEVISION NETWORKS, supra note 28, at 521-22; Chen, supra note 21, at 
1454-56. 
 505 See, e.g., Stanley M. Besen, The Economics of the Cable Television “Consensus”, 17 J.L. 
& ECON. 39 (1974); Rolla Edward Park, The Growth of Cable TV and Its Probable Impact on Over-
the-Air Broadcasting, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 69 (Papers & Proc. 1971). As FCC Chairman Dean Burch 
candidly admitted, the FCC had interpreted its public interest mandate to include “the short-term 
protectionism for over-the-air broadcasting” against incursions by cable television. See Besen, supra, 
at 41.  
 506 See 17 U.S.C. § 119(a)(2)(B) (1994) (limiting the compulsory copyright license for 
satellite broadcasters’ retransmission of broadcast programming to areas not already served by local 
broadcasters). In so doing, Congress explicitly acknowledged that the primary purpose of this 
restriction was to protect local broadcasters. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-887, pt.1, at 8 (1988), reprinted in 
1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5617 (recognizing that the original Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1988 was 
intended to protect the existing “network/affiliate distribution system”).  
 507 See, e.g., Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. 
No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460. 
 508 See supra note 224 and accompanying text. 
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risk of regulatory opportunism essentially intractable.509 The inability to 
render these risks more manageable will deter firms from making such 
fixed cost investments in the first instance. 
 Policy makers would thus do well to follow the advice of a recent 
study published by a staff member of the FCC’s Office of Plans and 
Policy. This study cautioned against knee-jerk extension of the regimes 
devised to regulate the existing legacy monopolies to new technologies, 
such as high-speed broadband. On the contrary, the study concluded that 
the better policy response would be to deregulate the existing legacy 
monopolies as technologies converge.510 
Conclusion 
 The history of vertical integration policy has been dominated by a 
search for simple policy inferences. The Harvard School’s initial advocacy 
of what amounted to per se illegality gave rise to the Chicago School’s call 
for a rule of reason approach to vertical integration. The Chicago School’s 
eventual rejection of the rule of reason in favor of per se legality, in turn, 
spawned the post-Chicago reaction demonstrating that vertical integration 
can under some circumstances have anti-competitive effects. There can be 
no question that post-Chicago scholarship is greatly enhancing our 
understanding of the economics of vertical integration and is likely to 
make additional contributions in the future. 
 The problem is that many advocates are all too tempted to try to turn 
the post-Chicago literature into a basis for returning to a world in which 
vertical integration is once again regarded as per se illegal. As is the case 
with most economic problems, the economics of vertical integration are 
not susceptible to the type of simple policy inferences needed to support 
broad generalizations. Instead, the economic literature suggests that 
whether a particular instance of vertical integration harms competition is 
likely to depend on a fairly refined set of factual predicates. As such, the 
problems of vertical integration appear to be poorly suited to the type of 
per se resolution associated with the categorical approach inevitably 
associated with regulatory enactments. This is not to say that vertical 
regulation should be immune from governmental scrutiny. This position 
simply acknowledges that, to the extent that anti-competitive dangers 
exist, they are better addressed in a forum, such as an antitrust court, that 
can evaluate each situation on the basis of its individual facts. 
                                                                                                                         
 509 See J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulation and Managed Competition in 
Network Industries, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 117, 122-25 (1998); see also Goldberg, supra note 114, at 
432-36 (noting that market participants seek some assurance regarding the long-term availability of the 
market before investing). 
 510 OXMAN, supra note 7, at 24-25. 
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 Moreover, noting that the anti-competitive impact of vertical 
integration turns on the facts of specific cases does not mean that we 
cannot draw some generalizations about the circumstances under which 
such anti-competitive impacts are most likely to occur. As I have described 
above, there is a broad economic consensus that spans both the Chicago 
School and post-Chicago literature confirming the notion that vertical 
integration is unlikely to harm static efficiency unless certain structural 
preconditions are met. Specifically, vertical integration raises few anti-
competitive concerns absent concentration and barriers to entry in the 
relevant markets. In addition, both approaches acknowledge that efficiency 
considerations might justify vertical integration even when these structural 
preconditions have been met. An application of this analytical framework 
to the broadcast television, cable television, and cable modem industries 
reveals that vertical integration in these industries is too unlikely to harm 
competition to justify broad regulatory prohibition. 
 Analyzing these markets in terms of dynamic efficiency only serves 
to reinforce this core conclusion. Regulatory restrictions on vertical 
integration harm dynamic efficiency by rescuing competitors from having 
to invest in developing alternative sources of supply that would ultimately 
break whatever monopoly bottleneck power that represents the true source 
of the anti-competitive harms. In addition, prohibitions on vertical 
integration can deter new entry in another way. By preventing firms from 
realizing available efficiencies, such regulations reduce the profitability of 
all operations. As commentators have noted, the fact that such a burden 
will weigh especially heavily on new entrants may lead such regulation to 
have the perverse effect of deterring entry, thereby entrenching whatever 
market power already possessed by incumbent firms. 
 Dynamic efficiency, of course, depends on innovation as well as 
investment incentives, and one can easily identify approaches that suggest 
that large integrated enterprises and considerations such as network 
economics can prevent the market from achieving an efficient level of 
innovation. A close review of the full range of the economic literature on 
innovation reveals a much more ambiguous story. Although some studies 
suggest that standardization, concentration, and network externalities can 
reduce innovation below welfare maximizing levels, other studies 
conclude that those same factors may play essential roles in ensuring that 
an appropriate amount of innovation does in fact occur. Thus, in the end, it 
appears that innovation-related theories do not provide a clear basis for 
adopting a skeptical stance towards vertical integration. The fact remains 
that, notwithstanding the many arguments to the contrary, vertical 
integration is not sufficiently likely to threaten competition as to justify 
imposing a categorical, regulatory prohibition of the practice. Such a result 
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would be tantamount to return to the world of per se illegality that typified 
the now discredited economic thinking of the 1950s and 1960s.  
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Appendix A. Broadcast and Cable Networks Ratings as of March 2001 
 
Company/Network Rating  Company/Network Rating  
    
Viacom  AOL Time Warner  
CBS  8.6 WB  2.6 
UPN  2.5 TBS Superstation  1.9 
Nickelodeon  1.6 TNT  1.6 
TNN  1.1 Cartoon Network  0.8 
MTV   0.9 CNN  0.7 
TV Land  0.7 WGN1  0.6 
Comedy Central2  0.7 Total  8.2 
VH1  0.5   
Total  16.6 Liberty Media   
  Discovery Channel6  1.3 
Walt Disney Co.  TLC6  1.0 
ABC  8.7 Court TV  0.6 
Lifetime3  2.0 Travel Channel  0.5 
Disney Channel  1.5 Game Show Network  0.5 
A&E4  1.4 Animal Planet6  0.5 
History Channel4  0.9 Odyssey Channel  0.4 
ESPN  0.9 Total  4.8 
Toon Disney  0.5   
ESPN2  0.4 USA Networks8  
Total  16.3 USA Network  1.9 
  Sci-Fi Channel  0.8 
News Corp.  Total  2.7 
Fox  6.3   
Fox News Channel  0.9 Cablevision Systems  
FX  0.8 AMC  0.7 
Fox Family Channel  0.7 Bravo  0.4 
BET5  0.6 Total  1.1 
TV Guide Channel  0.6   
Total  9.9 E.W. Scripps Co.  
  HGTV  0.7 
General Electric   Food Network  0.4 
NBC  8.1 Total  1.1 
PaxTV7  0.9  
MSNBC  0.4 Landmark Communications  
CNBC  0.4 Weather Channel  0.3 
Total  9.8   
 
1 WGN is owned by the Tribune Company, which in turn owns a 25% stake in WB. Although 
WGN is a WB affiliate, it does not transmit WB programming outside the Chicago area. 
2 Comedy Central is a joint venture between Viacom and HBO/AOL Time Warner and is 
allocated to the company with the largest holdings (Viacom). 
3 Lifetime is a joint venture between ABC/Walt Disney (50%) and the Hearst Corp. (50%) and is 
allocated to the company with the largest holdings (Walt Disney). 
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4 A&E and the History Channel are joint ventures of ABC/Walt Disney (37.5%), the Hearst Corp. 
(37.5%), and NBC/General Electric (25%), and are allocated to the company with the largest holdings 
(Walt Disney). 
5 BET is a joint venture of BET Holdings, Microsoft Corporation, News Corp., USA Networks, 
and Liberty Digital and is allocated to the company with the largest holdings (News Corp.). 
6 Discovery Communications, which operates the Discovery Channel, TLC, and Animal Planet, is 
a privately held company owned by Liberty Media Corp. (49%), Cox Communications, 
Advance/Newhouse, and founder John S. Hendricks. It is allocated to the company with the largest 
holdings (Liberty Media Corp.). 
7 NBC owns 32.5% of PaxTV.  
8 USA Networks, Inc., is a corporation owned by Liberty Media Corp. (20%), Universal (9%), 
and the public (71%). Because of the large percentage of public holdings, it is presumed to set price 
independently. 
 
Ratings for cable networks are taken from Basic-Cable Prime-Time 
Ratings, BRANDWEEK, June 11, 2001, at SR20, and represent prime-time 
ratings for the top forty cable networks for the first quarter of 2001. 
Notably, this data does not include data for premium movie or home 
shopping channels.  
 Ratings for the broadcast networks are taken from Broadcast Watch, 
BROADCASTING & CABLE, Apr. 2, 2001, at 25, and represent season-to-
date prime time ratings as of Mar. 25, 2001. Although the time periods are 
not directly comparable and prime time ratings may not be representative 
of viewership during other times of day, these numbers should provide an 
adequate basis for making a rough estimate of market concentration.  
 Ownership information is taken from WATERMAN & WEISS, supra 
note 21, at 24-32, and was verified by visiting the networks’ websites. In 
the absence of a clear majority owner, I attempted to make the most 
conservative assumption in terms of calculating HHIs by allocating the 
ratings to the player with the largest rating share. 
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Appendix B. Revenue of Twenty-Five Largest  
Television Networks, Projected 2000 Revenue 
 
Company/Network 
Revenue 
($ billion)  Company/Network 
Revenue 
($ billion)  
    
Walt Disney Co.  Liberty Media  
ABC 4.4 QVC 3.3 
ESPN 2.1 Discovery Channel 0.6 
Disney Channel 0.6 Starz! 0.4 
Lifetime 0.5 TLC 0.4 
A&E 0.5 Total 4.7 
Total 8.1   
  News Corp.  
Viacom  Fox 1.8 
CBS 3.5 Fox Sports Net 0.6 
Nickelodeon 1.0 Total 2.4 
Showtime 0.9   
MTV  0.7 USA Networks  
Total 6.1 HSN 1.5 
  USA Network 0.8 
General Electric   Total 2.3 
NBC 4.7   
CNBC 0.5 Univision 0.5 
Total 5.2   
    
AOL Time Warner     
HBO 1.7   
TNT 1.2   
TBS Superstation 0.8   
CNN 0.8   
Cinemax 0.4   
Total 4.9   
 
 Dollar revenue estimates are taken from 25 Top Television Networks, 
BROADCASTING & CABLE, Nov. 27, 2000, at 54. They represent only the 
top twenty-five networks and include all revenue. Ownership attribution 
follows the approach taken in Appendix A. 
 
